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Tunisia

(See page 167.)

The Middle East *Journal*

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THE SOCIAL SUPPORT OF CURRENT IRANIAN POLICY

T. Cuyler Young

THE ENDURING QUALITY of the present Iranian Government led by Dr. Mohammad Mosaddeq has surprised many people, even some comparatively close observers of the Iranian scene. In many countries of Europe and the Middle East a year is not much for the life of a Government, but in France and Iran, where politics, for all the differences of West and East, have surprisingly much in common, this is relatively a long time; and in Iran there is reason to believe that it may be extended — if not under the leadership of the present Prime Minister, then under the guidance of one who will likely follow much the same policies.

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For this situation and prospect there is a complex of causes, part of which concerns the personality of the Prime Minister and the people he so astutely leads, but most of which involves the changing nature of the society which forms the matrix of both these individual and corporate personalities. It is with an analysis of this significant social support of current Iranian nationalism and its policies that we are presently concerned.

I

For long centuries, if not for millennia, Middle East society has been traditionally dichotomous, consisting of a broad base of the folk, largely peasant or tribal, who constitute the productive masses upon whose steady labor and docile obedience rests the second group, the comparatively small but powerful elite which rules and reigns, enjoying the risks and gains of political responsibility and economic privilege. This latter group, the apex of the pyramid, is diversely formed: chiefly of men of the scepter, of the sword, of the pen, of the law — the court and high office, the army and police, the bureaucracy and civil service, the clergy and judiciary. This is the literate aristocracy, few in number compared to the rest of the population, whose own inner privileged few, generally intermarried and ingrown, owns the land — the paramount means of production.

It should be noted, however, that this has been essentially an "open" society, not closed in rigid caste levels, one in which it was possible by a combination of energy, ability, and good fortune to break out of the ranks of the "hewers of wood and drawers of water" into the upper echelons marked generally by literacy, although by no means always by superior intelligence or education. Yet for all this, as well as other redeeming values within it, this society is by tradition aristocratically organized and ruled. Paradoxically, however, despite its aristocratic organization and direction, this society has been characterized by a remarkably democratic spirit — in the literal meaning of that phrase, devoid of any Western connotation and configuration of political and economic democracy. This democratic attitude of man toward man within Islamic society is unfortunately too general and theoretical ever to have been embodied in stable social institutions

adequate for its expression and enhancement; but its existence, however inchoate, is important for fruitful intercourse and interaction with Western civilization in this century.

The 20th century has seen rapid changes in this fundamental structure of Middle East society in general, and of Iranian society in particular. It is no longer accurate to speak of an aristocratically organized dichotomous society. In Iran there is now emerging a third social force — call it a middle class or bourgeoisie, if you please — which has definitely altered the balance of social power and specifically challenged the hegemony of the old traditional ruling class or group.

The causes of this social change and development have been many and diverse. Perhaps the most important are to be subsumed under the term Westernization, a process so involved and complex as to be beyond the scope of this discussion. Yet there are certain aspects of this paramount Asiatic phenomenon which we would do well to summarize by way of introduction to any analysis of the composition of the new dynamic social force in Iran.

Perhaps the most obvious influence that Westernization has brought to bear on social alignments has been the rapid spread of literacy and modern education. It might be said that the mark of a member of the upper or ruling class of the traditional Eastern society was his expectancy and determination to bring up his children literate. But today, the great expansion of the literate group has made it too extensive for its members to divide contentedly the privileges traditionally obtaining thereto, especially when the privileges centering in the ownership of the means of production have tended to become even more than heretofore monopolized by a few. This is resulting in a bourgeois challenge of the traditional system and a demand for a greater share in the nation's resources.

This emergent middle class, or third social force, however, is by no means limited to the expanding literate section of the population. Iran has not increased its literacy percentage sufficiently to account in this fashion for such social ferment and revolution as we observe, even assuming that such literacy and ferment are tied together nicely and tightly as cause and effect, which they are

not. Modern education, with its mass communications such as radio and the theater, can enlighten and stir large illiterate groups into some realization of their status in society and of the possibility that perhaps it is not inevitable and unchangeable after all. This means that substantial illiterate sections of the society, the lives of whose members are bound up with middle class fortune and destiny, howbeit marginally, are to be reckoned seriously in this social realignment.

Of equal, perhaps in some respects of more importance as a contributory cause of this social realignment has been the inevitable drawing of Iran into the economic structure and interdependence of the modern world. By increasing travel abroad, especially in the West, by experience and observation of westerners and their varied activities in Iran, especially during the two World Wars, more and more individual Iranians realized the possibility of material benefits and higher living standards, and developed for all these a taste and desire as well as a determination to secure them. The discovery of oil in 1909 and its progressive exploitation, particularly after the concessionary revision of 1933, put new buying power in the hands of the government, especially in the foreign field. The expansion of trade — both foreign and domestic — and the extension of industrialization during the inter-war period of Reza Shah bound the country more closely to the international economic community, in spite of the drive for self-sufficiency. These developments also contributed to the increase in the urban population, as did universal military conscription, development of internal communications, the special World War II expansion and use of transport facilities by the Allies, and the burgeoning bureaucracy resulting from intensified centralization of governmental authority — to mention only the major factors involved.

Not least as a contributory cause of the emergence and particularly of the awakening self-consciousness of this new social force has been the combined yet competitive propaganda of foreign powers. Certainly since the war and to a considerable degree long before, Iranians have been hearing of the more abundant life that has been achieved by others and is possible for peoples like themselves. To be sure, there was never much agreement among the

competing propagandists as to the form this better life was to assume or the timetable or track of its arrival. But the repetition of its possibility from such divergent sources has made a deep impression on large sections of the population, the middle class in particular.

II

The elements of which this third social force or emergent middle class consists are of primary importance in estimating the present Iranian situation. They are by no means homogeneous. Thus far their coherence has been largely negative in character, that is, created and maintained by a nationalistic spirit primarily concerned with securing independence from foreign domination and influence. Yet there is apparently enough common ground of social interest among the diverse elements to lead one to expect some degree of cooperation in the more positive task of developing that independence into responsible revival and reform. Inherent and traditional Iranian individualism and atavism, however, may prevent this cooperation from attaining truly creative and significant proportions. But of the unusual coherence of these diverse elements in the present struggle against the British over oil there is little question.

Probably the most important group furnishing present support and future promise is that of the intellectuals. The spread of modern education has greatly increased their numbers to proportions of relative significance. For all the predominance of the emotional and aesthetic in Iranian personality, Iranian culture has been characterized by an unusually distinguished and persistent intellectual tradition. The cultivation of the mind has always been encouraged and honored in Iran, where the mind has ever been remarked for its native intelligence and curiosity, flexibility, and speculative bent. Professional intellectuals have been rooted in and supported by large sections of the masses who, illiterate but not untutored, have enjoyed the literary and artistic accomplishments of their leaders. It is therefore not surprising to observe this extension of the intellectual ranks in the current Iranian revival and the relatively influential role played by them in the present scene.

What has been said in the previous paragraph holds despite the fact that current intellectual concerns of Iranians of the educated class are centered on the sciences and economic development, in contrast to traditional concentration on literature, religion, and philosophy. The tradition is still persistent, with the result that educated Iranians are interested and even active in literary and philosophical pursuits, for all their professional concentration elsewhere. This is not to imply that all the educated are intellectuals, only that among the former are to be found this elite group which in Iran is larger, at least potentially, than ever before and plays an important role in the present nationalist movement. As furnishing a considerable leadership in both categories mention should be made of professional groups such as physicians, lawyers, clergy, teachers, engineers, and the like. These groups have increased rapidly in recent decades and play no small part in the formation and guidance of the fast-growing body of public opinion.

Also to be included in this category are the serious journalists. In few countries of the literacy percentage of Iran are journalists more numerous, facile, superficial, and irresponsible. Yet for all the spawning and specious nature of the Iranian press, it can be said that a considerable section of it is substantial and serious, and influential beyond what literacy statistics might lead one to expect, since papers are read in groups and news and opinions passed on by readers to illiterate friends and acquaintances. Good or bad, responsible or reprehensible, the majority of the press, with certain definite and fickle exceptions, has been consistent in its support of the present governmental policies. In this connection it may not be inappropriate nor inaccurate to remark that many Western observers are prone to underestimate the power and influence of the fourth estate in Iran.

Related to the above social groups, part of the new middle class and supporting the current movement, are the bureaucracy and civil service. Here is the sphere of career for many able and ambitious men, but too often also the haven and catch-all for a large portion of the mediocre, partially educated, and less aggressive aspirants for an easy and prestigious position among the white-collar class. This top-heavy, cumbersome governmental machine

is manned by an excess of young men frustrated by the faults of the system — rigid traditionalism, poor pay, nepotism and favoritism, slow advancement with disregard of merit, waste and inefficiency, graft and squeeze. Restless, dissatisfied, and impatient, most of these young men turn naturally to those leaders who give some promise of breaking the system and the status quo. Since foreign influence and interference is believed to be the main support of the status quo and the system, and that support primarily the work of the British, this group strongly backs the present crusade to free the country of what is regarded as an overly retarding, if not reactionary, influence and interference.

Not by any means least in the ranks of the educated is that large body of students who are in the process of initiation into those ranks proper. Convinced that the trappings of learning and professional kudos are valuable for advancement, yet disturbingly aware that only frustration awaits most of them under the present system, naturally sophomoric in accordance with their years and not seriously enough confronted and challenged by their mentors with high and inexorable intellectual standards, these students — even at the secondary level — turn to politics, not just in theory, but in practical pressure groups. They overflow the facilities of the state as well as the traditional pattern and proprieties provided by the society for their discipline and initiation therein. So much more aware politically and socially is this generation of youth than its predecessor that for better or for worse, certainly for change of some sort, it is of real potential importance, especially in such a fluid and explosive situation as currently obtains in Iran.

The second major segment of the society which looms large in the emergent middle class and constitutes a substantial basis of support for the present nationalist policy is that most strictly bourgeois, the trading and business groups. These may be described as three: enlightened commercial capitalists, substantial traders or wholesalers (both export-import and domestic), and small retail tradesmen.

The group of capitalists denoted is described as commercial, in contrast to those who adhere to the traditional pattern of investment in real estate, primarily agricultural; and enlightened,

since not all those possessing capital to invest in industry and trade feel any alliance with the growing middle class or wholehearted sympathy for the nationalist program this class supports. Yet it does serve to focus attention on a growing group who perceive the necessity of breaking the traditional pattern and underwriting cooperative ventures in economic development aimed at raising productivity and the standard of living of the people, at least of the growing middle class if not of the masses.

In recent years there has been a great increase in the ranks of those engaged in large-scale trade, both within and without the country. During the austere discipline of self-denial aimed at economic self-sufficiency obtaining during the Reza Shah regime this increase was most marked within the country, whereas during the last half decade of comparative freedom of trade it is the export-import trade that has expanded more rapidly, with more and more foreign-made products available because of the increase in supply of exchange, itself created by the expanded oil production and export. Obviously it is the possibility of substantial expansion of this lucrative area of trade that has interested this group of businessmen in backing the drive toward nationalization of the oil industry. The prospect of more profits accruing to Iran, and of these presumably vast profits being available for economic development generally has fired the imagination of such men and firmed their loyalty to the policy even when contrary pressures developed.

In a similar mold and mood are the third group of businessmen — the retailers and small tradesmen — who are relatively the most numerous. Their numbers have much increased in recent years because of the expansion of business in general and the cities in particular. Although complete and comparative statistics are not available, not to mention sober studies based on them, it is probably safe to affirm a movement of population from country to town, or rather city, where the spread of modern hygiene and public health education has noticeably lowered the mortality rate. In the last twenty years few cities have shrunk, most have grown, some substantially — particularly Tehran, now upwards of a million and probably double its previous population. This not only means an increase in tradesmen but a corresponding growth

in the needs of a modern urban population and therefore an increase in the ranks of the purveyors of services to meet these needs.

Before passing to a consideration of another category of supporters, it is well to record the warning that the fervor of the support of oil nationalization on the part of business and tradesmen has not yet been put to the acid test, although recent months of bazaar doldrums and scarcity of money, especially foreign exchange, have served to give warning of probably worse to come. These groups are among the first to feel the pinch of the unsolved dispute and comparatively idle oil industry. Their attitude may well be a barometer of what exists or may develop.

This brings us to a consideration of the labor groups in Iranian society, their alignment generally and their relation to the current nationalist movement and program in particular.

It might at first be assumed that all labor is automatically proletarian, holding nothing in common with the bourgeoisie. But this, in a country like Iran, is to run the risk of doctrinaire myopia. As a matter of fact there is a substantial segment of labor, skilled in character, which holds more in common with the middle class — certainly the petty bourgeoisie — than with the block of unskilled urban labor. The Western reader may well be cautioned against two mistakes at this juncture: against overrating or over-populating this group, or over-estimating the degree of industrialization and modernization that constitutes the basis of such a group's development; and against forgetting that the inherited traditional economy possessed a substantial body of skilled labor in the artisan groups with their elaborate guild systems. In the old traditional system these groups might not have been of the aristocracy, but neither were they of the laboring and peasant masses. Together with the tradesmen, with whom they were commonly grouped, they fitted loosely in the middle — where, indeed, they are today, since they now have much company and help to form the lower ranks of the middle class now emerging.

Amongst all of the foregoing groups are to be found the increasing number of small property owners in the cities who give to urban society much of its stability and furnish the present

nationalist movement steady support. Were the rural scene characterized by the same increase in small property holders the Iranian economy would be healthier and sturdier.

This analysis of the major components of the new and increasingly potent third social force would not be complete without some comment on the apparent fact that the top group in the old dichotomous society has been split or splintered, with many of its segments and members now absorbed in the emergent middle class. Perhaps portions of the aristocracy always possessed affinities for such a position but only with current developments attained sufficient numbers to find lodgement in their own group difficult and coalescence with other marginal groups, such as artisans and tradesmen, comparatively easy, thereby effecting the formation of a third force able to establish itself vis-à-vis both the aristocracy and the proletariat. At any rate, for all the overlapping of members of these categories just mentioned with the true aristocracy, still grounded in its monopolistic and restrictive ownership of land, they are more at home in a middle class company and are currently providing the core of support for the present nationalist movement and policy.

Indeed, it is surprising to observe the degree of support which the movement and the oil nationalization campaign have received from the members of the traditional aristocracy and ruling oligarchy. Unanimous legislative victories of the proponents of nationalization were by no means made possible only by intimidation and capitalization on the outbursts of political assassination. To be sure, these converts, often lukewarm and half-hearted, were early backsliders when they found the going tough and their more extensive privileges and interests proportionately more threatened, especially by the radical removal of economic and political friends who were interested in maintaining the status quo. During the autumn of 1951, when the British exerted every pressure to overthrow the Mosaddeq cabinet, these elements, heretofore quite adequately represented in the Majlis, easily changed their minds and yielded to the old blandishments. They were unable, however, to rally the necessary votes in the Majlis to accomplish their ends. The majority of the parliamentary deputies were scarcely elected by, nor representative of, the mid-

dle class, not to mention the masses, but only an inadequate minority were ready to flout public opinion or turn back from their original stand. Moreover, it should be remembered that many a member of the aristocracy has a family grudge to settle with the British because of some damage blamed on them; and that the majority of this group deeply resent any foreign power, in this instance Britain, which could bring a Reza Shah to power in the early twenties — as they believe — and then dethrone him in a matter of days as it did in 1941.

But any account of the nationalist support must also encompass the other end of the social spectrum in the cities — the sizeable group of unskilled labor and the proletariat. Here we are definitely beyond the limits of the third social force, strictly speaking; but not beyond that human territory which can be cultivated and used by this force for its purposes.

It is here that modern mass communications such as the radio, the public-address system — especially on wheels — and rapid transportation change the political scene and its potential. It is here that mass or mob manipulation looms large as a political force. Since time immemorial, as witness St. Paul's experiences in many places, the Middle Eastern city has known its mobs, their threat of fright and might. Indeed, it may be said that the widespread use of the institution of *bast*, or taking refuge, during the period of struggle for the constitution was a modification of mob pressure, and directed significantly enough by the bazaar group of the society with the help of clerical leadership. But the modern technique of concerted and continuous manipulation of the mob for practical purposes and ends has been taught the Iranians by the communists of the Tudeh Party and they have been apt pupils. Although the technique is uniquely the province and pet of the Tudeh, it is probably safe to assert that there has been no group tilting in the arena of Iranian politics that has not at some time or other used the technique to a more or less extent, a technique dignified today by the modern title of mass demonstrations. All too often it is filled with dynamite, literally and figuratively, and issues in bloodshed. Although one would hesitate to state that Prime Minister Mosaddeq has deliberately used this weapon to

gain his ends, it is a matter of record that he and his party have availed themselves of the fruit of its spoils.

Let it be made clear that these demonstrations of mass character are not limited to the urban proletariat and the rabble: there are participants from the middle-class groups, especially students and skilled workers, with others even higher placed furnishing leadership. Let it be also noted that mass demonstrations in favor of nationalization have generally been characterized by a genuine spontaneity, in contrast to most of the calculated and correctly marshalled variety so often purchased by the Tudeh for a lesser cause. This is not to imply that the Tudeh Party members and their ardent adherents are not genuine and vehement; only that, apart from nationalization, much of their mass is made up of fellow-travelling hirelings. In a country such as Iran, where normal vehicles and processes for expressing popular opinion are limited, it is not surprising that an aroused people will find such channels of their own for self-expression; or that they become supercharged among a naturally emotional people in connection with a subject as dynamic as national independence.

The gamut of Iranian society would scarcely be covered were something not said of the position and role of the peasants and rural folk in this nationalist movement. Yet this is the most difficult of evaluation unless one has had the opportunity and patience to travel leisurely through rural districts. Without doubt Tehran sets the pattern and the pace, but equally certain is it that most provincial cities emulate the example of the capital, some more and some less, depending upon local conditions. A surprising degree of interest and support is shown by small townspeople along the major highways. But in the villages and off the main routes of travel — and here probably still live the majority of the people — there is diminishing awareness of and interest in the issues and conflict. This is but another way of saying that the mass of the peasants and tribesmen have yet to experience the impact of modernity. They are running true to type and form, for down the centuries they have been amazingly indifferent to change in government or ruler, regarding all alike with fear and suspicion, indifference and resignation.

III

As has already been made evident, the pattern of nationalist social support is complex and the elements constituting it heterogeneous. But of all elements, the most difficult to understand and clarify with any definiteness is the Islamic. The state of Islam in Iran today would require more detailed analysis than is possible or relevant here, but something — however inadequate — must be said to do justice to the subject in hand.

Perhaps the most economical introduction to the topic is to explain that in Islamic society there have developed three major groups or attitudes in relation to the impact of the West upon that society. There are those, first of all, who are frank in their acceptance of the West and what it brings in all the areas of thought and action. They are overwhelmed by the present superiority of the West in the arts and techniques of civilization, especially in its ability to provide those material comforts and benefits which so much attract and impress them. Unaware of, or indifferent to, the deeper and more distinctive moral and spiritual foundations of both their own and Western civilization, they are prepared to accept the West and all it brings, the sooner and the more drastically the better. Or, as in the case of a few, quite aware all of this, they are genuine cultural converts, and look to thorough and rapid Westernization as the salvation of their people and nation.

Probably a more numerous group, but varied in their degree of self-consciousness and understanding, are those in favor of discriminate assessment and qualified assimilation of the West, in accordance with their proved and admitted needs, but in loyalty to their own tested and cherished values. This usually takes the form of forthright acceptance of Western science and techniques, selective adoption and modified adaptation of Western social practices and institutions, and more rarely the integration into their own philosophy of Western beliefs and values. They believe in and strive for drastic reform of their Islamic and Eastern society, but remain unconvinced that they need to or should abandon its essential principles and institutions.

The two foregoing groups for the most part are to be found

among the educated. There remains the vast majority, who probably themselves fall into four groups: those unaware of the problem posed; those indifferent to it; those vaguely troubled by it without knowing anything of the nature of their uneasiness; and those persuaded of a quite different reaction and solution — the rejection of the West except for its science and techniques, with some extremists rejecting even these. This fourth group is best designated as zealots.

The zealots believe that all the ills of their disrupted and confused society are to be blamed upon the nation's departure from the time-honored and tested Islamic Way. The past is idealized and its pattern must be reestablished if social health and stability are to be realized. They generally carry along with them that amorphous, vaguely troubled group which knows not the nature of its uneasiness.

Naturally enough it is the West that gets blamed for the moral confusion and disintegration, the social instability and dislocation evident and deplored by all these. Hence their drive to rid the country of all foreigners, particularly those who have become traditionally marked as guilty of exploitation and internal interference, and so the nation's enemies. The result is a dangerous compound of two particularistic and exclusive doctrines which aid and abet each other's fever and ills.

The extreme of zealotry is to be found in the ranks of the *fida'iyān*, or "devotees" of Islam, and their close sympathizers. It is this group that has been responsible for most of the assassinations of recent years, a traditionally recognized way of ridding Allah's people of their well-known enemies. Let it be made clear that this is not a numerous group, in no way comparable in size, membership, or duration to the Ikhwan al-Muslimin, the Islamic Brotherhood of Egypt and other Arab states. Even so, it cannot be ignored by those authorities responsible for law and order, even those, like Mosaddeq for instance, who have been in a position to profit by this "devoted" fanaticism and crime.

Islam is a religio-socio-politico system in which these components have varying meaning and hold upon its members. It is probably fair to state that today the relative strength and influence of these components are in the reverse order of the com-

pound attributive. But so related and interdependent are these elements for most Iranians that for one reason or another they are suspicious of, or opposed to, all those persons and practices which in any way weaken or abrogate the accepted body of genuine Muslim doctrine and law.

This large segment of the populace in recent years has found a shrewd and willing leader and spokesman in Ayatollah Seyyid Abul Qasim Kashani, who in the present phase of the nationalist struggle is such a powerful symbol because of his lifelong opposition to the British and his persecution in imprisonment and exile at their hands. Politically ambitious, he has not been slow to take over the leadership of this large, devout Muslim group that is zealous for the faith and the reestablishment of its reign of law.

In the heat of the present struggle it is natural that such a group should become politically militant, just as natural that the National Front leaders should avail themselves of its alliance. Particularly is this true because of the *fida'ian's* ability to dramatize the issues in a form calculated to rally the masses whose cooperation was essential in building up sufficient pressure to intimidate or persuade the traditional ruling group to join the crusade. All this is symbolized in the partnership of Mosaddeq and Kashani.

The significance of this whole movement for the future of Iran is of considerable importance, and the current resurgence of clerical power and influence is watched with misgivings by many within and without the country. This is no place to discuss it in detail, but only to point out a few salient developments germane to our present subject: that since the recent gun attack on Dr. Husayn Fatemi, new Tehran Majlis representative and former Deputy Prime Minister, Dr. Mosaddeq has endeavored to move resolutely to bring under control these lawless and irresponsible zealot extremists; that there is valid reason to believe that Dr. Mosaddeq is not averse to reducing tension and retarding zealotry by encouraging Kashani to take a trip abroad for medical treatment; that in the long run in Iran a Muslim cleric indulging in overt politics for personal power is looked upon askance and is not likely to last; that the present cooperation of Islamic lead-

ers and the nationalists, the first time in almost fifty years, presents both parties with a challenge and opportunity — the clergy for genuine revival and reform, the nation for new unity and strength; and last, but not least, that the recent evidences of Islamic leaders becoming truly aware of the nature and threat of communism to the whole Islamic system and way of life may not only temporarily check this enemy's progress but also force these leaders either to produce a modern and reliable apologia or abandon any claim to the allegiance of the growing educated group.

IV

This brings us to an examination of communism and the Tudeh Party as an element in the support of the current nationalist movement. There is no question about the community of interest of the two, but there is need for clear demarcation of the overlap and a correctly focused view of the situation. Early in the oil controversy too many responsible Western officials easily and loosely equated the two; just as mistaken would be the assertion that they have nothing to do with each other.

Ever since the attempt upon the Shah's life in February 1949, the communist-controlled Tudeh Party has been outlawed and forced to operate underground. In many respects this came to have tactical advantages in that it focused attention upon such seemingly innocuous front organizations as the "Partisans of Peace" and the "Society for Struggle Against Imperialist Oil Companies." The Tudeh has always posed as an indigenous, leftist, national, socialist party, interested primarily in Iranian revival and reform, only incidentally linked with the Soviet Union to the extent that Soviet support is necessary in the international arena — where Iran has ever found itself involved in pressure. Therefore it is only natural that the Party and its front organizations should follow a rabid and violent nationalist line: on the one hand to discredit and to eliminate if possible Western democratic influence, and on the other to prevent any constructive amelioration of the internal situation, politically and economically, under any auspices friendly to the West or uncommitted to the proletariat revolution.

With a portion of these aims shared by the National Front, it was only natural that the Front and the Party should consciously or unconsciously take advantage of each other's efforts. Subsequent developments have shown that this was mostly the tactic of the Party, which now for months has been critical of Mosaddeq and the National Front for what it charges as failure to continue the struggle to its logical conclusion. Yet the effect of early National Front policy or tactics, whether calculated or not, was to furnish the Tudeh through its front organizations a golden opportunity to seize leadership of the popular cause, and by its superior mass manipulation tactics and techniques the chance to rush the deeply stirred nation so rapidly into chaos as to make possible the Tudeh's assumption of power. By midsummer of 1951, however, it became apparent that some responsible and perspicacious elements in the nationalist leadership were prepared to challenge the Tudeh program, even using the latter's own techniques to accomplish their ends. By autumn apparently the people — Court, Government, Majlis, press, clerics, and general public — began to realize what was happening: the danger of possibly slipping by default into the loss of independence to the Soviet Union while struggling to be free of Britain. In any case the Tudeh band wagon got stalled and the Party so severely jolted that its all-out effort to elect a corps of deputies to the Seventeenth Majlis has completely failed. There has thus developed a clear break between the Nationalist Front and the Tudeh, with the former carrying the vast majority of the people with it.

The problem which Mosaddeq and the National Front face over Tudeh support is in many respects not unlike that which they face in relation to the support of the Islamic zealots. Both he and the responsible leaders of the present nationalist drive in this potent third social force are no more zealots than they are communists, no more prepared to turn their backs on the present process of modernization than to move behind the Iron Curtain. The problem posed is one of mutual support at various critical stages of a herculean struggle, and then perceiving accurately the right time to break with that support or to reduce it to manageable proportions. It is of the essence of the danger, however, that in dealing with both groups one is concerned with very

similar blind, ignorant, and fanatical extremes close to meeting on the side of the social circle opposite to where responsible statesmen and national leaders should be. Unless these leaders know certainly what they are about, and perceive clearly where they are, the coopted fanatical extremes, if given too much freedom of action, may precipitate them and the people whom they lead over the precipice of vital error to national destruction.

V

There remains one important element of the society to relate to the present movement in general and the National Front in particular: the Shah. In a fluid and often confused situation the Throne offers the one focal point of loyalty acknowledged by most Iranians except for the extremes of left and right, and therefore becomes the symbol and center of what unity and stability the nation has or can achieve.

Sincerely patriotic and wishing to serve the best interests of his people, Mohammad Reza from the first has chosen to rule as a constitutional sovereign. He has given evidence in the last decade of a desire for and an understanding of the necessity of political and economic reform in the interests of the people as a whole. He has chosen not to reign as did his dictator father, partly because of a known lack of taste and talent for the role, but more probably because he realizes that his people would never stand for it — unless by a miracle he should do a superlatively better job of it than his father. Often criticized adversely for not showing more strength in determining and directing national policy and affairs, he has chosen, on the contrary (perhaps by default, but one suspects more by design), to capitalize on this very weakness and thereby to assure the continuance, perhaps even the stability, of his throne. In any case, in the long view his policy would appear to be an effort to keep in balance his conceptions of what his country needs and should have with what it wants and will have.

The Shah's policy of ruling from weakness and balancing his and his people's estimates and desires for their mutual welfare is best illustrated in his contrasting actions in the autumnal election seasons of 1949 and 1951. In 1949 his Minister of Court,

Hazhir, was flagrantly interfering with the elections, even in Tehran where there had been previously established a precedent for comparative freedom. Dr. Mosaddeq and his threatened colleagues — subsequently to be called the National Front — took *bast*, or refuge, at the Court until His Majesty promised to put an end to such interference and assure a reasonable measure of electoral freedom, with the result that they were elected to the Sixteenth Majlis by handsome majorities.

In September 1951 the Shah resisted terrific pressure from within and without to dismiss Dr. Mosaddeq from the premiership; and in November, upon the Prime Minister's return from Washington, he backed Mosaddeq in his determination to hold what he announced as free elections. His Majesty not only continued his support, but promised to instruct and supervise the Court and Army and to prevent their taking any part in the elections other than to maintain law and order where necessary. There is reason to believe that this pact was kept, although perhaps it should be noted that the Tudeh charged discrimination against them by both the Shah's Army and Mosaddeq's Government. The problem raised by other charges of Government interference is not relevant to the particular point here under scrutiny.

Everyone knows that the Shah has not approved of much, if indeed most of what Prime Minister Mosaddeq has done in the last year. But the fact that he has nevertheless continued to support him, or, perhaps more accurately, to refrain from opposing or ousting him, is cogent evidence that His Majesty perceives that the Prime Minister has the majority of the Iranian people behind him. Events and circumstances may in this plagued and unpredictable situation bring unforeseen modification of the present pattern, but by this very alignment of the royal policy with the currently expressed wishes of the people, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi is probably strengthening his throne and assuring its continued service to the nation as a rallying point of unity and stability in these troublous times.

THE MIDDLE EAST SUPPLY CENTER

A Reappraisal

Martin W. Wilmington

IN THE EARLY STAGES of World War II, the British Middle East Command established in Cairo a small office to assist the military chiefs in the solution of a desperate shipping bottleneck. The cry of "*Rommel ante portas*" rang through the Mediterranean lands and more and more tonnage was needed to reinforce and equip the British forces guarding the gates of Egypt. Submarine warfare was taking its terrifying toll of Allied vessels while the combined air forces of Germany and Italy harassed the maritime approaches to the principal Eastern Mediterranean ports. Yet, as British officials noted with dismay, a large flow of goods for the civilian population, many of them of nonessential character, were arriving in these ports, pre-empting vessels needed by the military and clogging up the limited unloading, storage, and forwarding facilities ashore. The new agency was given the task of screening civilian claims on Allied shipping and of advising the Command on how to allocate seaborne traffic to the Middle East in such a way as to step up the inflow of military supplies without depriving the area of goods deemed essential to the welfare of the civilian population and to the prevention of politically dangerous economic dislocations.

From these modest beginnings rose an organization which was to dominate the entire Middle Eastern economy. By a harsh yet

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equitable pruning of imports from outside the region, the reorientation of trade channels, and the promotion of a substantial expansion of local productivity, the Middle East Supply Center reduced nonmilitary imports by sea by several million tons and caused a steady supply of war equipment to flow from Middle Eastern producers to the Allied forces in the theater. As a key factor in the consolidation of the Anglo-American security position in the Eastern Mediterranean the Center wrote a brilliant chapter of international economic administration in the midst of war until its unceremonious but very honorable discharge from duty in September 1945.

One of the noteworthy features of MESC was the attempt to use the leverage of wartime pressure for more than just the military security of the Middle East; there evolved, in fact, a determined effort to employ the elements of energy, planning and co-operation, infused by the pursuit of military objectives, for the permanent benefit of the region. This included technical assistance as well as the promotion of a regional approach to the solution of problems which for centuries had obstructed economic progress in these ancient lands. If current Anglo-American efforts to unite with the nations of the Eastern Mediterranean in a compact of common defense should be crowned with success, the new Middle East Command will face again many of the economic problems and perspectives that preoccupied the men and women of the Middle East Supply Center.¹ A description and critical appraisal of its methods and policies therefore at this time should be of more than historic interest.

SCOPE OF OPERATIONS

The Middle East Supply Center (MESC) was set up in April 1941. Originally part of General Wavell's command it was soon transferred to the jurisdiction of the British Ministry of War Transport to free the military authorities from concern with ci-

¹ Point 3 of the Joint Statement of November 10, 1951, by the Four Powers on the proposed Middle East Command reads as follows: "The Middle East Command is intended to be the center of cooperative efforts for the defense of the areas as a whole; the achievement of peace and security in the area through the Middle East Command will bring it social and economic advancement." *Middle Eastern Affairs*, vol. 2, (December 1951), p. 415.

vilian questions in its theater. It became a joint American-British undertaking in 1942 and ultimately serviced an area which included Egypt, the Sudan, Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, the Somalilands, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Aden, Saudi Arabia, Transjordan, Palestine, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Iran, Cyprus, Malta, and in some instances, Turkey. At the height of its assignment, the Center exercised a large measure of economic control over nearly 5 million square miles with a total population of almost 100 million, composed of six at least nominally sovereign states, four British colonies, four mandatory states (including two wrested from Vichy control), three territories formerly belonging to the enemy, and one condominium. After its closure in September 1945, the British Middle East Office kept alive some of its advisory and research functions.

The operation of the Middle East Supply Center unfolded in four stages. The initial stage, during which the activities of the Center were confined to the screening of nonessential imports, was of brief duration. It soon became evident that even after the elimination of luxuries and semi-luxuries, the volume of civilian imports carried by Allied ships was heavy. The Middle East, before the war, had depended heavily on other regions for the supply of many essentials. Droughts and the termination of trade with the European continent had intensified its dependence on supplies from England and the Western Hemisphere, and most of these had to be carried, until the end of 1941, on British and other Free Europe ships, since the Neutrality Act barred U.S. merchant vessels from Mediterranean ports. It became necessary, therefore, to think of ways to reduce the volume of "essential" imports as well.

This ushered in the second stage, during which the Center played a major role in increasing trade among Middle Eastern nations. In peacetime, economic links between Arab countries had been few and weak.² Traditionally, traders had looked for

² For a striking illustration of the persistence of this pattern, see the following passage from the newspaper *Mukattam* (Cairo) as quoted in the *Christian Science Monitor* (Boston), April 14, 1948:

"... Why does Egypt have to send a delegate to India and Pakistan to try to exchange its surplus of rice against corn? Why not talk directly to Lebanon, Syria, and Transjordan, which have such need for rice? At Beirut, two pounds of rice sell for 30 Egyptian piasters (about \$1.20). Such is the need of these countries for our

markets and supplies outside the region, particularly in the Western world. This attitude persisted after the war had begun. The Center now set about to compile data on regional availabilities of goods and services (the "Commodity Index Sheet") which could replace extra-regional procurement, and released this intelligence to the local organizations concerned, with the advice to shift their procurement to these alternate sources. This procedure, combined with a harsh tightening of import controls, helped intra-regional trade, which in 1938 had amounted to only 7 percent of the foreign trade of the Middle East, to rise to 33 percent.³

The drive to substitute local and regional suppliers for distant sources logically brought about the third phase. From the beginning of the war emergency, a shift and an increase in production had taken place throughout the Middle Eastern area. Local producers were stimulated by the disappearance of foreign competition and the resultant high prices. Local governments, spurred by the specter of desperate shortages, took steps to raise the output of cereals and clothing. In addition, the British Army had been placing a limited amount of repair and light equipment contracts with local workshops and factories. Yet the scale of all these activities was small in relation to the size of the shipping problem. Moreover, there was an almost complete absence of regional coordination; each country seemed to be proceeding without considering the needs and resources of its neighbors. Also, the scale of these adjustments was kept down by an apparent reluctance of the British Government to assist, financially and with the supply of matériel, in the creation or expansion of local industries which could jeopardize the resumption of British trade with the Middle East after the war. There were also such obstacles as the reluctance of Egyptian cotton growers to shift to wheat cultivation,

rice. On the other hand, Syria and Lebanon produce fruit in abundance. These fruits are generally lacking in the Egyptian markets, where they sell for exorbitant prices.

"A few years ago, Egypt needed wheat, and at that time Syria produced more wheat than it consumed. On the other hand, Egypt consumed less sugar than she produced. Why not export the surplus to neighboring countries? It is known that in Beirut, for example, sugar is four times as expensive as in Egypt."

³ United Nations, *Review of Economic Conditions in the Middle East*. Report to the Economic and Social Council, Jan. 31, 1951, New York. Some, but by no means all, of this percentage increase simply reflects the lower volume of total foreign trade.

either because of their reliance on government support of cotton prices or because rent collection is easier to accomplish with cotton than with wheat (which the tenants can consume). The Middle East Supply Center deserves major credit for removing many of the bottlenecks to a full-scale production effort in the region. By pressure and skilful guidance it not only intensified the useful reorientation and expansion of output in agriculture and industry but eliminated much waste and duplication of effort within the region as a whole. At the same time, it was largely instrumental in bringing about a favorable change in the attitude of the British and American governments toward self-sufficiency of the area.

The fourth stage in the Center's stewardship took prominence in the waning months of the war. The tide of the war was irrevocably turning toward victory; shipping lanes were opening up; pro-Axis sentiment no longer was a force to fear; the original *raison d'être* for MESC was dissolving. Yet the agency's close watch over the pulse and nerve of the Middle East economy had generated a concern for its growth and health after the war. As in other areas where British and American proconsuls held sway, a sometimes amusingly intense identification with the autonomous interest of the ward area had crept into the thinking of MESC officials. Moreover, a loud note of "postwar planning" had sounded persistently almost from the very beginning through the orchestration of the Anglo-American war effort on all the higher levels of command. Finally, preoccupation with the "long-term" problems of the Middle Eastern economy was a natural outgrowth of the Center's manifold activities in the field of technical assistance.

At first, technical assistance had been mainly concerned with furnishing such advice and guidance as would lead to a more economical and expeditious use of resources and equipment for the war-born civilian and military needs of the region. Training facilities were provided for tractor operation and repair, better ploughing, sowing, and grain storage; specialists were made available to assist in the setting up and running of new plants; public health experts were rushed in to organize campaigns against epidemics and locust attacks as well as animal and plant diseases;

and financial and public administration advisers were delegated to assist local authorities in such matters as rationing and fiscal and credit controls. As the military threat receded there was growing anxiety among MESC's leadership lest the momentum of accelerated development which this technical aid had infused into the social and economic structure of the Middle East become bogged down with the return of peacetime conditions, as it had after World War I. Consequently, efforts were initiated to supply at least some of the essential prerequisites for a long-range, regionally coordinated, economic development program, among them the compilation of basic data for the region (lacking so far because of the inadequacy of local statistical and geological services) and the provision of facilities for regional exchange of information and coordination of policies. The result of these efforts was a number of resource surveys and studies written for MESC on agricultural and technological problems of the Middle East⁴ and several regional conferences during which experts from various parts of the area found their first opportunity for an exchange of ideas and information in their development plans. It was the fervent hope of the Center's leadership that their organization would be maintained in some form on a permanent basis after the war to further the cause of economic unity and advancement of the Middle East. In that, however, they were to be sadly disappointed.

SPECIFIC ACHIEVEMENTS

What specifically were the major results of MESC's tenure during World War II? When it opened shop in Cairo, the Middle East was threatened with starvation and economic chaos, while making voracious inroads into the precious treasure of shipping space controlled by the Allies. Two years later, non-military cargo carried by Allied vessels to the Eastern Mediterranean had shrunk from 5.5 million to 1.5 million tons per annum. Yet the area was fed and industries and workshops were humming; agricultural acreage had been raised by nearly 2 mil-

⁴Of these, three reports were made public shortly after the war: B. A. Keen, *The Agricultural Development of the Middle East*; E. B. Worthington, *Middle East Science*; H. B. Allen, *Rural Education and Welfare in the Middle East*. (Reports to the Director-General of the Middle East Supply Center, H. M. Stationery Office, London, 1946.)

lion acres; cotton cultivation had been more than halved to make place for cereal output; with the help of emergency supplies of drugs and pesticides administered with the aid of foreign experts, epidemics and locust attacks had been averted; better farming and herding techniques were evident in many areas, and agricultural machinery was used in greater numbers and with more efficiency; delegates from all over MESC jurisdiction had met and were going to meet in the first regional conferences on agriculture, finance, rationing, transportation, locust control, grain collections, and statistics ever held for this area; through offices in Cairo and other capitals, an intensive exchange of economic and technical intelligence was flowing back and forth; the operation of official grain collection and distribution schemes had reduced the assault of hoarders and speculators on the food supply of the urban masses; training centers were furnishing skilled and semiskilled workmen to industry, tractor stations, and repair shops for the Forces; and many establishments in manufacturing and transportation were using oil instead of imported coal. Mining and industrial capacity had been expanded at a respectable scale and from it came forth a stream of consumer goods, raw materials, industrial supplies, and war equipment, including cast iron, pipes, steel castings, lead tubes, batteries, hand tools, precision instruments, automobile parts, brass castings, accumulators, aircraft heaters, antitank mines, shrapnel balls, signal gear, window glass, electric bulbs, nuts and bolts, processed jute, tungsten, tin, chrome ore, refined lead, drugs, carbonic acid, sulphuric acid, sodium silicates, sodium sulphates, superphosphates, potassium chlorate, borax, lactic acids, refractory bricks, industrial diamonds, saddle soap, canteen equipment, army boots and clothing, cardboard containers, canned foods, and, to the delight of His Majesty's thirsty forces, millions of bottles of beer brewed in hastily improvised breweries in Cairo and points East.

MODE OF OPERATIONS

Not all of these achievements of course were due to the activities of the Supply Center. The difficulty of being precise in measuring the full impact of MESC on the Middle Eastern economy stems from the fact that, officially, its status was primarily an

advisory one. It issued no orders, made few nonadministrative disbursements, and had no machinery of enforcement. Its principal channel of influence were recommendations made both to the Allied governments and to local authorities in the Middle East. Twice a year the Center received from Washington notification of cargo space appropriated tentatively for civilian imports to the Middle East. This quota was divided up among the constituent political units of the region, the governments of which then issued tentative import licenses for extra-regional goods within the limits of shipping assigned to them. These licenses — or rather, claims — were, after a thorough screening, welded into a regional import program by MESC and then forwarded to Washington and London, together with a schedule of proposed shipping priorities, for final approval.⁵ The decision of the supreme allocating authority was then communicated to the governments of the claimant countries along with whatever conditions Washington and London wished to attach to the fulfillment of their pledged supply of shipping facilities for imports approved. From then on, MESC was supposed to administer a very loosely defined supervision concerned with the meeting of shipping schedules on the Anglo-American end and the proper use of supplies on the recipient end in the Middle Eastern countries.

On paper, this chain of command gave the Middle East Supply Center little direct authority. The history of World War II is littered with the debris of combined boards which remained almost completely ineffectual because their spokesmen were unable to assert their views in the maze of feuding and overlapping national, military, and cabinet jurisdictions within the supreme command of the Allied war effort. S. McKee Rosen, in his *Combined Boards of the Second World War: An Experiment in International Administration*,⁶ has given a graphic account of this predicament on the highest levels of policy-making in Washington and London. MESC, on the other hand, was able to enlist the cooperation of the policy-making and enforcement authorities in Washington, London, and throughout the Middle East,

⁵ Winant and Dawson, "The Middle East Supply Program," *Foreign Commerce Weekly*, U.S. Department of Commerce (Washington, D.C.), vol. 15, no. 1, April 1, 1944.

⁶ New York: Columbia University Press, 1951.

and secure the execution of many far-reaching designs which went far beyond its original terms of reference.⁷ A position of influence was thus established which was quite out of proportion with the normal impact of a civilian advisory agency in an active theater of military operations.

CAUSES OF SUCCESS

The spectacular way in which the Supply Center had cleared up the transportation muddle in the Mediterranean in 1941 had endeared it to the military commanders and spared the agency much of the jurisdictional and supply squabbles that hampered inter-agency harmony in other theaters. In Washington and London, the stock of the Center rose quickly because of the efficient use made of the supplies and shipping space allocated to the Middle East. Not only were the often extravagant import claims of the local authorities pruned in a ruthless and courageous fashion, but with the aid and supervision of MESC, waste in the employment of scarce goods was kept down rigidly. This was achieved by the agency's use of what became known as "supply sanctions," *i.e.*, the threat to withhold approval of locally granted import licenses unless and until the proper use of allocated materials was ensured. The "supply sanctions" were soon developed into a very effective instrument of policy-making by the Supply Center, inducing local authorities to comply with MESC recommendations on many aspects of economic mobilization.

There was another more positive reason for the governments of the region to accept the stewardship of MESC. While it vigorously curbed imports deemed nonessential, it worked with equal vigor to secure for the population of its ward area those "outside" goods and services which were held indispensable. In the United States, the Combined Agency for Middle East Supplies,⁸ acting

⁷ "To rationalize all supplies for the Middle East and to ensure that with the utmost economy in shipping space the people of the Middle East should receive vital requirements."

⁸ This bureau was set up to handle the processing and final approval of the supply program submitted by the Middle East Supply Center. For that purpose, it received a so-called "program license" from the Foreign Economic Administration which empowered it to make specific allocations of shipping space out of the Middle Eastern allocation for a six-month period. Both the Combined Agency and the MESC prepared, jointly and

on the request of the Supply Center, rendered valuable assistance in securing the cooperation of the War Production Board and other supply authorities in the procurement of the goods approved for shipment to the Middle East. The procedure under which imports to the Middle East were authorized left it in most cases to the ultimate importer to find the source of supply; some of these sources were government-controlled, others had to be squeezed out from private suppliers in competition with other holders of priorities. The Combined Agency proved far more successful in obtaining such goods and services than private importers or diplomatic representatives from individual Middle Eastern areas, particularly from those with lukewarm war records, could have been in the babel of urgent requests coming from more favored or more publicized claimants all over the globe.

MESC also enlisted the cooperation of Allied bureaus and agents in other parts of the world in its search for scarce goods needed in the Middle East. The excellent commercial intelligence passing through the Center unearthed for the benefit of the Middle Eastern economy many alternate sources of supply inside or adjacent to the region, when transoceanic cargo space was denied.⁹ The unpretentious office on Tolumbat Street in Cairo became at one and the same time the spigot and the pump for waters which the parched economies of the whole Middle East craved. Very soon the appeals for help addressed to the Center outnumbered the appeals against license denials.

As the war progressed, the Center derived additional authority from the expansion of Allied political and military control from East Africa to the Persian Gulf. Recommendations of MESC were often accepted as a matter of routine by British military and civil governors. In Palestine, for example, certain ukases of

separately, surveys and estimates of the specific commodity needs of the various countries involved, independent from the claims of the latter. These reports developed into independent "audits" of country claims.

⁹ The many feats of procurement heroism accomplished by MESC in the Middle East, Africa, and beyond form a rich lore of administrative adventure that often challenges the fancy of Oriental storytellers. Equally fascinating is the story of the many bouts with unbending local customs and whims, such as the refusal of Ethiopians to wear the grey sheeting secured by the Center with infinite labor, on the grounds that they always had used white sheeting before. (White sheeting being in extremely short supply, an educational campaign was needed to remove this bottleneck.)

the mandatory regime listed "rulings" of the Middle East Supply Center as the basis for their promulgation.

Last but not least, the caliber of its own personnel contributed heavily to the stature of MESC inside and outside the region. In its direction, particularly through the Middle East Supply Council (the directing committee of the Center), high-level officials like Mr. James M. Landis, Mr. Frederick G. Winant, and Mr. John P. Dawson, all with distinguished records in high government offices of their country, represented the United States at various times; the British Government was represented by a cabinet member, the Resident Minister of State for the Middle East, a post successively held by Mr. Oliver Lyttleton, Mr. R. G. Casey, Lord Moyne, and Sir Edward Grigg (now Lord Altrincham). Inevitably, their combined voice carried great weight in Washington and London, wherever and whenever the needs of Middle Eastern countries were under deliberation. Assisting them were dynamic executives and diplomats like Australia's Commander R. G. A. Jackson, the Director General, one of the most brilliant administrators brought to the fore by the war,¹⁰ and a glittering array of British and American experts such as had never before bent their heads in unison over the mountainous problems of an underdeveloped area.¹¹ They made the Supply Center a rock of strength, purpose, and competence in a sea of weakness and disunity, and it was natural that its leadership should assert itself regardless of the lack of enforcement authority. And although the Center was by no means popular, even the forces of Arab nationalism could not deny a certain amount of grudging recognition to an agency which — for purposes of its own, it is true — had given more economic unity to the lands of the Fertile Crescent than they had seen since the dying days of the Ottoman Empire.

FAILURE OF POSTWAR PLANS

Two principal questions confront the observer who wishes to apply the lessons of the MESC experience to Middle Eastern

¹⁰ Commander Jackson subsequently became Deputy Director of UNRRA and Assistant Secretary General of the United Nations.

¹¹ MESC personnel was composed primarily of English, American, and Commonwealth nationals. The British element had numerical majority (the percentage of Americans hardly ever exceeded 10% of those participating in the work), but in the upper echelons something approaching Anglo-American parity existed.

problems today. The first is why so little of the spirit and the processes which brought about economic development and regional cooperation in the Middle East between 1941 and 1945 lived on after the end of the war.¹²

The turbulent march of political events in the area of course bears some responsibility.¹³ The dissolution of the Supply Center itself, a step opposed by most of its leadership, was another factor. Also, the noncomplementary character of the individual economies of the Middle East coupled with the pent-up demand for Western capital and luxury goods made for powerful pressure to return to the economic separatism prevalent before the war.

There were, as well, serious flaws in the pattern of MESC itself which go a good way toward explaining the meager inheritance it left. The great services which the Supply Center rendered to the civilian populations of the Middle East and the extensive way in which it consulted with local authorities could not eradicate the fact that it was a foreign agency, created and cosponsored by the foremost colonial power in the world, and using in many instances colonial administrations for the enforcement of its will. Suspicion and friction were constantly kindled by the fact that the people of the Middle East had no representative of policy-making status with the Supply Center, so that its decisions inevitably looked like a foreign dictate, no matter how much local interests had been consulted. This explains why regional controls and coordinating arrangements were demobilized in the Middle East faster than almost anywhere else: in this case it was not only a matter of being tired of austerity shackles, but also just as much an act of political self-assertion against the foreign devil.

¹² The regional approach disintegrated with the end of the emergency. Its only feeble echoes so far have been the economic provisions of the Arab League Pact and the Muslim Economic Conferences held at Karachi and Tehran, neither of which has as yet produced any tangible effects on the economic development of the Middle East, regionally or otherwise.

¹³ Yet exaggerated blame has been laid at the doorsteps of such developments as the new State of Israel. The Israel issue does not explain why there could not have been a continuation of economic synchronization on a more limited geographical scale, as, for example, among the Arab states. On the contrary, it could be claimed that the emergence of the new state produced the only effective, albeit negative, postwar concert of economic policy of the Arab nations, viz., the boycott of Israeli goods.

One might wonder if the same would have happened had the Supply Center been organized as a truly regional organization with equitable representation of local interests on the directing committee. This would have provided a "native nucleus" in the scheme fathered by MESC which could have taken up the mantle of regional cooperation after the Supply Center itself and the Anglo-Americans had departed. It could have continued the economic development and trade promotion work of MESC without suffering from the odium and suspicion of a foreign-imposed scheme. It is true that participation of representatives from the various Middle Eastern countries could have interfered with the effective reduction of nonessential imports and would have involved the danger of sharing secrets of Anglo-American strategy with men of uncertain allegiance to the Allied cause; and it would have most certainly diminished the role of MESC in Allied councils. It would have courted the special displeasure of the many Americans in high government office who throughout the war were to resist a situation in which foreign nations — non-belligerent at that — would have a say-so in the allocation of American resources.¹⁴ Yet, had the Allies foreseen what was to happen in the Middle East after the war, and had the concepts of Point Four and regional organization been as articulate and widely accepted as they are now, it is certain that some arrangement would have been sought to compromise between the dictates of war and postwar needs. In any case, the participation of local Middle Eastern delegates would not necessarily have compromised the Allied supply program for the Middle East, since the final decisions were made by the supreme arbiters of allocation in Washington and London.

RESTRICTIONS ON INDUSTRIALIZATION

The suspicions of native leaders found corroboration in certain restrictive attitudes of MESC regarding new industries. From

¹⁴ This American attitude was to reassert itself after the war in various instances. It was very bluntly put into words by Mr. Spruille Braden, former Assistant Secretary of State, in a speech at Colgate University, explaining why the U.S. Government had not merged the Point Four Program with the Technical Assistance Program of the United Nations: "This Nation would continue to make the major financial and technical contribution, yet the direction and control thereof would be vested in those organizations where our single vote would be overwhelmed by those of the plan's beneficiaries." *Congressional Digest*, May 1950.

the beginning the plans of MESC for the expansion of local production as a way to ease the shipping shortage encountered opposition among British and American leaders. This opposition arose from their acute apprehension as to what such expansion would do to the markets for Anglo-American exports in the area. Britain in particular had not forgotten its World War I experience, when it had lost a large portion of its trading empire as a result of indigenous industrialization. It also looked with growing anxiety on the swelling sterling balances which Middle Eastern countries kept building up in London in return for goods and services sold to the British forces, and which would put its gold and dollar reserves under calamitous pressure if its traditional exports to the area were no longer desired. In consequence of the desperate military situation in 1941-42, and in response to the urgings of MESC officials, the original opposition to the rendering of aid for the industrial mobilization of the Middle East had been softened. But the Center remained suspect in the eyes of native leaders. A major source of suspicion was the repeatedly affirmed determination of MESC to prevent the establishment of industries "likely to become uneconomical after the war."¹⁵ The definition of an "uneconomical industry" is at best an elusive one. In its broadest sense it applies to industries that cannot remain competitive under normal circumstances. But what are "normal" circumstances? It is quite apparent that Allied officials during the war tended to assume that the Middle East's return to normalcy after the war would be characterized by a return to more or less unrestricted free trade. References to the "reopening of world markets" and the "chill winds of competition" appeared frequently in British or American appraisals of the postwar outlook for the region. Apparently, the Middle East nations were not conceded the idea of preserving the industrial stature gained during the war by the application of the same protectionism which Western Europe later was to practice so vigorously in defense of its dollar holdings and which strong American voices were demanding so righteously for the salvage of such wartime creations as the "uneconomical" expansion of the United States merchant fleet.

¹⁵ Boardman, F., "Civilian Requirements from War to Peace: The Middle East Supply Center," *Department of State Bulletin* (Washington, D.C.), vol. 13 (1945), p. 339.

It is true that after World War I many "uneconomical" industries set up during the war in this area had folded up and ushered in a period of economic demoralization. But one of the principal reasons had been precisely the rapid reopening of the Middle East's gates to goods from outside the region, brought about largely by Western political pressure, such as the low tariff regime imposed on Turkey by the Treaty of Lausanne and the open door clause included in League of Nations mandates.¹⁶

There is a passage in the report of the British Military Governor of Cyrenaica¹⁷ on the Barce Plain project which illustrates the restrictive attitude of Western officials dealing with war economics in the Middle East. Lord Rennel points out that "while the increase of wheat production in Cyrenaica (Barce Plain) was helpful in war, wheat growing on a large scale in peace-time will probably not be economically justifiable. . . ." He then goes on to tell how he received instructions in 1945 that the acreage cultivated was to be reduced to 10,000 in the following year. Before these instructions could be carried out, however, it had become apparent, the governor states, that a world cereal shortage was to be expected and the War Office reversed itself to approve the maximum possible sowing of wheat in the Barce Plain in the autumn of 1946.

To Middle Eastern leaders, with a clear remembrance of events after World War I, MESC policy on "uneconomical industries" could mean only one thing: the Anglo-Americans were thinking in terms of Western exports which would again be available after the war, in deciding where to place the tag "uneconomical." The agency thus could not help being looked upon as another manifestation of commercial imperialism. Under these circumstances native interests must have looked forward with positive relief to the abdication of Allied participation in economic planning for the region and to the termination of MESC and all its works.

¹⁶ B. D. Weinryb, "Industrial Development in the Near East," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, vol. 61 (May 1947), pp. 471-499.

¹⁷ Lord Rennel of Rodd, *British Military Administration of Occupied Territories in Africa* (London, 1948), p. 470.

FAILURE TO STOP INFLATION

There was still another reason why the Center left no lasting residue of inspiration for a concentrated region-wide attack on economic backwardness in the Middle East. Technical assistance, as postwar experience has shown, exposes the foreign administrator to the cross fire of national and racial suspicion. It also delivers him to the cross fire of class interests and inordinate expectations. The Center antagonized what is often called, with more venom than scholarly discrimination, the "ruling classes" of the Middle East by its rude interference with their habit of luxury and laissez-faire. On the other hand, it disappointed what is also quite vaguely called the "progressive elements" for its failure to alter the gross inequities in the social and economic structure in their lands.

This disappointment is reflected, *inter alia*, in a preliminary report for the United Nations *Review of Economic Conditions in the Middle East*.¹⁸ Analyzing the negative effects of the war on economic conditions in that region, the authors complain that wartime industrialization on the whole neither changed the structure of industry nor its place in the economy of the different countries to any considerable extent; that industrial expansion was not equally distributed among the different parts of the region and accrued mostly to the benefit of the more industrialized countries, instead of aiding in the expansion of industry in the more backward sections; and that economic policy during the war accentuated the inequalities of the social structure in the Middle East, rather than easing them.

Indeed, the benefits which accrued to the lower income classes in the Middle East during the war—wages earned in war industries, training in new skills, reduction in farm indebtedness where fixed rents prevailed—were more than offset by the ravages of hyperinflation which the Center proved unable to check effectively. Cost of living indices tripled in Egypt, rose fourfold in Iraq, and increased 500 percent in Syria and Lebanon, and these figures still understate the real level since they are based on official ceiling prices in selected urban centers and ignore the

¹⁸ Document E/1910/Add. 2, Jan. 31, 1951.

flourishing black markets on which all too many people had to buy their necessities. The Center took piecemeal steps to counter this trend, among them the sale of gold on the open market to soak up excess purchasing power; the dumping of commodity stocks on certain markets to break up speculative hoarding rings;¹⁹ and pressure on local authorities to institute rationing, bond sales, anti-inflationary taxes, and controlled grain collection and distribution. But the effect of these remedies was localized and at best temporary. They were in part sabotaged by the profligate spending of Allied military personnel in the tourist-conscious bazaars and by the generous contracts placed by the Armed Forces; for the rest, the Center could not or would not use the full measure of its persuasive power on local governments. Yet, without a regional anti-inflation program, which the Center alone had the facilities to launch, the galloping of prices could not be stopped, since goods tended to be smuggled rapidly from countries with price controls to adjacent noncontrolled areas, thus making the maintenance of controls untenable in the "exporting" country.²⁰

What the Center could have done in regard to such gargantuan questions as land reform, progressive taxation, and income distribution is hard to say. Years of Axis propaganda had made the people of the region extremely sensitive to massive interference in their internal affairs, no matter how well intended. The goodwill of the landlords, controllers of political power in most parts of the area, was needed to advance the immediate demands of the war; as it was, they had been greatly antagonized by import restrictions and by what they considered the creation of "hot-house industries" which would call for protection after the war and interfere with free marketing of cotton abroad and the importation of cheap industrial products at home.²¹ It was safer not to stir up deep turmoil by pushing social reform. Yet there were the complaints of the others, such as the one that MESC had worsened the plight of certain fellahs by supplying tractors to landlords which they in turn rented to their tenants at such

¹⁹ A. R. Prest, *War Economics of Primary Producing Countries* (Cambridge, 1948).

²⁰ Prest, *op. cit.*

²¹ *Egyptian Gazette*, quoted by *Great Britain and the East*, vol. 13, No. 1626 (July 25, 1942).

exorbitant rates as to intensify the hopelessness of the latter's debt burden.²² It is the old story of foreign meddling: some accuse you of doing too much, and others blame you for doing too little.

The men associated with MESC will of course scoff at the attempt to blame them for all this, and rightly so. They were sent to the shores of the Mediterranean to regulate the use of shipping and to prevent starvation of the civilian population. Their orders had been to help win the war. Almost as an afterthought and without lease of power they had nibbled here and there at the towering roadblocks to long-term progress in the Middle East. It was absurd to expect them to dent the blocks dramatically on such short notice and under such circumstances. It would have been different had the Allies from the beginning set up an organization empowered both to handle the short-term tasks of the war and use the leverage of war organization for the genesis of basic reforms. But the concept of Point Four was yet to be born. As it was, a unique opportunity was lost to galvanize the progressive forces of the Middle East into action that might have carried on economic development long after the Middle East Supply Center had taken down its shingle on the shores of the Nile.

ANGLO-AMERICAN TRADE RIVALRY

The second big question arising out of the MESC experiment is why Anglo-American cooperation in the Middle East in the economic field ended so abruptly after the end of the war. The British Government, through the British Middle East Office, did attempt to salvage the wartime relationships focused in and around the Center. Repeated invitations were extended to the United States to make this a joint venture again; Washington not only refused but dissolved with dispatch the last remnants of its own regional setup.

The roots of this parting of the ways lay in the fact that when Americans and Britishers sat down at the common table of the Middle Eastern supply program they forgot to leave the sharp weapons of their trade rivalry outside. British exports and British

²² Prest, *op. cit.*

traders had dominated the commercial relations of the Middle East before the war. Now, the concentration of Britain's production on war goods was seriously impairing its position as a supplier, and U.S. exporters were appearing on the scene to take its place. The grandeur of America's production miracle which sustained the Commonwealth in its hour of greatest need was showing its less welcome side. Unlike Britain, the hands of its export industries tied by the forging of arms, the American colossus could afford not only to place more than 10 million well-armed and well-fed troops in the field, but arm and sustain its Allies, keep its own people in bountiful supply of most comforts, and still respond with alertness to trade opportunities all over the world. This meant that the British Isles were threatened with loss of postwar markets without which they could not survive. In the Middle East, specifically, where a majority of nations belonged to the dollar pool arrangement of the sterling area, it meant a sustained attack on the precious hard currency holdings administered in London.

This situation led British officials in the Middle East to favor certain discriminatory practices against American imports for other than shipping reasons.²³ In doing so, they felt they were acting in the United States' interest as well, since the latter's interests would not be served by a disastrous decimation of the dollar reserves of the Commonwealth. Postwar events were to justify this position, for, by a twist of supreme irony, it could then be claimed that by keeping down dollar purchases in British-controlled areas during the war an ultimate saving had been accomplished for the American taxpayer in his contribution to the European Recovery Program and assorted other campaigns against the dollar shortage.

It may be appropriate here to interject that the political impact of America's great economic margin during World War II has been one of the factors most thoroughly neglected in American analyses of inter-Allied relations. From the viewpoint of our Allies, there was a profound injustice in the fact that the United States could use its economic resources, sheltered from war de-

²³ J. M. Landis, "Anglo-American Cooperation in the Middle East," *Annals of the Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, vol. 240 (July 1945), pp. 64-72.

struction, to usurp political and economic positions left undefended by them because their productive capacity was almost fully committed to the prosecution of the war. The counter-measures they chose to take were, in their eyes, not a matter of cynical ingratitude, as many Americans chose to call it, but a matter of self-defense.

As to the American view of the controversy, the Middle East Supply Center had been a thorn in the side of U.S. exporters from the very beginning. Fabulous prices were offered in the Middle East for American goods—single tires fetched several thousand dollars on the black market—and only the Center stood between them and a thriving business. This hostility continued after the agency had become a joint Anglo-American venture and led to a mounting wave of protests in Washington against its activities. The Center was accused of being a British tool used to discriminate against American goods, and of employing lend-lease goods to strengthen British trade connections.²⁴ The feud was intensified by the fact that, primarily on American insistence, private trade was allowed to handle the bulk of the wartime trade of the Middle East: government procurement through bulk purchases was limited to iron, coal, textiles, medical supplies, farm machinery, and trucks and tires. That the Supply Center more than once thwarted U.S. traders in their attempts to circumvent its licensing policy in collusion with Middle Eastern parties did not improve relations, either.²⁵

U.S. officialdom did not share all the grievances of the exporting trade. In fact, there was for a while considerable impatience with private merchant concerns which tried to pre-empt cargo space at a time when the armies of General Montgomery were girding for their decisive bout with Rommel. But gradually the position of Washington and of American representatives in the Middle East stiffened at the sight of trade restrictions and discrimination being applied against the United States by a country to which, freely and magnificently, billions of dollars' worth of supplies and services had been given in its hour of supreme crisis. American policy, moreover, was committed to

²⁴ "New Trade Waters Chartered," *Business Week*, No. 744, Dec. 4, 1943.

²⁵ *Prest, op. cit.*

the reestablishment of free and competitive trade in the new world order to follow the war. That preferential trade positions should be established by America's principal ally through participation in the allocation of American supplies was manifestly intolerable. The growing official displeasure broke into the open in January 1944, when the Foreign Economic Administration decided to deny the Middle East Supply Center jurisdiction over American exports of cotton yarn and textiles to Middle Eastern countries not under British occupation or control.²⁶ The very tenor of this decision indicated that agreement between the two governments on import allocation for the Middle East had become impossible and that the Center was deemed dominated by British policy considerations or at least to be incapable of asserting a balanced Anglo-American view in the trade policies of the Middle East.

The controversy of course raged inside the Supply Center as well. It was an open secret that the management of import controls was the subject of a prolonged internecine struggle which culminated in the resignation of Mr. Landis early in 1945.²⁷ Shortly thereafter, Mr. Landis publicly discussed his position and grievances in a paper read before the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences in Philadelphia.

This resignation was a turning point in the evolution of the Center and in many ways sealed its doom as a postwar project. From then on, the thinking in Washington moved rapidly to a position which saw in MESC primarily a wartime expedient, characterized by restrictions and controls, which should be abolished as soon as feasible to permit the restoration of free trade in and with the Middle East. It led to the ultimate dissolution of the Supply Center and strongly influenced the United States' subsequent reluctance to re-create or participate in any new permanent framework of Anglo-American economic policy coordination in the Middle East. It even destroyed something Mr.

²⁶ "Business Abroad," *Business Week*, Jan. 29, 1944.

²⁷ Although this struggle was the result of a clash between American and British interests, the lines of battle crossed the lines of nationality and resolved themselves largely into a clash of personalities and concepts. And although the controversy as such existed almost from the beginning of Anglo-American cooperation in the MESC setup, it did not effectively hamper the conduct of operations until 1945.

Landis and others had looked upon as a desirable improvement in the mechanism of our foreign policy: the substitution of a regional approach for a country-by-country approach. Unlike Britain, the United States failed to operate an office of regional policy coordination after MESC ended.

CONCLUSIONS

In summary, the feats and failures of the Middle East Supply Center point up the following conclusions:

1. The Middle East has untapped sources of productive capacity which with proper assistance can be effectively harnessed not only to its own defense and sustenance but to Western rearmament as well.²⁸

2. During World War II this was effectively brought about by the establishment of an independent Anglo-American civilian agency entrusted with the rationalization of imports and the expansion of productivity in the region.

3. A large measure of MESC's success was due to its ability and readiness to render technical assistance and to the skilful use of its "spigot" position for Western supplies to make economic policy despite the lack of enforcement machinery.

4. The combination of military planning (by the Middle East Command) and civilian coordination (by the Middle East Supply Center) revealed possibilities of regional cooperation far greater than the political dissensions of the region had made apparent.

5. Regional economic cooperation in the Middle East during World War II also revealed an opportunity to use the leverage of war for the accelerated promotion of long-range economic development in underdeveloped areas.

6. This opportunity was insufficiently exploited because it was not understood from the beginning and was too thoroughly subordinated to the demands of war expediency.

7. Failure to provide adequate native representation in the

²⁸The following classic comment is worth recalling: "The two [Assembly] plants employed over five thousand of the poor hopeless citizens of the Backward Races, and they were so shiftless and unteachable that they could do no better than learn how to turn out trucks at the rate of one every five minutes." J. Sayre, *Persian Gulf Command* (New York, 1945).

MESC design for defense jeopardized the postwar continuation of its design for long-range development.

8. Failure of the Western Powers to settle in advance their conflicting interests in the region destroyed the usefulness of wartime cooperation as a framework for permanent synchronization of their foreign policy in the Middle East, at least in the economic field.

9. Wartime experience in the Middle East has shown that certain advantages can be gained by regional coordination of our foreign service operations as against the habitual country-by-country approach of U. S. diplomacy.

10. The threat of war can be a mighty ferment of economic development. Regional defense pacts can bring progress no less than protection if they are conceived as military perimeters behind which the United States, working on the basis of equality with the other participants, can proceed with renewed hurry and energy to secure weak lands against poverty as it braces them against aggression.

THE TUNISIAN NATIONALIST MOVEMENT

Four Decades of Evolution

Benjamin Rivlin

FRANCE HAS BEEN in Tunisia for over seventy years; for forty of these years it has had to deal with a steadily growing dissident nationalist movement among the Muslim population.¹ Following the pattern that is discernible throughout most of the colonial world, the birth of Tunisian nationalism took place only after France had been in Tunisia for several decades and a new generation of Tunisians had grown up under the influence of its ideas and culture. To be sure, there was some armed opposition to the French and considerable resentment of their presence when the Protectorate was established in 1881.² But actually it was not until some thirty years later that the latent opposition and resentment, always present in a subject people, manifested itself in the form of a nationalist movement.

Early signs of the Tunisian nationalist movement appeared during the first decade of the 20th century among educated elements of the upper classes. In 1912 the first organized body of nationalists emerged in the persons of a group of young intel-

¹ In addition to the Muslim population, numbering 3 million, the native population includes some 75,000 Jews. The European population of 250,000 includes approximately 150,000 French, 80,000 Italians, and some 6,000 Maltese.

² France's position in Tunisia is regulated by two treaties: the Treaty of Bardo of 1881 and that of La Marsa of 1883. The actual term "protectorate" does not appear until the second treaty.

♦ BENJAMIN RIVLIN returned in the fall of 1951 from French North Africa and France, which he visited as a recipient of an Area Research Travel Grant from the Social Science Research Council to study current trends in Franco-Muslim relations. During World War II he served with the Office of Strategic Services in Washington and North Africa and more recently worked on African affairs in the research branches of the Department of State and the Trusteeship Division of the United Nations. He is currently a member of the Political Science Department of Brooklyn College.

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lectuals known as the Young Tunisians. Influenced by the culture and ideas of Western liberalism and patterned and inspired by the Young Turk movement, the Young Tunisians preached the doctrine of liberal nationalism, calling for the application of the principle of national self-determination to Tunisia and for the equalization of rights and liberties between Tunisians and the French inhabitants of the country.

This program brought the young nationalists less into conflict with the French authorities than with a group of old religious traditionalists called the Old Turbans. The Old Turbans looked with disdain at the modernist tendencies of the Young Tunisians. Neither did they find much cause for objecting to French rule, since the Protectorate administration maintained and respected Muslim traditions and the position of the religious fraternities in the country. However, in 1919, when the French proposed to open parts of the *habous* land (land under the control of religious bodies) for colonization, the Old Turbans no longer found the French to be such staunch supporters of Muslim tradition. The end result was that they overlooked whatever objections they had to the Young Tunisians and joined with them in presenting a solid Tunisian front in protest against the French action.

This collaboration between the Old Turbans and the Young Tunisians is the first example of the eclectic dualism — Western modernism and traditional Islam — that characterizes Tunisian nationalism to this day. Although the joining of forces was made initially on the specific question of the *habous* lands, it took on a more stable character as the two groups worked together against the French administration. The same year that the Old Turbans and Young Tunisians began to cooperate, the world was caught in the swell of idealism inspired by Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points. Fired by the Wilsonian doctrine of the right of all people to national self-determination, a delegation of Young Tunisians and Old Turbans went to Paris to plead Tunisia's case before President Wilson and the Paris Peace Conference. It was not long before the Tunisians realized their first — but not their last — rebuff in appealing to the conscience of the world.

THE DESTOUR

After failing in these efforts, the nationalists in 1920 organized the first Tunisian political party. Sheikh Abd-el-Aziz Taalbi, whose pamphlet *La Tunisie Martyre* rallied the nationalists after their rebuff in Paris, was the party's organizer and prime mover. The thesis of Taalbi's pamphlet — that the Tunisian people were growing up and that the time had come to grant these people quasi-independence through a constitution — provided the party's platform. It chose "Destour," meaning Constitution, as its name. In part, this name referred to the liberal Tunisian constitution of 1857 which proclaimed the equality of all before law but which did not remain in force for long.³ Its demise, in fact, predated the French occupation of Tunisia. In part, the name referred to the current demands the nationalists were making for a new constitution. The Destour program demanded "the emancipation of the Tunisian people from the bonds of slavery" and set down the following 9-point program for its achievement: 1) creation of a deliberative assembly composed of Tunisian and French deputies possessing equal rights and elected by universal suffrage; 2) responsibility of the government to the assembly; 3) separation of legislative, judicial, and executive powers; 4) official posts to capable Tunisians; 5) equal pay for Tunisian and French officials performing equal work; 6) elective municipal councils; 7) compulsory primary education; 8) participation of Tunisians in the acquisition of crown lands and of lands for colonization; 9) freedom of press and assembly.⁴

Ever since its formulation in 1920, this program has served, with certain modifications, as the core of nationalist demands. It cannot be said that the nationalists have succeeded in getting any one of these demands permanently accepted. In the light of today's crisis being caused in large part by the inability of the

³ See A. Girault, *Colonisation et Législation Coloniale* (Paris, 1928), vol. 5, pp. 2, 70. For background and early history of Tunisian nationalism see S. H. Roberts, *History of French Colonial Policy* (2 vols., London, 1929); H. I. Priestly, *France Overseas* (New York, 1938); and Rodd Balek, "La Tunisie Après la Guerre," *L'Afrique Française*, vol. 30 (June 1920).

⁴ Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Survey of International Affairs, 1937*, vol. 1, p. 175.

Franco-Tunisian negotiators to agree on the basis of representation in the proposed Tunisian legislature — the nationalists insisting that the body be entirely Tunisian in election and composition and the French insisting that French inhabitants in Tunisia be accorded the franchise and representation in the legislature — it is interesting to note that in the first of the 1920 nine points the right to French representation is admitted. On this basic point of a Tunisian legislature, there has been a significant shift in conception on the part of the nationalists: it may well be that were such a demand presented today, the French would find it a welcome moderation of current Tunisian demands. However, thirty years ago they would have none of it nor of most of the other eight points. All Destourian efforts to stimulate French action on this program failed and Taalbi went into voluntary exile in protest against French inaction. Soon his exile became involuntary as the French pursued a "get tough" policy with the nationalists.

By the middle of the twenties, the nationalist movement, weakened by loss of leadership and repressive French policy, declined and fell into inactivity, and it was not until the early thirties, on the occasion of the celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of the French protectorate over Tunisia, that there was a revival in nationalist activity. Characterizing the nationalist resurgence was its growing identification with the masses. A religious issue first aroused popular support for the nationalists. A French law of 1923 offered French citizenship to qualified Tunisians. In conjunction with religious leaders, the nationalists launched an intense campaign against French naturalization, which was condemned as an act inconsistent with the true tenets of Islam. In fact naturalization was considered in the eyes of many Muslims as heresy since it involved the acceptance of French law and the jurisdiction of French courts in place of Islamic law and Muslim courts.

Up to this time, nothing had generated so much anti-French feeling as had this campaign, which reached its climax in mass demonstrations and violence over the burial of naturalized Tunisians in Muslim cemeteries. Feeling was so strong among Tunisians that the French were able to resolve the controversy only

by the creation of separate cemeteries for the Muslims who had accepted French naturalization since normal Tunisian cemeteries were forbidden to them. The effect of this unhappy "affair of the cemeteries" was to demonstrate to the Tunisians their distinctness from the French and to underscore religion as a unifying bond of the Tunisian people. That the French chose this time to hold the Catholic Eucharistic Congress at Carthage, ancient city of St. Augustine, did not help the situation.⁵

SCHISM IN THE DESTOUR: THE OLD AND THE NEW

From its inception, the Destour Party was perhaps more a movement than a political party *per se*. It encompassed within it various shades of opinion — religious-traditionalists and Western modernists, extremists and moderates, aristocrats and middle class. It is not surprising, therefore, that differing viewpoints and rifts should result. By 1934, it proved impossible to contain all the factions within the single body. The differing evaluations of the experience of the Destour since its revival made by a young modern-minded intellectual element and the traditional aristocratic elements in the party's Executive Committee brought on a schism in the party's leadership. Although the Destour had succeeded in evoking mass anti-French manifestations, it had not embarked upon a program of political indoctrination of the masses. The young liberal element felt that the party's experience since its revival had proven the desirability and the necessity of broadening the base of the nationalist movement. It felt that the movement had to become a mass movement based on an awakened national consciousness directed into collective action toward political liberation and social emancipation. The older, more conservative element did not attribute the same importance to political indoctrination of the masses, and the result was the breakup of the Destour into the Old and Neo-Destour parties.

Soon after its appearance on the scene, Neo-Destour became the leading nationalist party. Its activities, sparked by the exuberance of youth, eclipsed those of the Old Destour. In the ensuing years, several attempts were made to bring the two factions

⁵ For developments during the thirties see Charles-André Julien, "France and Islam," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 18 (July 1940), pp. 680-99.

together but to no avail. The most hopeful attempt came in 1937 when Sheikh Taalbi returned from exile. As the founder of the party, and having been away when the breach arose, it was hoped that he could effect a reconciliation. However, even he failed. His sympathies were with the older group and the Neo-Destour refused to knuckle under. In 1946, another attempt was made to heal the breach. A national front was formed, but this too did not last. Besides doctrinal differences between the two groups, there seems to be an irreconcilable clash in temperament and personality of the respective leaderships. While Taalbi was alive there was no love lost between him and Habib Bourguiba, the dynamic Secretary-General (later President) of the Neo-Destour. Today the Old Destour still is vitriolic in its condemnation of Habib Bourguiba and other Neo-Destour leaders. For its part, the Neo-Destour demonstrates its scorn for the Old Destour by ignoring its existence.

The Neo-Destour achieved its superiority over the Old Destour through an intensified campaign of mass education: organizing youth groups, holding demonstrations, and establishing a party organization throughout the country. Incidents of violence between the two factions occurred frequently. The Neo-Destour borrowed some of its militant techniques from Fascist Italy — uniforms, parades, etc. The intensity with which the Neo-Destour operated soon brought the new party into difficulty with the French authorities. As the French took strong measures against Neo-Destour activity, incidents of violence increased. Finally, in September 1934, Bourguiba and other Neo-Destour leaders were sent into exile in the Sahara. With the coming into power of the Popular Front regime in France in 1936, the French relaxed the stringent control of nationalist activities that had been instituted by previous governments. Bourguiba, Taalbi, and the other exiled nationalist leaders were allowed to return, freedom of the press was restored, and Premier Leon Blum announced that his government's policy aimed at enabling Tunisians to participate in the administration of their affairs, as the first step toward Tunisia's emancipation. The Old Destour remained aloof but the Neo-Destour welcomed this new liberal policy and at a Party Congress in the fall of 1937 enthusiastically

cally went on record favoring collaboration with the French Government.

The "era of good feeling," however, did not last. With the fall of the Blum Ministry and the changed attitude of the new Government, as evidenced by the abandonment of the *Projet Violette*, the reform program in Algeria, and the suppression of the *Comité d'Action Marocaine* and the *Parti du Peuple Algérien*, the nationalist parties in Tunisia's sister North African territories under French rule, the *Neo-Destour* discarded its policy of collaboration with the French. Good feeling gave way to friction and again the French clamped down on the nationalists. In April 1938 Bourguiba and other nationalist leaders were imprisoned, and both the Old and *Neo-Destour* parties were dissolved. Dissolution of the parties hardly meant the falling apart of the nationalist movement. It just meant that the parties went underground, keeping their organizations intact even under the shadow of the stringent state of siege rule which France proclaimed in Tunisia with the outbreak of World War II in 1939.

TUNISIAN NATIONALISM AND WORLD WAR II

The cataclysmic events of the war in France and North Africa were felt of course in Tunisia and had their effect on Tunisian nationalism. The country came under German occupation from November 1942 to May 1943 and the nationalists suddenly found themselves in a strange and unique situation. The Nazis played up to them for obvious selfish reasons that had nothing to do with the inherent merits of their program. At one swoop, the nationalists became the possessors of freedoms that had been denied them since 1938 as well as some privileges that they had never enjoyed. The nationalists were permitted to throw off their clandestine mantles and to operate openly and freely. Bourguiba, who was in prison in France, was released upon the intervention of the Germans and returned to Tunisia. But the opportunity to exercise their new found freedoms, which included, besides the publication of a newspaper, the broadcasting of anti-French nationalist propaganda on the Tunisian radio, was short-lived.

When the Allies ejected the Germans from Tunisia in May

1943, the French reassumed control over the government and the nationalist parties became again illegal bodies. Besides the reimposition of the state of siege rule, the French stimulated more anti-French sentiment among the Tunisians by deposing the popular reigning sovereign, Moncef Bey. The cause for Moncef's removal was alleged to be pro-Axis sympathies detected during the German occupation, but it was quite apparent that the real reason was that the Bey was too favorably disposed toward the nationalists.

The freedoms accorded the nationalists by the Nazis and the willingness with which they accepted them gave rise to the charge that the nationalists, particularly Bourguiba and the Neo-Destour, were Nazi and Fascist collaborators. These charges were recently raised again in certain French circles. No doubt it is true that since France was an Ally, the Tunisian nationalists were not overly enthusiastic for the Allied side and that France's defeat in 1940 gave them considerable satisfaction. The Arabic aphorism "the enemy of your enemy is your friend" undoubtedly made much sense to the anti-French Tunisians. Yet despite these very strong propensities toward collaboration with the Germans, it is not borne out by the evidence that Bourguiba and the Neo-Destour were collaborators of the ilk of Quisling or Laval. A reading of a famous speech by Bourguiba over the Italian Bari radio, which is cited as evidence of his collaborationist activities, fails to substantiate these charges.

AFTERMATH OF THE WAR: CHALLENGE AND CRISIS

Besides the consequences resulting from Tunisia's direct contact with the war, the conflict had another notable effect in Tunisia. Nationalist expectations were heightened, just as they were in India, Indonesia, Burma, and elsewhere in the colonial world, by the noble sentiments of the Atlantic Charter, the United Nations Charter, and the "principles" which the Allies said would govern the postwar world. Manifestly a return to the *status quo ante* was impossible in the colonial world in general and in Tunisia as well. However, while the nationalists were anxiously looking forward to the changes that the postwar world was to bring to their status, the French either were less

willing to recognize fully the facts of life or they just were not appreciative of them.

Reminiscent of the Young Tunisians' and Old Turbans' appeal to the Paris Peace Conference was the hope of the nationalists that the international community would come to their aid. Thus they intensified their efforts both within and without Tunisia. Bourguiba slipped out from under French surveillance in 1945 and made his way to Cairo, where he established contact with the Arab League. He also visited Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Transjordan, and Saudi Arabia, and in 1946 he went to the United States to plead the case of the Tunisian nationalists at the United Nations headquarters at Lake Success and before State Department officials in Washington.

Within Tunisia, the nationalists were equally busy on various fronts. In the postwar period, an all-Tunisian labor organization, the Union Générale des Travailleurs (UGTT), took shape. This organization is perhaps the strongest arm of the Neo-Destour. Through it the Neo-Destour is able to effect political strikes and work stoppages as demonstrations of its strength and as a means of applying pressure. The UGTT is significant in still another way, in that it demonstrates the anti-Communist character of the Neo-Destour. Its mere existence represents a break in the hold which the French Communist controlled CGT has over labor organizations in North Africa. In this Tunisia stands as a marked contrast to Morocco or Algeria. In July 1951, the Neo-Destour brought the UGTT into the anti-Communist International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), again manifesting its anti-Communist character.

The great success of the UGTT in organizing the Tunisian workers and in marshalling their support for the Neo-Destour is evidence of the alertness and astuteness of the Neo-Destour leadership. The growth of the proletariat in the cities, resulting from overpopulation in settled rural areas and the impoverishment of the nomadic tribes, created a ripe situation for the Communists. But the action of the Neo-Destour, which is anti-Communist, in seizing upon the situation forestalled a Communist build-up among the Tunisian workers.

In the field of agriculture, another nationalistically oriented organization, the Union Générale de l'Agriculture Tunisienne (UGAT), appeared with the twofold purpose of fighting against the ignorance of the Tunisian fellah and against "the policy of racial discrimination which obtains in all sectors of our country's life and which by favoritism and privilege has made of our country a fertile source of material riches without the least respect for our rights."⁶ Two other allied organizations—the Tunisian (non-French) Association of Chambers of Commerce and the Feminist Movement—round out the fields in which Tunisian nationalism has broadened its activities in the seven years since the end of the war. All these developments within and without Tunisia together with frequent demonstrations of strength in Tunisia, increased the pressure on the French to initiate changes.

Among the French, there were those who thought that the French Union would provide the vehicle for solving the Tunisian problem as well as other problems with French territories overseas. However, in the case of Tunisia and Morocco this road was complicated by the fact that these territories as protectorates possessed sovereignty distinct from France. It was hoped to overcome this juridical obstacle by establishing Tunisia and Morocco as Associated States of the French Union. But the French Union is still a myth in many respects even for territories in less tenuous juridical positions than that of the North African protectorates, and Tunisia and Morocco to this day stand outside the French Union notwithstanding frequent popular reference to them as Associated States. The idea of being part of the French Union as an Associated State has been categorically rejected by the nationalists as inconsistent with Tunisian sovereignty. They view the French Union with deep suspicion, fearing it to be a guise for continued French domination.

This does not mean, however, that all Tunisians objected to a continued close relationship between France and Tunisia. As a matter of fact, despite their great antipathy toward French rule there is a great admiration of France and even an identification

⁶ From the opening address of the Secretary-General of UGAT at its second national congress, May 23-25, 1951.

with French culture by many of the nationalist, particularly Neo-Destour, leaders. A good many of them, including Bourguiba himself, were educated in France, have French wives, and consider many aspects of French culture as their own. The type of relationship with France acceptable to the Tunisian nationalists is to be found in Bourguiba's statement: "What Tunisia demands is the status of an independent and sovereign country tied to France by a freely negotiated treaty of alliance which guarantees to the latter its strategic, economic and cultural interests. The Government of Tunisia will be national, constitutional and democratic, under the aegis of the legitimate Sovereign of the country."⁷ The nationalists similarly were cool to the several reform projects introduced by the French between 1945 and 1950. The reason for their attitude is best summarized by Bourguiba's statement: "It is not administrative posts we want. We want to govern our country." The reforms of 1945 and 1947 hardly offered that much.

*FRANCO-TUNISIAN DÉTENTE: THE GOVERNMENT
OF NEGOTIATION*

In 1950, Bourguiba spelled out the Neo-Destour's demands in a 7-point program which stressed the necessity of reasserting Tunisian sovereignty by the allocation of greater responsibility to Tunisian officials while decreasing the authority of the French Residency. This was to be accomplished not at one fell swoop but by a series of reforms. Bourguiba's program, significantly enough, soft-pedaled any demand for immediate independence and omitted any of the Pan-Arab references which so infuriate the French. He went even further in holding out the olive branch to France when he said "we feel that these constitutional reforms, which are needed to promote our national independence, would strengthen the spirit of cooperation between Tunisia and France. This cooperation, in our view, is a geographic necessity. We are not unaware that we are militarily weak, and strategically too important, to do without the assistance of a great Power. This Power we would like to be France, in so far as she is willing to recognize the legitimacy of our claims. We

⁷ "La France devant le Problème Tunisien." Statement issued in Cairo, October 15, 1945.

are always ready to cooperate with her on terms of equality." To this Bourguiba added a warning: "Failing this, I feel, weighing my words carefully, that Tunisia would go through a dangerous and chaotic period which neither France nor Tunisia would have to be thankful for, and which would certainly not be a matter of indifference to those Powers interested in real peace and stability in that vital part of the Mediterranean world."⁸

By 1950, forces within France which had felt all along that France would have to introduce fundamental changes in Tunisia succeeded in getting the French Government to consider reforms that were more in line with what the nationalists were demanding. A combination of several factors helped bring about the new course of action by the French Government. First was the fact that Tunisia's eastern neighbor, Libya, was moving rapidly toward independence under the auspices of the United Nations and that the effect of Libyan independence was being felt in Tunisia and elsewhere in French North Africa. France could not stand pat in the face of the Tunisian nationalists' amply justified assertion that they were more qualified to govern themselves than were the Libyans and the growing evidence of discontent and restlessness among the Tunisian people. The second factor was the reasonableness of Bourguiba's presentation of the nationalists' case. This certainly made it less difficult for the French to adopt a more conciliatory position.

The announcement of France's decision came in an address by Foreign Minister Robert Schuman on June 11, 1950, in which he revealed that France was sending a new Resident Minister in the person of M. Louis Perillier, who was to be entrusted with the "task of trying to understand Tunisia, and to lead her to the full development of her resources, and to the independence which is the final objective of all territories of the French Union." Schuman added that the objective could "only be reached by stages." Bourguiba immediately welcomed the change of attitude, saying "if France is willing, of her own accord, to lead Tunisia to independence, she will have won our hearts in a way

⁸*Recent Developments in Tunisia (April 1950-May 1951)*. Published by the Neo-Destour of Tunisia (Paris 1951), p. 18. This publication contains all the official statements, documents, and letters from which most of the quotations in this section are taken.

that will serve her purpose more effectively than the possession of our territory." However, he stipulated that a timetable must be set for each of the various stages that Tunisia must go through.

It was apparent from these statements that a basis had been established for a resolution of the Tunisian problem through the peaceful cooperation of the French and Tunisians. France recognized the inherent right of the Tunisians to independence and the nationalists acknowledged the existence of a close relationship between France and Tunisia and the need of proceeding by stages to the final goal. Within two months of the clearing of the air, a new Government was established in Tunisia. Headed by Mohamed Chenik, an independent nationalist who had been a close associate of the deposed Moncef Bey, as Prime Minister, and including Salah Ben Yousef, the Secretary-General of the Neo-Destour, as Minister of Justice, the new Government was designated a "Government of negotiation." An official announcement stated that "its task is to negotiate, in the name of H. H. the Bey, such institutional modifications as are required to lead Tunisia, by successive stages, toward internal autonomy." What the successive stages would be and what the duration of each would be was not clearly defined.

For a while, things moved along smoothly. On October 1, 1950, Perillier declared that discussions on the subject of reforms had taken place in "an atmosphere of mutual understanding and confidence" between the Tunisian members of the Government and high officials of the Residency. However, complications soon set in. The French population in Tunisia, exerting pressure on their conservative friends in Paris, almost brought an abortive end to this experiment in Franco-Tunisian relations. For several months the "Government of negotiation" hung on by a thread. Several times it appeared imminent that the nationalists would quit the Government in protest against the dilatory attitude of the French. However, heads were kept on both sides and finally on February 8, 1951, a series of six reform decrees were issued by the Bey.⁹ The essence of the reforms was to grant the Tunisians a greater measure of self-rule by increasing the participation of

⁹ For text of the decrees of February 8, 1951, see *Middle East Journal*, vol. 5 (Summer 1951), pp. 354-59.

Tunisians at all levels of government administration. The Tunisian members of the Government were to be given far greater latitude in running their departments and in proposing legislation in the fields under their authority, by greatly reducing the role of the Secretary-General of the Protectorate,¹⁰ who was shorn of the power to countersign all ministerial orders. This does not mean that the French yielded their control over Ministerial actions. Henceforth, this was to be done only by the office of the Resident-General, and it was understood that it would be employed far less drastically than previously. These changes represented some very substantial concessions on the part of France to the claims of the Tunisian nationalists. For their part, the nationalists also made some concessions. Since reform was being obtained within the framework of the present treaty arrangements between Tunisia and France, it was understood that they would refrain from demanding the abrogation or revision of the Treaty of Protectorate. Furthermore, it was understood that for the time being demands for immediate independence would be dropped and emphasis would be in the direction of a cooperative Franco-Tunisian undertaking to bring about *internal autonomy*.

The initial success of the "Government of negotiation" was hailed in many French circles and by the Neo-Destour as a development of far-reaching significance, as in fact it seemed to be. It certainly signified a radical change in the long history of tension between Muslim nationalists in French North Africa and the French Government. It also stood in marked contrast to the experiences France and other Western governments were having with native nationalism elsewhere in French North Africa and in the Middle East. At a time when relations between Western powers and native populations in colonial and quasi-colonial territories seemed to be going only from bad to worse, the Tunisian experience appeared as a bright beacon showing the way to peaceful cooperation. A leading French newspaper referred to it as "the pilot-experience of the Maghreb."¹¹ Hedi Nour, Assistant Secretary-General of the Neo-Destour and editor of its organ

¹⁰ The Secretary-General is the second highest French official in Tunisia, ranking after the Resident-General. He and his office, the Secretariat, exercised direct control over all the affairs of the various government departments until the reforms of February 8, 1951.

¹¹ *Le Monde*, May 3, 1951.

Mission, declared: "The Tunisian reforms form a bridge of friendship between two forms of civilizations. Tunisia is at a turning point in history. Everyone recognizes that. The measures undertaken today constitute a test. If we obtain a result, and there is no reason to doubt that we shall, we could influence France's entire Muslim policy."¹²

Perhaps no decision taken by any nationalist leaders in Tunisia throughout the four decades of the existence of a nationalist movement can compare in importance with the decision of the Neo-Destour to enter the Tunisian Government. Basically it involved a reversal of the trend the nationalist movement had been pursuing since the failure of the Popular Front in France. Particularly since the end of World War II, Tunisian nationalism had grown more militant, more demanding, and less compromising. Collaboration with the French authorities seemed ruled out by the repeated assertion that nothing short of independence could satisfy nationalist aspirations, and by the lack of confidence the nationalists felt for French words and deeds. There was ever increasing evidence that the nationalists were preparing to go over the heads of the French by appealing to the international community for aid and support. The Tunisian nationalists, with Neo-Destourians in the forefront, started to work closely with the Arab League, and they helped establish the Maghreb office in Cairo, whose sole purpose was to fight French rule in North Africa. Bourguiba's travels throughout the Middle East and in other parts of the world, during which he pleaded the cause of Tunisian nationalism, have already been noted. To be sure, there always existed within the Neo-Destour the tendency to seek satisfaction of Tunisia's national aspirations by means of peaceful cooperation with the French, particularly when it appeared that a basis for such cooperation existed, as was the case when the Blum Government was in power. Nevertheless, the whole course of events during and after World War II, both in Tunisia and elsewhere in the colonial world, hardly pointed to the Neo-Destour's decision to enter into the "Government of negotiation."

The importance of this shift in policy is heightened when one considers that for the Neo-Destour it entailed the very serious

¹² *L'Aube* (Paris), Feb. 15, 1951.

risk of being discredited in the eyes of the Tunisian masses. Upon undertaking negotiations with the French, the Neo-Destour came in for some very sharp criticism from Pan-Arab and Pan-Islamic circles, where the prevalent view was that nothing could be attained by entering into an "unholy alliance" with French colonialism. Cooperation with the French meant compromising something that was not reconcilable. In effect the Neo-Destour was accused of betraying the true cause of Tunisian nationalism by its unprecedented gesture of trust and friendliness toward France.

The Old Destour, which had been relatively quiescent, was stimulated to action. So long as its program and that of the Neo-Destour were similar, it could not compete with the latter's dynamic leadership which had captured the imagination and the support of most Tunisians. However, with the Neo-Destour leaders embarking on a course that invited attack on highly emotional grounds that might well sever the ties between them and the masses, the Old Destour sprung to life. It is not entirely coincidental that the Old Destour should, on February 1, 1951, have launched a newspaper called, significantly, *Indépendance*. In its first issue this newspaper featured an article headlined "Pour l'Indépendance Contre la Collaboration," which said in part: "It is perfectly clear that those whose object is to lead us by successive stages (in order to avoid stirring strong emotions) toward an internal autonomy, do not only take a false route but are going contrary to nationalist aspirations." In the same issue Salah Farhat, leader of the Old Destour, derided the acceptance of a ministry in the French-sponsored "Government of negotiation" as a "disavowal of all our efforts and all our sacrifices for the cause of our country." It was "falling into a trap with hands and feet tied." When the actual reforms were announced on February 8, the Old Destour labeled them "regressive reforms" that "strengthened the protectorate regime." The Neo-Destour was repeatedly charged with having "duped" the Tunisian people and of having broken faith with them by collaborating with colonialism. Its leaders were charged with having put personal ambition above the interests of the people. It was also accused of having broken a solemn agreement entered into in Cairo by the

nationalists of Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia not to undertake separate negotiations with France. Repeatedly the assertion was made by the Old Destour (perhaps it was a case of wishful thinking) that the Tunisian people were beginning to realize that they had been "sold out" by the Neo-Destour.

Obviously, the Old Destour was making a serious bid to win popular support away from the Neo-Destour. In this bid it did not content itself with negative criticism. On the positive side it called for the establishment of a National Front in Tunisia in which all nationalists — Old Destourians, Neo-Destourians, and independents — would work together and in closer collaboration with the Arab League and with other North African nationalist movements. To bolster the Old Destour's position, *Indépendance* published a declaration by the Amir Abd-el-Krim and an interview with Azzam Pasha, in which both frowned upon the Neo-Destour's collaboration with the French and exhorted all Tunisians to unite in a national front for the attainment of independence.¹³

The Neo-Destour paid no overt attention to the Old Destour's demands for a National Front. In their minds, the Old Destour represented nobody but a few disgruntled, self-seeking, short-sighted, narrow-minded Tunisians who were envious of the Neo-Destour's successful rapport with the Tunisian population. As for the charges of having betrayed the cause of Tunisian nationalism, the Neo-Destour rejected them completely. Its leaders insisted that so long as the French Government was sincere in offering to recognize Tunisian aspirations and was prepared to implement this recognition with action, it was incumbent upon the Neo-Destour to work with the French. Doing so did not make the Neo-Destour any less nationalistic or less patriotic, argued its leaders. Independence still remained their goal.

In cooperating with the French, they were merely seeking the attainment of the ultimate objective in a realistic way. It was a matter of tactics, whose choice was dictated by two basic considerations. Firstly was the absence of any force outside France that held promise of wielding the power to bring about change in Tunisia. No matter how strong were the sympathies of the Arab

¹³ *Indépendance*, April 19, June 14, 1951.

League for Tunisian national aspirations, there was little the League could do about it. France, on the other hand, had the power and could employ it in a way to help the cause of Tunisian nationalism. Secondly was the necessity of laying solid groundwork to support an appeal by Tunisia above the head of France should Franco-Tunisian cooperation fail. Thus, the leaders of the Neo-Destour felt that they had to accept the French invitation in order to put to a test France's sincerity, once and for all. Their theory was to hand France a rope and then see whether it would use it to tie a friendly Tunisia to itself or whether it would use it to hang itself. Furthermore, they felt that they had to enter into the "Government of negotiation" in order to demonstrate dramatically and publicly for all the world to see that Tunisian nationalism was not synonymous with fanatic obstructionism. Thus they would be proving their own sincerity and reasonableness, while putting France on the spot.

While the Neo-Destour leaders reasoned that there was a lot more to be gained by entering into negotiations with France than by staying out, they did not lose sight of the great risk their decision carried. The "Government of negotiation" and the Neo-Destour assumed far from a "milk-toast" character. The reforms of February 8, 1951, were hailed as just the beginning, and the Neo-Destour called for continued negotiations to lead up to the second round of reforms in the near future. It is difficult to evaluate at the moment the lasting effect that the Neo-Destour's policy of cooperation with the French had upon the Nationalist movement in Tunisia. Nowhere is evidence to be found of a great deflection of popular support from the Neo-Destour to the Old Destour, although it is quite apparent that the Old Destour seems to have had new life breathed into it.

BREAKDOWN AND CRISIS: THE IMPATIENT VS. THE IMMOBILE

The Neo-Destour did not find itself long in the equivocal position into which the respectability of cooperation with France had put it. Whether the Neo-Destour leaders found their new position too uncomfortable because of fears that the Old Destour might make serious inroads into their popular support; whether

they were truly dismayed at the reluctance with which French officials were implementing the reforms of February 1951; or whether the trend was just part of a preconceived plan that they had, is difficult to say. In any case, it was not long before the Neo-Destour and the independent nationalists in the "Government of negotiation" were again at loggerheads with the French. There were two points of contention: the first concerned the implementation of the February reforms; the second involved the next stage of reforms.

As to the first point, the "Government of negotiation" and the Neo-Destour charged the French with failure in implementing the reforms. Specifically they charged that the veto power over decisions and actions of the Tunisian ministers, which was to have been greatly curtailed by the limitation of the Secretary-General's power, returned through the back door by the creation of a Direction des Affaires Politiques et Administratives in the Residency with the very same veto power. Actually the reforms did not provide for the complete short-circuiting of French control over proposed decrees. The Resident-General's assent was still necessary before a decree could be laid before the Bey for his signature. What the reforms were supposed to provide was more autonomy for the Tunisian ministers. It was *understood* that the power of veto would be used less extensively, thus widening the authority of the Tunisian ministers. The fact that the Residency officials tended to hold up legislation for long periods was admitted by Resident-General Perillier, who attributed this to the officials being unaccustomed to their new duties in the performance of which they displayed excessive zeal.¹⁴

The Tunisians asserted also that reluctance to accept the reforms of February 8 was not limited to French civil servants. Prime Minister Chenik charged that the French ministers in his Cabinet tended "to ignore the decrees of February 8" as well as "to consider themselves bound by no obligations to the Tunisian authorities, or to the Head of the Government of Tunisia whom they may with impunity rebuke as they please." Undoubtedly, there was a lack of enthusiasm bordering on obstructionism in the attitude of many responsible French officials toward implement-

¹⁴ *The Times* (London), Aug. 17, 1951.

ing the reforms. In this they reflected the attitude of the European population of Tunisia, which almost succeeded in preventing the reforms from being adopted and which now continued its fight to prevent them from being put into effect. The attitude of the French community in Tunisia, which was being flaunted among other places in the French section of the Grand Conseil, where discussion of political matters is forbidden, so enraged the Tunisian ministers that they refused to participate in the spring 1951 session of the council.¹⁵

On the matter of new reforms, the "Government of negotiation" and the Neo-Destour called for "Step No. 2" to be initiated without further delay. Prime Minister Chenik, in a letter to the Resident-General, indicated what the next step should be—the replacement of the consultative Grand Conseil by a Representative Assembly. The Prime Minister's proposal was reinforced by the Bey's address from the Throne in May in which he charged the Cabinet with making the necessary arrangements to establish a system of elected representatives in the country. The address was delivered without the prior approval of the French Resident-General and consequently it touched off a minor crisis. Perillier demanded an audience with the Bey as soon as he learned of it. To this audience he came accompanied by spahis and a detachment of troops, an unusual display of pomp which was widely interpreted as an intimidating gesture.¹⁶ The Resident-General reproached the Bey for having delivered the speech "inspired by a certain party" and he proposed the dismissal of Chenik and Ben Youssef "for the good of the throne."

However, the Bey was not to be intimidated. Instead, he forwarded a letter to French President Vincent Auriol complaining about the threatening tone of the audience. This minor crisis was duly settled: a soothing letter from President Auriol and a less demanding attitude by Perillier did the trick. But the question of a Tunisian legislature was by no means settled. The

¹⁵ The Grand Conseil was established in 1922 as the central advisory body in Tunisia and has been reorganized several times since then. It consists of two sections—one French and one Tunisian—and may discuss and act upon only economic and social questions.

¹⁶ *Le Monde*, May 23, 1951; P. M. Dessinges, "Oppositions Destouriennes," *L'Observateur*, May 28, 1951.

French position was that reforms could not be introduced hastily. "Those who would rush the stages render a disservice to their country," declared Perillier. He admitted that the reforms of February were only a step in the direction of internal autonomy in Tunisia and further steps would be necessary. But he argued that it was necessary to have the original reforms functioning in an atmosphere of confidence before undertaking further negotiations.¹⁷

Following several months of jockeying, the French Government finally agreed to resume discussions, the new talks aiming for agreement on the next stage of reforms. On October 31, 1951, conversations began in Paris between French Foreign Minister Schuman and Prime Minister Chenik, aided by Salah Ben Youssef and Mohamed Badra, Minister of Social Affairs. The major Tunisian demand was for the establishment of an *all*-Tunisian legislature. It was to be composed exclusively of Tunisian nationals elected by Tunisian nationals. Since the European population of Tunisia were not Tunisian nationals but French citizens they were foreigners and therefore had no legal right to participate in Tunisian elections. To admit the right of Europeans to vote in a Tunisian election would constitute an abrogation of Tunisian sovereignty, something the nationalists would have no part of. It would be incompatible with the Protectorate treaties and would open the door to the eventual disappearance of Tunisian sovereignty and its replacement by permanent French domination under the guise of "co-sovereignty."

The French rejected the Tunisian demands. In a note to the Bey in mid-December, Foreign Minister Schuman pointed out that France and French citizens had made and were making great contributions to Tunisian developments which could not be ignored when considering the future of the country. It was therefore impossible not to permit the French population of Tunisia to participate in the political institutions of Tunisia. With the delivery of this note the negotiations came to a fruitless end, after nearly two months of conversations. "M. Schuman definitely closed the door to further negotiations," declared Habib Bourguiba, "by reaffirming that it was basic policy of the French

¹⁷ *Le Monde*, May 28, 1951.

Government to insist on the right of French citizens in Tunisia to participate in the country's internal political affairs."¹⁸ Although Bourguiba had not participated in the conversations, he was in Paris at the time of their collapse, having just completed an eleven-month tour which included visits to Indonesia, India, Pakistan, England, and the United States and was highlighted by addresses before the World Muslim Congress at Karachi, the Indonesian Parliament at Jakarta, and over the B.B.C. and the Voice of America. Bourguiba's outspoken declarations during the course of this tour infuriated the French and no doubt contributed to the intransigence of their position.

An impasse had been reached. The French were immobile and the Tunisians impatient. In their note to the Tunisian Ministers, the French announced their intention, provided the nationalists first accepted the principle of equal French-Tunisian representation in municipal councils, of appointing a mixed Franco-Tunisian Commission to study the problem of establishing a representative system to replace the Grand Conseil. To emphasize their firmness they relieved Perillier, the man who was appointed Resident-General with the express purpose of leading Tunisia toward independence and who, in a way, symbolized the policy of Franco-Tunisian cooperation. To the Tunisians, this meant not only more French procrastination but also confirmation of French intention to fasten permanent control upon the country. Hence the nationalists prepared to shift the battle to another field. After consulting with the Arab and Asian delegates to the Sixth Session of the U.N. General Assembly then meeting in Paris, they petitioned the Security Council in mid-January to consider their dispute with France. They had reached the conclusion that without such outside pressure France would not engage in further or fruitful negotiations with them. Concurring in this decision to turn to the U.N. were the Bey, the Prime Minister, and the Neo-Destour leaders.

Back in Tunisia, feeling was running high. In support of their ministers in Paris, the nationalists held street demonstrations throughout the country. Bourguiba's return to Tunisia, after an

¹⁸ *New York Times*, Dec. 22, 1951.

absence of nearly a year, heightened the tension. Bourguiba is hated and dreaded as much by the French in Tunisia as he is adored as the symbol of Tunisia's fight for independence by the Neo-Destour. Knowing that demonstrations without the Government's permission would result in police action, the Neo-Destour apparently embarked upon a deliberate policy of creating a series of incidents which would arouse the sympathy of world opinion for the Tunisians' political plight. As the demonstrations increased, the new Resident-General, Jean de Hautecloque, called out security forces and on January 18, Bourguiba, Mongi Slim, Acting Secretary-General of the Neo-Destour while Salah Ben Youssef held down his post in the Tunisian Cabinet, and several other party leaders were taken into custody and placed in controlled residence away from the urban centers. At the same time, in what could be interpreted as an attempt to smear the Neo-Destour in red, the French also took into custody several leaders of the small Tunisian Communist Party. The arrest of Bourguiba touched off a series of violent incidents far more serious than had preceded it. Tunisia experienced ten days of very large-scale and violent disorders, that almost bordered on revolt. The French succeeded in restoring an uneasy quiet in the country only after bringing in reinforcements from France and Algeria.

While all this was going on, Salah Ben Youssef, the Secretary-General of the Neo-Destour and Minister of Justice, and Mohamed Badra, Minister of Social Affairs, went to Paris to press the Tunisian case before the United Nations. France has sought by every means possible to prevent the question from coming before the United Nations. It has contended that the Tunisian Government had no right, under the existing treaties between France and Tunisia, to make such an appeal and it has cancelled the passports of Salah Ben Youssef and Mohamed Badra, the two Tunisian Ministers who were preparing to leave for United Nations headquarters in New York to present the case to the Security Council. Notwithstanding, the question seems destined, unless the situation suddenly takes a turn, to come before the Security Council. Pakistan, a member of the Council, has announced its intention of presenting the complaint.

REFLECTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

The foregoing survey of the course Tunisian nationalism has followed during the past forty years offers insight into the character and potential of the movement. The fashion today is to brand native nationalist movements in colonial and quasi-colonial areas as fanatic, xenophobic, or communist inspired, and to dismiss them as unrepresentative of the "real" needs or wishes of the people. The record of Tunisian nationalism should be considered with these charges in mind. What does the record show? At the minimum it furnishes reasonable doubt as to the accuracy of these charges with reference to Tunisia.

Being a Muslim country, Tunisia's nationalism is frequently equated with the fanaticism of the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt and the Fida'iyān-i-Islām of Iran. The facts of the matter belie the comparison. One of the outstanding characteristics of Tunisian nationalism is the absence of religious fanaticism in the movement. The top leadership has been practically devoid of religious personages. It is even said that many of the leading nationalists, educated and trained in France, are neither practicing nor observing Muslims. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that religion does play a very significant role within the framework of Tunisian nationalism. The "affair of the cemeteries" during the thirties emphasizes the great importance of religion in binding the Tunisian people together and in distinguishing them from the European population of Tunisia. One element in Islam's importance to the nationalist movement of Tunisia and throughout French North Africa is the unassailable spot it occupies in the Tunisian nationalist armor. The example of Ramadan observance may serve to point this up. Ramadan is observed very widely by pious and impious alike not purely because of religious motivation but as a symbol of something that is strictly and uniquely native. There is an aura of belligerent protest around it, implying "What are you going to do about it? This is something you cannot take away."

The fact that religious feeling in Tunisia has not given rise to fanaticism does not mean that it could not do so under proper conditions. Given a series of continued reverses in the struggle

for national self-determination, who can say that religious demagoguery could not take hold? The idea of a Holy War makes good sense to a people whipped to a high pitch of emotional frustration.

Fanaticism does not, of necessity, have to be only religious. Nationalism itself is in a way a religious cult with even greater propensity toward fanaticism than most religions. What is implied by fanaticism here is a tendency to employ extreme means to obtain the given end. Are not the Tunisian nationalists fanatics in this sense? It cannot be denied that nationalist feelings are strong in Tunisia and that in some cases they may border on fanaticism. However, there is a distinction to be drawn between fanatical devotion to a cause and fanaticism. What the record of the past forty years reveals is that while the nationalist leadership has been, by and large, fanatically devoted to the cause, the most dominant part of the movement — the Neo-Destour and the independents — have been moderate in their approach. In view of the Old Destour's failure to make a serious dent in the Neo-Destour's popular following during the trying days of the "Government of negotiation," the same conclusion can be reached with regard to the masses. They have stood by the Neo-Destour even when its moderate stand may have overtly appeared to be a betrayal of the essence of nationalist aspirations. However, just as with the question of religious fanaticism, there can be no guarantee that moderation will not give way to extremism if those espousing the moderate course are unable to produce results.

The moderate attitude of the dominant group of nationalists has, in a sense, played down the effects of xenophobia. Since the distinction between the "haves" and the "have nots" and the "ins" and the "outs" is generally found to be one lining up Europeans and Tunisians on opposite sides of the camp, it is normal that xenophobic tendencies should be present. It is undoubtedly this feeling of inferiority that is the most important root of Tunisian nationalism. What is significant is that the moderate influence has kept xenophobia in check. The intransigence of the nationalists in the matter of European representation in the proposed Tunisian legislature cannot be cited as evidence of xenophobia. The objection to having Europeans participate in the political

process is not based on a feeling of hatred but on the fear that it would perpetuate French domination and the present superior-inferior relationship. If the Europeans would agree to give up their French citizenship and accept Tunisian citizenship, the nationalist objection would be eliminated. However, the Europeans are loathe to give up French citizenship. They must maintain it for protection against possible abuses from a Tunisian government. The irony of the situation is that they are sowing the seeds of future abuses by willfully obstructing even the gradual introduction of internal autonomy.

For years it was the practice of the European population in Tunisia and the French Government to pooh-pooh the nationalists. "Whom do they represent?" they asked. "Only themselves! They are only a few intellectuals, or wealthy bourgeois greedy for power who just want to replace enlightened French rule for purposes of exploitation on their own behalf." The events of the past few years have convinced them of the error of their thinking. It is now generally agreed that the Tunisian nationalist movement, through the organization of the Neo-Destour and its affiliated organs — the UGTT, the UGAT, the Tunisian Association of Chambers of Commerce, and the Feminist Movement — has popular support that extends throughout the country — in urban and rural areas alike.

With regard to the popular support that the Neo-Destour commands, a more fundamental question may be asked: Can they maintain this support? Is there not a strong possibility that once they supplant French rule with their own they will not be able to deliver the goods in the face of the very serious social and economic problems that have to be solved? Nationalism by itself is no answer to unemployment, land problems, and population pressures. Would the nationalists not run the risk of losing popular support and control, thus inviting chaos and then communism? It cannot be contended that this risk does not exist. How can it be allayed? By having those who possess the wherewithal to help the Tunisians solve these fundamental problems — that is, France, the United States, and possibly the United Nations — working with the nationalists and not against them? But would the nationalists be receptive to working with France and the

United States? Is there any reservoir of confidence or trust in France after the recent debacle? Have faith and hope in the United States been erased by the support it has given to France's strategic position in North Africa and the cool reception it has accorded recent nationalist demands? Cannot one expect the nationalists to follow in the direction of the Arab League states, even to the extent of overtures in the direction of Moscow?

In answer to these questions, the statements made by Bourguiba from his enforced residence seem most apropos.¹⁹ First, he has reiterated his earlier contention that Tunisian independence must permit continued cooperation between France and Tunisia in strategic, economic, and cultural matters. Second, he has stated that he opposes the policy of Arab neutralism in the East-West "cold-war," pointing out that this stand of his has contributed to the coolness between himself and the Arab League. "The interest of the Arab nations," declared Bourguiba, "lies in a loyal cooperation, purged of any idea of domination, with the free world."

It seems apparent that so far as the Neo-Destour is concerned there exists a basis for cooperation with the West and with France itself notwithstanding the ill-feeling of the past several months. How long such a basis will continue to exist is difficult to say. The moderate nationalists — that is, the independents and the Neo-Destour — are in the forefront of the Tunisian nationalist movement today. Tomorrow reasonableness may forsake them or they may have to give way to more militant and extreme leaders. Tunisian nationalism stands at the crossroads. The road it follows, however, does not lie essentially in its own choosing. It lies in the hands of France, perhaps the United Nations, and certainly the United States.

¹⁹ *Mission* (Tunis), Feb. 1, 1952.

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF JORDAN

E. Theodore Mogannam

THE HASHIMITE KINGDOM of the Jordan has recently entered upon a period of unusual change and development as a result of the attainment of independence in 1947, the Palestine war in 1948, and the inclusion of a portion of eastern Palestine within its boundaries in 1949. Not the least of the problems raised by these changes has been their impact on the legal system of the country: it is obvious that a body of law which was adequate for the Bedouin Arab of Transjordan thirty years ago, in his simple way of life, can no longer meet the requirements of the state today. Much has already been done to bring Jordan's legal structure in accord with the times, the most outstanding development being the introduction of a new constitution at the beginning of 1952. Legal problems and developments have been much more widespread, however, than would be indicated by this one example.

Since the need for legal change was expedited by the unification of what was formerly known as Transjordan, or East Jordan, with that part of eastern Palestine which is now called West Jordan, we must glance briefly at the legal system applicable in mandated Palestine in order to get a true picture of the situation today.

The British Mandate authorities in Palestine, by virtue of Article 46 of the Palestine Order in Council, 1922, proclaimed that the Ottoman Law in force on November 1, 1914, should remain in force in Palestine unless repealed or amended. During the 30-odd years of British administration, Palestine advanced greatly in all fields of life, particularly in commerce and indus-

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try, and so did its laws. This led to the gradual repeal of the old Ottoman Laws, as occasion called for, and their replacement by modern legislation mostly based on the Common Law of England and British Statutes and Rules.

At the same time, and by virtue of the same Palestine Order in Council, the Common Law and doctrines of equity in force in England were made applicable to Palestine in all matters on which there was no specific legislation; subject to such modifications as were rendered necessary by the special requirements of Palestine and its inhabitants. This led to the reception of many English principles in the fields of the Law of Evidence, Contracts, Procedure, and Torts. Further, the Mandate Government enacted many ordinances on commercial and labor law, outstanding examples of which are the Companies Ordinance, the Partnership Ordinance, the Bills of Exchange Ordinance, the Bankruptcy Ordinance, Winding up of Companies Rules, Workmen's Compensation Ordinance, Labour Ordinance, Factories Ordinance, Civil and Criminal Procedure Rules, the Criminal Code Ordinance, and the Civil Wrongs Ordinance or Torts Ordinance. All these laws were in most part exact copies, with a few modifications and amendments to meet local needs, of the corresponding English Acts and Rules, and were to be interpreted by reference to the law of England and English rules of Equity and Common Law applicable in each field. The Torts Ordinance repealed the greater part of the old Ottoman Civil Code, the *Mejelle*, which had hitherto been applicable.

In Transjordan, however, English Common Law was not applicable nor were any of the above modern laws enacted. The old Ottoman Commercial and Criminal Codes (the *Mejelle*) and the Rules of Procedure remained in force. It is apparent that throughout the mandate period there was a wide difference between the two systems of law applicable in Palestine and in Transjordan. When a part of Palestine was united with Transjordan to form one Kingdom under the rule of the late King Abdallah, many problems naturally arose.

In May 1948, when Jordanian forces occupied a part of Palestine, the then Military Governor, Ibrahim Pasha Hashim, originally a Palestinian from Nablus and an ex-Prime Minister of

Transjordan, issued a proclamation to the effect that all laws and regulations in force in Palestine up to the termination of the Mandate should remain in force unless they were in contradiction to the Transjordan Defence Regulations. The Courts continued to function, after a short period of readjustment, in accordance with the Mandatory laws and procedure.

In 1950, the late King Abdallah ordered general elections for a new Parliament with members from both the west and east banks. The 40 members of the Council of Representatives were elected from both banks, 20 from each, and the Council of Notables was appointed by the King in a like manner. With the election of the new Parliament the Government announced a program for the unification of the laws of the Kingdom, and accordingly a Judicial Committee was appointed to draft laws for the whole of Jordan. The members of this Committee were appointed from among judges and lawyers on both sides of the Jordan. As a result of the efforts of this Committee, a number of laws have subsequently been enacted, but in branches where no unified laws have been passed, each side of the Jordan still applies its own laws embodying different principles. When we consider that Jordan is a very small country with less than 2 million inhabitants, and that the distance between Amman and Jerusalem is less than 100 miles, we can appreciate the many complications and inconveniences which arise from such a state of affairs.

Among the new laws enacted in Jordan late in 1951 were a Criminal Code and Criminal Procedure Rules. The Criminal Code repealed the Palestine Criminal Code of 1936, which was basically an English law, interpreted according to the principles of the Common Law of England. The new Jordan Code follows in many parts the Syrian Criminal Code of June 22, 1949, which is based on the Lebanese Criminal Code, which in turn is influenced by French legal principles.

To the Palestinian lawyer such a change was uncalled for. The Palestine Code of 1936 had proved itself a very efficient piece of legislation: a number of amendments had been introduced to it as occasion called for, and the Palestine courts had established a long line of precedents on many important sections. Furthermore, the new Jordan Code follows in some respects different

principles from those set out in the Palestine Code, one of which is to provide minimum penalties for most crimes and misdemeanors. This principle is foreign to the Palestinian lawyer, as the Code of 1936 did not provide any minimum penalties, save for murder and high treason, which were punishable by death. Another important change is that the new Code has reintroduced certain stipulations which had long been repealed in Palestine, such as making adultery a criminal offense.

There is a difference of opinion as to which system of criminal law is the better, and no attempt is made here to condemn the one or defend the other, each having its own merits and demerits. But when the majority of the inhabitants of a country have been used to the English system, and it had been proved to be satisfactory, and when one considers the fact that the east bank of the Jordan, that is, Transjordan, had not previously applied the Syrian Code or its system, the change would seem to have more disadvantages than merits.

In addition to the changes in substantive criminal law, fundamental changes were made in Criminal Procedure. The Palestinian Criminal Procedure Rules were drafted on the English principles of Trial Upon Information. Under this system, a person has first to be committed for trial by an Examining Magistrate who hears all the evidence, the accused having the right to cross-examine the witnesses and also introduce evidence on his own behalf. If the Magistrate finds that there is sufficient evidence against the accused to support the charge he will order his committal for trial before a court of jurisdiction. This mode of procedure gives the accused a fair and just trial, as he knows what evidence is to be introduced against him at his trial, and has had the opportunity to see the witnesses and cross-examine them.

Under the new Jordan Procedure Rules, the committal order is not made by an Examining Magistrate but by the Attorney General himself, who conducts the investigation and wields the powers of a police officer and judge at the same time. Furthermore the accused is not entitled to hear the witnesses against him before the investigator or to cross-examine them save at his actual trial. And last but not least, an accused even at his trial is not allowed by law to give evidence on oath on his own behalf, or to

deny such allegations as might be made against him. He may only make an unsworn statement if he so desires. Under these new procedure rules, the duties and powers of an Investigating Officer and the Examining Magistrate are often overlapping.

To the Palestine lawyer such a system is not what it should be, he being used to a more perfect mode of investigation of crime in accordance with the Trial Upon Information Procedure Rules. Attempts have been made to amend these new criminal laws by Palestinian members of the Jordan Parliament supported by their Jordan colleagues, and it is believed that many of these points may be amended.

Yet these new criminal laws are certainly a great improvement on the old Ottoman Laws that had been applicable in Transjordan, and it is indeed a credit to the Jordan Government to have legislated these new laws in such a short period, when there are so many other major problems to consider. From another point of view, the enactment of the new Criminal Code also has its merits, as it follows the laws of Syria and Lebanon. This fact in itself has the advantage of bringing the Arab states nearer to each other, at least in the legal field.

In the practical field of applying criminal law, it should be stated that in spite of the poverty due to the pitiful condition of the Palestine refugees, which might be expected to lead to a wave of crime and disorder, security conditions in Jordan are much better than they ever used to be under the British Mandate, and the number of crimes committed per year has considerably decreased.

Turning to another branch of the law, credit must be given to the Jordanian Ministry of Finance for enacting in 1951 a new Income Tax Law, repealing the old Jordan Income Tax Law which had not provided the country with an efficient taxation system. Many merchants and big property owners had been able to find loopholes in it to evade taxation, and income from real property was not subject to income tax at all. With the increasing demands of Government for a bigger budget to cope with the economic advancement of the country and the many problems which resulted from the Palestine question, a new Income Tax Law was called for. This new Law passed in 1951 follows in

most parts the principles of the Palestine Income Tax Ordinance of 1947, which was originally enacted in 1941 on the lines of the Indian Income Tax Act, both following British taxation rules and principles. It provides a graduated scale of payments, the exemption of small incomes, and considerable deductions for large families. Other provisions deal with the collection of income tax at the source, the calculation of depreciation on fixtures and machinery, and the definition of allowable disbursements and expenditures. Provision is also made that life insurance premiums up to a certain amount be deductible from the chargeable income of an assessee. A new principle exempts all income derived from agricultural produce or land. It is the hope of the Government that the ultimate result of this provision will be to encourage farming and the reclaiming of agricultural land, of which the country is in great need.

The rich property owners and merchants of Amman have not welcomed this new tax law, and in November 1951 petitioned the Court of Cassation in Amman, sitting as a High Court of Justice, to declare it illegal on the ground that it was approved when Parliament was not in session, having been dissolved by the late King Abdallah. It is not expected that such attempts will be successful.

Other complications have arisen from the enforcement of this tax law, as by its provisions different principles of taxation are applicable to Incorporated Companies and Partnerships, for a Partner is taxed as a person, while a Company is taxed as a body or firm. Under the Palestine Commercial Laws the distinction between a Company and a Partnership is apparent and the definition of each in the Income Tax law is made accordingly. But under the old Commercial Code which is still applicable in East Jordan, there is no such distinction, and a Partnership could call itself a Company Incorporated, while the tax law does not resolve the difficulties resulting from such a misnomer. This old Commercial Code does not meet the requirements of modern business organization and transactions, and it is likely that before long it will be repealed and replaced by new legislation based on the Palestine Commercial Laws.

The Law of Evidence in Jordan has also been changed as the Palestine Evidence Ordinance has been repealed in favor of

a new Evidence Law enacted in 1951. Many of the details of the English law of evidence have been replaced by a codified law of evidence. It is of interest to note that under this new Evidence Law, a plaintiff or defendant is not a competent witness and cannot give evidence on his own behalf; nor can his wife or children and other near relatives. This follows the old Ottoman evidence rule found in Article 1703 of the *Mejelle*, which reads: "A person cannot be both plaintiff and witness. Consequently, the evidence of a guardian on behalf of an orphan and of an agent on behalf of his principal is inadmissible." It further contains a few hard and fast rules excluding evidence which is not in writing, thereby creating hardships and in some cases possibly leading to injustice. Oral evidence against a written document is inadmissible; under the Palestine Evidence Law this also was the case, but with many exceptions. Now the rule is absolute. However, taking Jordan as a single unit, the Law of Evidence is a great improvement over the old evidence laws which were applicable in Transjordan and will surely lead to a better administration of justice.

The enforcement and execution of judgments under the British Mandate in Palestine still followed the old Ottoman Law of Execution. Since that law was badly drafted, the process by which a judgment was collected or any other legal remedy enforced was difficult and lengthy. Jordan in 1951 repealed this old Law and replaced it by a new and efficient Execution Law, whereby a judgment creditor can enforce his right in a speedy manner.

As to the execution and collection of judgments, a very delicate and important problem has arisen in Jordan in respect to Palestine refugees, who, in the course of their business dealings in the now Israeli-controlled part of Palestine, had contracted debts before May 1948 with creditors outside present Israeli territory. These unfortunate persons, having left everything they owned on the other side, have come to Jordan only to find that their creditors are now suing for the payment of these old debts. Such a situation called for prompt legislation and the Jordan Government very appropriately enacted a special law for the protection of this category of persons. The main provisions are that the rate of

interest on all such debts was to be reduced from the legal rate of 9 percent to 3 percent and payment was to be made in installments in accordance with the circumstances of each debtor as found by the execution officer. At the same time it made provision for safeguarding the rights of the creditors against concealment or illegal disposal of property.

Palestine and Jordan, in applying the Ottoman Land Code, have inherited a complicated land law system with many categories of land — *mulk*, *miri*, *masha'*, and different kinds of *wakf*. This Code was amended in certain limited respects by Palestine Government Ordinances; also the Palestine Courts, applying the principle of the Common Law of England and doctrines of equity, had introduced new principles into the Land Law which in effect modified its provisions. A few examples of these are the specific performance of contracts for the sale of land, equitable relief against forfeiture, and the distinction between actual damages and a penalty, the latter being illegal and unenforceable. In accordance with land regulations, every sale of land or other disposition has to be registered in the Tapu, or Land Registry Department; otherwise it is void. The Courts in Palestine have held that if such a contract was not a complete contract of sale but simply an agreement to sell, the contract is good, and if other requisites are fulfilled, such as payment of the full purchase price, specific performance of the same may be ordered. In Jordan, these English principles have not hitherto been applied; but now, as they form part of the Palestine precedents and as Palestinian judges are being appointed on the east side of the Jordan River, it will not be long before these principles are introduced into the Land Law of the country.

The new Civil Procedure Rules enacted in 1951 favored Palestine law over both the old Transjordan law and new legislation. Following a middle course between the two, these Rules repealed the Ottoman Civil Procedure Code, which had been applied in Transjordan, and adopted for the most part the Palestine Civil Procedure Rules of 1938, which had been drafted on the lines of the British Supreme Court Rules and Orders. They offered an excellent system of civil procedure; yet some parts of the Palestine Procedure Rules, such as the provisions dealing with affida-

vits, were omitted since it was felt that a judge would prefer to see the witness in court than merely read his affidavit. To the lawyer the frequent impossibility of submitting evidence other than by affidavits creates difficulties. However, in spite of such comparatively minor flaws, the new civil procedure system is as good as any other in the Middle East.

The constitution of the Courts always offered difficulties in Palestine, especially when a British judge was trying a case. Not knowing the language, he would have to rely on the translations offered to him, and lawyers have felt that many points were missed as a result. Now these difficulties have been overcome, as all the judges know the language of the country and are thus in a better position to weigh the evidence.

A question which was always being objected to under the British Mandate was that a murder case could be tried by a single British judge sitting alone. This has now been abolished as Courts of First Instance, which have jurisdiction to try such cases, have to be constituted of three judges.

In 1951, a new Court Establishment Law was enacted for the whole of Jordan. It provided for the following Courts:

1. Magistrate's Courts, established in nearly every town of any considerable size, with jurisdiction to try civil cases the subject matter of which does not exceed JD 150, and criminal cases involving offenses punishable with a maximum penalty of one year's imprisonment and/or a fine. The Magistrate's Court also has jurisdiction in all eviction cases irrespective of the amount of rent involved, in division of property owned in common between partners, and in other such matters. The Magistrate's Court is constituted of one judge.
2. Courts of First Instance, established in every district of Jordan with jurisdiction to try all cases, whether civil or criminal, not within the jurisdiction of the Magistrate's Courts or any other Court, such as the Muslim or Christian Religious Courts or the High Court of Justice. The Courts of First Instance are composed of three judges.
3. Two Courts of Appeal, one sitting at Amman and the other at Jerusalem, constituted of three or more judges, with jurisdiction to hear appeals from Magistrate's Courts and Courts of First

Instance. The Court of Appeal in Jerusalem hears all appeals from the west side of the Jordan and the Court of Appeal in Amman from the east side of the Jordan.

4. A Court of Cassation, sitting in Amman, to hear appeals from the two courts of appeal in civil cases (provided the subject matter of the judgment exceeds JD 500), certain major criminal offenses, and any judgment which involves an important legal point of general interest.

5. This Court of Cassation also sits as a High Court of Justice, with jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus and mandamus petitions and issue injunctions or restraining orders against wrongful acts of public servants in respect of illegal orders issued in the course of the performance of their official duties. The establishment of this Court has met with great approval from all circles in Jordan, as it is a most effective way of ensuring that justice is done and that government officials do not overstep their powers or duties and that they enforce the law without favor or prejudice. This Court was originally established in Palestine but is new to East Jordan.

6. Religious courts now functioning in Jordan: these are the Muslim Shar'iah Courts and the different courts of the Christian communities, such as the Greek Orthodox, the Catholic, the Armenian, and the Greek Catholic, each with its own special Court of Appeal. The only Christian community which does not have a religious court is the Protestant community. These Courts have jurisdiction in all matters of personal status: marriage, divorce, succession, guardianship, and the confirmation of wills. The Protestant community has these matters tried by a Civil Court of First Instance. Many problems arise in personal status law, including disputes as to which Court is seized with a case. Such disputes are decided by the High Court of Justice. But as the laws of the various communities differ in many major points, and as members of different communities often intermarry, the complications and problems of personal status seem to multiply.

An important change has been introduced into the jurisdiction of the religious courts functioning in Jordan by Article 109 of the 1952 Constitution. Personal status is defined in that article as

comprising all matters within the jurisdiction of a Muslim Shar'iah Court.

The jurisdiction of the Christian religious courts had been regulated by Article 54 of the Palestinian Order in Council of 1922, which read: "The Courts of the several Christian communities shall have: (1) exclusive jurisdiction in matters of marriage and divorce, alimony, and confirmation of wills of members of their community other than foreigners as defined in Article 59; (2) jurisdiction in any other matter of personal status of such persons where all the parties to the action consent to their jurisdiction; (3) exclusive jurisdiction over any case concerning the Constitution or internal administration of Wakf or religious endowment constituted before the religious court according to the religious law of the community if such exists."

The effect of the provision of the new Constitution would seem to enlarge the jurisdiction of the Christian religious courts in matters which previously had not been within their exclusive jurisdiction. Among these are determination of the succession of deceased persons where minors are involved or the appointment of a guardian over a minor. These cases were previously outside their jurisdiction since the consent necessary under Article 54, paragraph 2, could not be obtained, a minor not being legally able to give such consent.

A further change in the legal structure of West Jordan was introduced by Article 129 of the 1952 Constitution, which repealed the Palestine Order in Council of 1922 which had introduced the Common Law of England and the doctrines of equity. But Article 128 provides that all laws and regulations shall remain in force until repealed. Many laws applicable now in West Jordan include sections to the effect that such ordinances shall be interpreted by reference to the law of England relating to such law, and that English rules of equity and common law shall be applicable to it in so far as they are not inconsistent with the express provisions of such law. It follows that English principles are still to be applied in the interpretation of the particular laws which embody these provisions.

Of the numerous problems which arose after the Mandate Government left Palestine in May 1948, not the least in impor-

tance, perhaps, are the complications which resulted in legal practice. There is, for example, the question of the right of the Jordan Courts to hear cases which were within the jurisdiction of Palestinian Courts which are now in the state of Israel regarding transactions concluded before May 1948. The difficulty arises if a defendant resides outside of Jordan, for as such transactions were not made in Jordan, the jurisdiction of the Jordan Courts is doubtful. Contradictory decisions have been handed down on this point.

One most interesting and important case which arose as a result of the termination of the Mandate, and which is now being tried by the King's Bench Division of the British Courts in England, is that of the Arab Bank Ltd., one of the largest local banks in the Arab world with its head office now in Amman, against Barclays Bank (Dominion, Colonial and Overseas), a British bank which has a branch in Jerusalem. The Arab Bank is suing for the payment of about £750,000 of its account with Barclays Bank at its Jerusalem Branch only. One of the many legal issues in this case is whether the decision of the United Nations declaring Jerusalem an international city affects the local legislation of the state of Israel in respect to the amounts due to the Arab Bank at the Jerusalem Branch. The savings of hundreds of depositors depend on the decision to this case.

Concurrently with these efforts to revise the legal system of Jordan, the Parliament elected in 1950 embarked upon the drafting of a new Constitution for the state. Under the Constitution of 1947¹ the Cabinet had not been responsible to Parliament but to the King; nor did Parliament have any control over financial policy. The new Constitution, embodying more democratic principles, was promulgated in January 1952 by King Talal.² The principal changes are that the Cabinet is now responsible to Parliament: by Article 53 a vote of confidence may be taken in the Council of Representatives; if a two-thirds majority of the Council decides on a non-confidence vote against the Cabinet it must resign. Article 54 provides that ten or more members of the Council of Representatives or the Prime Minister may ask for a

¹ For text of the Constitution of 1947, see *Middle East Journal*, I (July 1947), pp. 322-31.

² For text of the Constitution of 1952, see pp. 228-37.

vote of confidence in the Cabinet or any member thereof, and upon the appointment of a Cabinet it shall submit to the Council a statement of its policy and a vote of confidence shall be taken thereon.

Another important change in the Constitution is the limitation of the prerogative of the King to confirm or veto laws. By Article 93, if the King rejects the confirmation of a law, and the law is passed for a second time by a two-thirds majority in both the Council of Representatives and the Council of Notables, such law shall be promulgated. A time limit of six months is fixed for the King to return a law, either confirmed or rejected. If the six-months' period elapses without the King doing so the law is considered in effect.

In conclusion, Jordan has done much in the past few years to better its legal system and constitutional structure. There is always more to be done, yet considering the magnitude of the problems it has had to face and the short period in which these changes have been accomplished, the progress so far is laudable, particularly the development toward democratic principles as embodied in the new Constitution.

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DEVELOPMENTS OF THE QUARTER: COMMENT AND CHRONOLOGY

THE CRISES in both Iran and Egypt marked time pending the outcome of new elections. In Iran, where balloting for the Seventeenth Majlis had been underway since January, interim negotiations for a settlement of the oil problem through the intermediary of the International Bank bogged down in March, talks being broken off on the 16th. The obstacles to agreement remained the same as those which had prevented a successful outcome to the Harriman-sponsored negotiations in the summer of 1951: Iranian direction of a reactivated oil industry; the rehiring of British technicians; and the terms on which oil products were to be sold in exchange for a long-term purchasing contract. Despite the vocal opposition of a few Senators and deputies in the Majlis, Prime Minister Mosaddeq evinced no willingness to compromise on these points and the matter stood at an impasse pending the completion of the elections. The composition of the new Majlis, so far as it had become known, pointed toward continued support of Mosaddeq's policies provided there was no major breakdown in the country's economy.

Egypt's crisis was more explosive than Iran's in that the Egyptian Government and the Palace were attempting to guide developments on the basis of a parliamentary minority. For a brief time after the riots of January 26 the ousted Wafd party declared its support of the Government of Ali Mahir Pasha which replaced it. This was not to be for long, however. On March 1 Ali Mahir resigned over the question of the dissolution of Parliament; he was succeeded by Nagib al-Hilali Pasha, a former Minister of Education who had been expelled from the Wafd party in the fall of 1951 because of his criticism of political corruption. The next day Hilali Pasha suspended Parliament for one month, and on March 11 the Wafd party withdrew its support. The following week two leading members of the former Wafd Government, Minister of the Interior Fu'ad Sirag al-Din Pasha and Minister

of Social Affairs 'Abd al-Fattah Hasan Pasha, were placed under house arrest; on the 23rd King Faruq dissolved Parliament and called for elections on May 18, with the new Chamber of Deputies to assemble on May 31.*

The problem which faced King Faruq and Prime Minister Hilali Pasha, who represented no politically organized group, was how to effect a rapprochement with Great Britain which would be acceptable to the new Parliament. There was no doubt but that the Palace and business circles were frightened by the savage violence which had erupted in the riot of January 26 and that they were anxious to see a more moderate spirit prevail. At the same time, Egypt was irrevocably committed to the removal of British troops from the Suez Canal zone and the recognition of the sovereignty of the Egyptian Crown in the Sudan. It was still hoped, and optimistically believed, in Egypt that an acceptable formula could be found which would provide for Britain's (and the West's) strategic interest in the Suez Canal and the Sudan's desire for home rule, if only Britain and the West would rub the slate clean and approach Egypt as a truly free and equal partner. Why, Egyptians asked, should not their country be trusted with the guardianship of the Canal just as Turkey was being trusted with the guardianship of the Straits?

The answer lay in the West's lack of confidence in Egypt's stability and in a continuance of its pro-Western orientation. So long as the British had been in effective control of Egyptian politics, they could, by throwing their influence to one side or the other, serve as a counter-balance to either the Wafd or the Palace as circumstances required. But now that British pressure could no longer operate in this fashion, the responsibility for controlling

* It was announced on April 11 that the elections were indefinitely postponed pending the revision of electoral lists.

the extremes of Wafdist policy devolved upon the Palace. The Throne, however, was itself being subjected to severe criticism from Egyptians. Deprived, by its new responsibility, of the option of appealing to extreme nationalism and anti-foreign sentiment in order to arouse popular support, the Throne was now in a weak bargaining position. Nor was there any likelihood that the Palace could so manipulate the coming election, or in the time allotted so undermine the Wafd's entrenched popularity and organization, as to bring about the return of a subservient Parliament. There was no assurance, therefore, that any negotiations now entered into would carry any weight with the new Chamber of Deputies or that any agreement with Britain would win its approval.

It was to the Palace and the personality of the British Ambassador in Cairo, Sir Ralph Stevenson, that credit was due for maintaining any contact at all between Egyptians and Britishers after the crisis of January 26, which in less wise hands might have provoked an ultimatum as disastrous to Egyptian-British relations as the ultimatum of 1924, following the murder of Sir Lee Stack. For the time being, however, nothing more had been secured than an open door to negotiation.

Sovereignty in Tunisia

The French Government, on March 28, attempted through drastic action to clarify the political atmosphere in Tunisia. Spurred on by continued nationalist disturbances and the prospective presentation, by Pakistan, of the Tunisian case to the Security Council in April, French Resident-General Jean de Hauteclocque ordered the arrest and detention of Tunisian Prime Minister Mohammed Chenik and three of his cabinet Ministers. This was carried out, albeit by coercion, with the consent of the Bey, Sidi Mohammed el-Amine Pasha. Prime Minister Chenik, an independent nationalist who had been regarded as a pro-French moderate when Resident-General Perillier appointed him in August 1950, was now held responsible for the insubordination of the Neo-Destour, the continuing domestic disturbances, and the "slow-down" in Tunisian administrative functions. He was also held

responsible for the complaint regarding French policy which he signed and which (without the formal approval of the Bey) two Neo-Destour members of his Cabinet presented to the United Nations in Paris in January.¹

During his term in office Prime Minister Chenik had, indeed, drawn closer to the Neo-Destour in sympathy, although he was still reputed to be a moderate. In his place, the French Resident-General and the Bey now appointed Salaheddine Baccouche, another pro-French moderate, and charged him with the formation of a Cabinet, an assignment he found some difficulty in fulfilling. Concurrently, the French announced proposals for executive and legislative reforms to be drafted in final form by a Franco-Tunisian committee scheduled to convene on April 24.

The proposals comprised an extension of the executive and legislative decrees promulgated on February 8, 1951.² By these reforms, the Resident-General had retained control over the executive orders of all Ministers; under the current proposals, the Resident-General might only refer such orders to a specially constituted French-dominated tribunal. Under the arrangement by which the Neo-Destour had agreed to cooperate in the February 1951 decrees, one-half of the Ministerial posts were held by Tunisians. Under the new proposals, the remaining departments would be turned over to Tunisians during a period of five years, with three exceptions which would remain the responsibility of the Resident-General and his French appointees: foreign affairs, internal and external security, and finance. It was now further proposed that the administration of larger municipalities be equally in the hands of the French and Tunisian inhabitants; but that in lesser municipalities it be based on the numerical proportion of the respective communities. On the national level, the reforms proposed that two Consultative Assemblies be established: one to be exclusively Tunisian with competence over all non-financial aspects of matters submitted to it; the other Franco-

¹ For the background of the Tunisian nationalist movement up to the events of January 1952, see the article by Benjamin Rivlin in this issue, pp. 167-93.

² For texts of the February 8, 1951, decrees, see *Middle East Journal* V (Summer 1951), pp. 354-59.

Tunisian, with competence in economic and financial matters. The method of election or appointment would be discussed by the proposed committee. Finally, the new reforms envisioned a more liberal acceptance of Tunisians into the civil service, priority generally being given to them over Frenchmen provided they fulfilled the required qualifications.

These proposals were an advance over any previous offer of the French Government. How much of an advance they would prove to be in fact depended — as did the decrees of February 8, 1951 — upon the sincerity with which they were offered and the spirit in which they were carried out; also upon the Neo-Destour's willingness to cooperate, which was doubtful considering the circumstances under which the proposals were made. Moreover, they were still bound by the framework of the 1951 reforms and thus failed to admit two principles which the Neo-Destour considers basic.

The first of these principles involves the nature of Tunisian sovereignty. The French Government has repeatedly asserted its recognition of the sovereignty of the Bey of Tunis, but never of the Tunisian people. It is the sovereignty of the Bey which France has undertaken to protect. The forced dismissal of Prime Minister Chenik was termed a move to return to the Bey his "freedom of action." France has not yet conceded that an elected assembly should be anything more than consultative and advisory, or that the Tunisian cabinet be responsible to any body other than the Bey and his French protector. Despite declarations by the French that they desire the gradual introduction of democratic principles, the basic principle of the sovereignty of the people has not been admitted. The closest that French spokesmen have come in this direction is to admit the goal of satisfying the desire of the Tunisian "élite" for full control over their country's internal affairs. By "élite," however, the French do not apparently mean the whole body of Western-educated Tunisians (among whom many of the Neo-Destourians are to be counted), but a much smaller group who have become, to all intents and purposes, assimilated with France, and who are represented, insofar as they indulge in nationalist activities, by the ineffective Tunisian National Party.

The second principle on which there remained basic disagreement is a corollary of the first: the right of French residents of Tunisia to a share in Tunisian sovereignty. The Neo-Destour has insisted that so long as these French residents remain French citizens they can expect no part in Tunisian governmental affairs; the French, on the other hand — and in this the *colons* remain adamant — have held that in view of France's vested interest in the economy of the country (not to mention the retarded character of Tunisian society), co-sovereignty is the French residents' due. If the Neo-Destour accepts the French premise that Tunisian sovereignty resides solely in the Bey, it would be forced to concede the right of the Bey to extend or deny electoral and legislative powers as he sees fit — and the Bey's freedom of action is directly under the "protection" of France. This explains why the Neo-Destour has held that giving in on the principle of sovereignty might jeopardize Tunisia's chances of ever attaining its goal of independence by virtue of a legal right.

Spain's Arab Policy³

The seeking out of Arab friendship by Madrid and by the Spanish Chief of State these days is a factor to be watched insofar as the unsettled Arab world is concerned. Since the end of the war, General Franco has encouraged the Arab League states in their national aspirations, openly praising them for what they are and what they stand for as representatives of Muslim culture. It is not too much of an exaggeration to state that the Spanish Caudillo, a staunch Roman Catholic, would like to see some sort of loose Catholic-Muslim alliance, with Spain as its spiritual guide, supporting the ideals of the Arabs, especially in North Africa, against the Western colonial powers from which Spain is now estranged. Even today there remain remembrances of the literary, scientific, and artistic treasures of the ancient Islamic kingdoms on Spanish soil and in the Spanish dependencies. General Franco has always relied heavily on his Moorish troops, whose 10,000 well-trained members were the backbone of the invasion

³ Condensed from a report by John D. Harbron, an education officer with the Royal Canadian Navy.

of Spain from Spanish Morocco as the Civil War began in 1936. Today the Moorish regiments are still the crack regiments of the Spanish Army — pampered and uniformed by the Spanish Caudillo.

But the Arab concerns of Franco are deeper than the loyalty of his Moorish troops. Spain is still an African power, if only in a minor sense — Franco himself has referred to Spain's African colonies as "our African possessions, those residues of the unjust . . . division of this rib of northwest Africa. . . ." It possesses Muslim subjects who still devoutly look to Mecca as their religious home. At the same time, the military governor of Spanish Morocco and the Spanish police must deal with the Islah Party, the Independence Party of the Spanish Zone, which, Franco or no Franco, wants an Arab state free from all outside encumbrances.⁴

In an address made in the spring of 1950 over the radio and reported in the press, Franco declared:

Spain feels, as a European nation, that the ill-will and the misunderstanding shown her have driven her toward other peoples who, linked with her by ties of blood, language or faith . . . may constitute a decisive force in the future of mankind. The Arab nations, with their chivalrous traditions similar to our own, have captured the sympathy of the Spanish nation, which for so many centuries has lived with them.

But General Franco's wooing of the Arab world has been more than a question of words or visions. Muslim Institutes, developed and subsidized by the Spanish Government's Higher Council for Scientific Research, keep the traditions, language, and science of Muslim Spain alive. An Institute for African Studies exists in Madrid and a Spanish Institute has been opened in Tangier. Spain is well represented diplomatically in the Arab League states and culturally through the media of Spanish book exhibitions in which the works of Arabo-Hispanists of the Middle Ages are exhibited to the nationals of the Arab countries.

⁴ On March 12 the Spanish Government announced that it would permit the formation and functioning of political parties and associations in Spanish Morocco, provided they supported collaboration with Spain in its mission of "lending its

Spain's relations with Egypt have become increasingly cordial over the past two years. In November 1950, Señor Ibáñez Martín, former Spanish Minister of National Education, and Señor Alberto Martín Artajo, the Spanish Foreign Minister, formally opened the Egyptian Institute in Madrid. During the current Egyptian crisis, in which the future status of the Suez Canal area and of the Sudan have been at stake, the Spanish Chief of State has officially recognized Faruq of Egypt as King of the Sudan, thus going along with the unilateral and contentious proclamation of the Egyptian Government that Faruq's official title from now on would be "King of Egypt and of the Sudan." Early in April 1952 Spanish Foreign Minister Artajo was scheduled to embark on an extensive tour of the Arab capitals.

Probably the most ostentatious manifestation of Franco's interest in the Muslim world was the state visit which the late King Abdallah of Jordan paid to Spain in August 1949. Arriving at La Coruña, Abdallah was carried into El Ferrol aboard a Spanish cruiser. He made a fortnight's tour of Spain, chiefly into Andalusia in the far south, home of the Moorish kings and whence Abdallah's ancestors once ruled more than half of the Iberian Peninsula. Although a Spanish Moroccan delegate attended meetings of the Arab League as early as March 1946 with the sanction of the Madrid Government, it is significant that Abdallah did not visit Tetuan. To Moroccan nationalists under Spanish rule, Abdallah in their midst would have been much more the visible sign of an independent Arab culture than Catholic General Franco.

Franco's desire to woo the Arab world is due mainly to the snubbing of Spain by the great powers and to its enforced absence from all United Nations' organizations. Common suffering at the hands of the Western powers indeed offers a bond of sympathy between them on which to build a spirit of mutuality. Also related to Franco's moves with regard to the Arab world are the futures of Tangier and Gibraltar. Tangier, seized by the Caudillo in the summer of 1940 when fellow members of

assistance to the Moroccan Government to promote evolution and progress in all fields."

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the Tangier International Zone were busy with a world war, is perhaps of the lesser importance despite the publicity Madrid is now giving it. But the constant demand by the Spanish press and by various anti-British Spanish leaders for Gibraltar's return has meant strained relations between Spain and England. In early February 1952, Señor Federico Sánchez, a well-known Spanish lecturer with no political affiliations, in a speech in Madrid entitled "The New Siege of Gibraltar," compared Egypt's rights to Suez with Spain's rights to Gibraltar. Sánchez's reason-

ing was based on the premise that both Egypt and Spain were being robbed of territories which are part of their national birthrights.

Over against Franco's interest in the Arab world must be set the impoverishment of contemporary Spain. Economically weak and relying to a large degree on outside aid to keep body and soul together, Spaniards are in no position to assume the type of leadership that Franco now desires of his nation. Nevertheless, given the sensitivity of the Arab world today, the repercussions of Spanish policy may come to be felt from Morocco to Egypt.

Chronology¹

DECEMBER 1, 1951 — FEBRUARY 29, 1952

General

1951

Dec. 19: The U.S. Government made known its reply to the Soviet Government's note of November 24 charging that plans for a Middle East Defense Command "represent nothing other than an attempt to draw the countries of the Near and Middle East into military undertakings being realized by the aggressive Atlantic bloc." The U.S. note declared that a defense plan for the Middle East was necessary because of the acknowledged and documented aggressive intentions of the Soviet Union toward that area.

Dec. 22: Dr. Henry G. Bennett, Director of the U.S. Technical Cooperation Administration, and 3 associates were killed in an airplane crash in Iran while on a tour of the Middle East to investigate progress of the U.S. Point Four Program.

Aden

1951

Dec. 19: The people of Lahej elected representatives to the Legislative Council of the Sultanate. (*Arab News Agency [ANA]*, Dec. 22.)

Egypt

1951

Dec. 3: In a clash between British forces and Egyptian policemen and civilians outside the town of Suez, 16 Egyptians and 11 British were reported killed.

Dec. 4: A British communiqué said that 2 British and reportedly 20 Egyptians were killed in another clash outside the town of Suez.

Dec. 5: The Government announced that measures would be taken to prevent further demonstrations in Cairo, Alexandria, and other localities. All schools in Cairo and Alexandria and a number of universities were closed for an indefinite period.

Minister of the Interior Fu'ad Sirag al-Din Pasha reported that 117 Egyptians had been killed and 438 wounded since the first incident in the Canal Zone, October 16.

Dec. 6: Egypt was elected to membership on the U.N. Economic and Social Council.

Dec. 7: The Government issued orders to the Governor of Suez to oppose by force British troops if they went ahead with plans to demolish the village of Omroman in order to build a safe road to their water distillation plant.

The British commander in the Suez Canal Zone, Lieut. Gen. George Erskine, disclosed that he had made 4 demands of the Egyptian Governor of the Canal Zone and that he had "nothing more to say . . . unless there is a marked change of attitude and an improvement in the situation." The demands were: (1) No armed policemen on any route used by British troops in the Suez area; (2) British reservation of the right to enter Suez to protect British lives at any time, but agreement otherwise to place the town off limits; (3) closing of all roads in and out of Suez for the duration of the emergency except for essential supplies; (4) dismissal of the Suez police chief as "incompetent."

Dec. 9: The British completed construction of a road to a water distillation plant despite protestations made by the Government.

The Cabinet decided to dismiss all Britons employed in Egyptian public offices and public institutions.

Announcement was made that the Government

¹ In general, items on the Chronology are drawn from the *New York Times* unless otherwise indicated.

- had decided to confiscate the 150-acre Gezira Sporting Club of Cairo for use as a public park.
- Dec. 13:* The Cabinet announced its decision to recall Egypt's Ambassador to Great Britain, 'Abd al-Fattah Amr Pasha, as a "sign of protest against British aggression in the Suez Canal Zone."
- Dec. 15:* The Police Department declared a state of emergency in Cairo and stationed riot squads at various points in the city to prevent any possible student demonstrations.
- Saboteurs derailed a British military train in the Canal Zone.
- Dec. 16:* The British Government asserted that elements of the Egyptian police in Ismailia were guilty of a "ruthless and murderous intention" to precipitate disorder "with the object of killing members of the British forces" in the Canal Zone.
- Dec. 18:* Foreign Minister Muhammad Salah al-Din Pasha conferred in Paris with British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden on the possibility of reopening talks between the two governments.
- Dec. 20:* Lieut. Gen. Erskine, British commander in the Suez Canal Zone, informed the Egyptian Governor in the Suez Canal Zone that a sunset-to-sunrise curfew would be imposed on southern approaches to Ismailia because of what he described as the "deterioration of law and order in Ismailia." General Erskine requested that the Egyptian police cooperate in making the curfew effective, but reserved the right to enforce it himself if the Egyptian authorities did not do so.
- Dec. 22:* Dr. Hafiz Afifi Pasha was appointed by the King as Chief of his Cabinet.
- Dec. 26:* The governing councils of Fu'ad al-Awal University, Faruq al-Awal University, and Ibrahim Pasha University ordered that they be closed after students had demonstrated in Alexandria and Cairo against the appointment of Dr. Hafiz Afifi Pasha as Chief of the Cabinet to King Faruq.
- It was announced that 'Abd al-Fattah Amr Pasha, Ambassador to London, had been appointed by King Faruq as his adviser on foreign affairs.
- Dec. 30:* The Cabinet approved a bill that would make collaboration with the British forces a crime punishable by imprisonment and fine.
- Dec. 31:* Gen. Brian Robertson, Commander of British forces in the Middle East, declared that "neither passage of time nor murderous episodes" would force the British troops out of the Canal Zone.
- 1952
- Jan. 1:* A group of 28 armed civilians attacked British forces for 3 hours along the Sweetwater Canal.
- Jan. 5:* The Government informed Great Britain that it could not be held responsible for a newspaper offer of £E1,000 as a reward to any Egyptian who would kill Lieut. Gen. Erskine, British commander in the Suez Canal Zone.
- Jan. 9:* A clash occurred between Egyptians and British troops at the village of Al-Mahsama.

- Jan. 10:* The Government told Lieut. Gen. Erskine to get his troops out of the village of Kafr Abdou or "face the consequences."
- Jan. 16:* A son was born to King Faruq and Queen Narriman. He was named Ahmad Fu'ad.
- Jan. 17:* British Prime Minister Winston Churchill requested "token forces" from the United States, France, and Turkey to be "stationed in the Canal Zone as a symbol of the unity of purpose which inspires us."
- Jan. 18:* The Government, through its delegation to the United Nations, warned that "the invitation of Mr. Churchill, addressed to the United States, France, and Turkey, to send forces, even though symbolic, to the territory of a state other than its own, far from aiding the maintenance of peace and freedom of navigation, constitutes a new attempt on the sovereignty of a member of the United Nations of such a nature as to seriously compromise security in the Middle East."
- Jan. 20:* British forces cordoned off the city of Ismailia and rounded up snipers after a nun was shot and killed at the St. Vincent de Paul Convent.
- Jan. 22:* British forces continued their hunt for snipers and hidden stores of arms in Ismailia.
- Jan. 23:* Minister of the Interior Fu'ad Serag al-Din Pasha declared that the British search for snipers and arms in Ismailia had gone beyond the stage of "mere protestations" and that he had demanded "an immediate cessation" from the British commander, Lieut. Gen. Erskine.
- Jan. 24:* British troops continued their search for snipers and hidden stores of arms in Ismailia.
- Jan. 25:* British sources reported that a "military operation" in which 1,500 British troops were engaged resulted in the killing of 41 to 46 members of the Ismailia auxiliary police and the wounding of 58 others. The British also reported that they had detained 800 Egyptians captured in the fighting. The purpose of the engagement was to disarm the Ismailia auxiliary police who, the British charged, had "both connived at and taken actual part in guerilla warfare against British forces, indulging in sniping and harassing activities with the full knowledge of the Egyptian security authorities in Cairo."
- Jan. 26:* The killing of more than 40 Egyptians at Ismailia provoked anti-foreign riots in Cairo. Rioters burned, pillaged, and smashed tens of millions of dollars worth of U.S., British, French, Greek, and Egyptian-owned property, including Shephard's Hotel. At least 67 persons were killed and wounded. The Government (as reported by Reuters) declared that "subversive elements today attempted to overthrow the Egyptian Government in accordance with a prepared plan."
- Foreign Minister Muhammad Salah al-Din Pasha was recalled from Paris, where he was attending U.N. meetings.
- Martial law for all of Egypt was declared.
- Jan. 27:* King Faruq dismissed the government of

Prime Minister Mustafa al-Nahhas Pasha because of its failure to maintain "security and order," and appointed Ali Mahir Pasha as Prime Minister. Prime Minister Mahir announced the following Cabinet:

Ali Mahir Pasha — Prime Minister, Foreign Affairs, War and Marine
Murtada al-Maraghi Bey — Interior
Dr. Zaki 'Abd al-Mot'aa — Finance, National Economy
Hamad Sulayman Pasha — Public Works
'Abd al-Khalik Hassunah Pasha — Education
Mahmud Hasan Pasha — Social Affairs
Ahmad Ibrahim 'Abd al-Wahhab Bey — Commerce, Industry, and Supply
Sa'd al-Labban — Muslim Charities
Salib Sami Pasha — Agriculture
Muhammad Ali Namazi Pasha — Justice
Dr. Ibrahim Shawki Pasha — Health and Municipal Rural Affairs

Jan. 28: Ahmad Husayn, leader of the prewar Green Shirts, was arrested and charged with "top responsibility" for the riots of Jan. 26.

Egyptian saboteurs blew up an army train near Qantara on the Suez Canal, injuring 4 British soldiers.

Feb. 6: The following Cabinet changes were announced: Alphonse Greiss Bey replaced Salib Sami Pasha as Minister of Agriculture. Salib Sami Pasha became Minister of Communications. 'Abd al-Galil al-Amri Bey was appointed Minister of Commerce and Industry in place of Ahmad Ibrahim 'Abd al-Wahhab Bey, who became Minister of State attached to the Prime Minister's office.

Feb. 7: The British Government in a diplomatic note delivered to the Government at Cairo expressed the "strongest condemnation" of the killing of 10 British subjects during the riots of Jan. 26.

On orders of Prime Minister Ali Mahir Pasha, Egyptian police rounded up 244 Egyptian terrorists in raids in the Canal Zone and bordering areas.

Feb. 9: Prime Minister Ali Mahir Pasha announced that the military training of Egyptian "volunteers" would be taken over by the War and Navy Ministry. He said that the volunteers, after training, would be put in a territorial army, an auxiliary of the regular army.

Feb. 11: Because of a "state of comparative peace" in the Canal Zone, Lieut. Gen. Erskine announced that all military roadblocks and check points on the main road from Port Said to Suez had been removed.

Feb. 14: The Government made public identical notes of regret sent to 15 nations in answer to their protests over the losses of property incurred as a result of the Jan. 26 riots. The Government announced that it had proposed to Parliament that a credit of £E5 million (almost \$15 million) be made available for the owners of shops and buildings damaged or destroyed in the riots.

Feb. 15: Mines laid by terrorists wrecked a British army oil train in the Canal Zone, resulting in the reimposition of drastic security measures in the area by Lieut. Gen. Erskine.

Feb. 22: The Ministry of Public Works announced a 4-year plan to increase the amount of irrigation water available from the Nile.

Feb. 23: The Government announced the conclusion of a barter agreement with the Soviet Union by which 50 million pounds of Egyptian cotton (estimated at \$25 million), would be exchanged for 200,000 tons of Russian wheat (estimated at \$22 million).

India

1951

Dec. 6: Sir Benegal Rau was elected to represent India on the International Court of Justice.

Dec. 15: Announcement was made of an agreement between the Burmah Shell combine (Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Company and Burmah Oil Company) and the Government for the erection of a \$45-million refinery at Bombay.

1952

Jan. 5: The Government signed a 5-year agreement with the United States whereby the U.S. would contribute \$50 million, made available by the Mutual Security Act, toward Indian economic development projects.

Jan. 31: Polling in the national elections for the provincial legislatures and central Parliament was completed, with the following results: Congress, 363; Independents, 36; Communist Front, 27; Socialists, 12; others, 51.

Feb. 29: Finance Minister Chintaman Deshmukh presented the new budget to Parliament. The total revenue was estimated at \$996 million and expenditures at \$810 million. Expenditure on defense was estimated at \$362 million.

Iran

1951

Dec. 1: Prime Minister Mosaddeq announced the following Cabinet appointments:

Maj. Gen. Morteza Yazdanpanah — War
Dr. Ali Amini — National Economy
Amir Taymur Kalali — Interior
Shamsuddin Amir Alai — Justice

Dec. 4: The Bank Melli Iran suspended the opening of credits abroad for all imports.

The following Cabinet Ministers resigned in order to stand for election to Parliament: Zia Farmand (Agriculture); Dr. Karim Sandjabi (Education); and Mahmud Nariman (Finance). Mahmud Hessabi was appointed Minister of Education and Mahmud Talghani was appointed Minister of Agriculture to replace the outgoing ministers.

Dec. 5: Senators Abolghassem Najim and Mohammad Soruri resigned from the Oil Nationalization Board, reportedly because of opposition to Governmental policy on oil matters.

Dec. 6: New York Times correspondent Michael

Clark was ordered by the Government to leave the country within 48 hours. He was charged with engaging in "activities in favor of the former British-controlled Anglo-Iranian Oil Company." The Government specifically objected to a news dispatch which it said linked "incipient terrorism" with the Mossadeq regime.

A demonstration of 5,000 Communists led to a 5-hour battle with the police and 5,000 anti-Communists in which at least 24 persons were killed.

The British Government published a White Paper containing documents relevant to the AIOC dispute with Iran.

Dec. 8: The British Foreign Office announced that the International Bank had suggested the following settlement of the oil dispute: The Bank would finance, as trustee, the production and refining of Iranian oil; the oil and refined products would be sold to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company at "current Persian Gulf rates," and Iran would receive the sales price.

Eleven newspaper editors who opposed the Government's policies and 11 opposition deputies moved into the Parliament building and announced that they were taking refuge from pro-Government terrorists. They said that they would remain there until Prime Minister Mossadeq resigned.

Dec. 10: The Government appointed Hosayn Navab, Minister to the Netherlands, as representative of the Government at the International Court of Justice and empowered him to contest Great Britain's complaint against Iran in the matter of the nationalization of the properties of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.

Dec. 12: The Government announced that former customers of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company had until December 22 to buy oil. At the end of that time "the Iranian Government will be free to sell oil to any would-be buyer."

Dec. 13: The Government ordered Leopold Herman, correspondent for Reuters News Agency, to leave the country within 48 hours. He was charged with false reporting, which charge he denied.

Dec. 16: The Majlis (Parliament) adopted a resolution instructing the Government to present within one month legislation prohibiting the use, sale, or manufacture of alcoholic beverages, a measure which the Senate had already approved.

Dec. 19: The Governor-General of Tehran, Hadi Ashtari, was reported to have resigned because of a disagreement with the Minister of the Interior, Amir Taymur Kalali, on the number of citizens to be summoned to form an electoral supervisory council.

Gen. Mohammad Sadegh Kupal became Chief of the National Police.

Dec. 20: Thirty to 40 pro-Government supporters joined in an organized boycott of the Majlis in order to prevent 15 anti-Mossadeq Deputies from resuming attacks against the Government.

Dec. 26: Prime Minister Mossadeq announced at a press conference that a reported International Bank plan for settlement of the oil dispute was unacceptable to the Government. He said that Iran could not accept the plan because it could not agree to the re-engagement of British oil experts of the former Anglo-Iranian Oil Company by the National Oil Company of Iran and it could not agree to sell oil to Britain at a price below international rates. The Prime Minister added that since both Britain and the International Bank insisted on a discount to Britain on oil purchases, the talks had broken down.

Dec. 28: About 5,000 Communists, organized as the "Association to Fight the Imperialist Oil Companies," met and adopted a 5-point resolution centered on opposition to the proposal that the International Bank should work out a plan which would enable the oil industry to resume operations.

Dec. 30: The Government announced that because of a lack of foreign exchange no more passports would be granted to Iranian subjects wishing to leave the country, except for official business or medical purposes.

1952

Jan. 1: The International Bank proposed conditions under which it would undertake to finance and operate the oil industry: Oil operations would be conducted under the management of a neutral top executive group to be selected by the Bank and to be responsible to it. The Bank would be free to engage and discharge such other personnel as it considered necessary, and all management staff and other personnel would be responsible to the Bank. The Bank's services would be rendered as an interim measure and would not prejudice the legal rights of the interested parties. The services would be performed on a nonprofit basis. The Bank would provide the funds necessary for restoring operations, under conditions appropriate to protect it against undue risks. These funds would be repaid out of oil revenues. The Bank would make a bulk export contract for the sale of oil through established distribution channels. The profits would be divided into 3 parts: one to the Iranian Government, one to the bulk foreign buyer, and one to be held in reserve by the Bank. The arrangement would be for 2 years, unless an earlier settlement was made, and provision would be made for its continuance thereafter. The arrangement could be terminated by either party.

Jan. 3: Prime Minister Mossadeq rejected the International Bank's proposal that profits be divided in three parts among the Government, the bulk foreign buyer, and a reserve account to be held by the Bank "since purchasers of our oil have no partnership with Iran." He also insisted that the Bank would have to "carry out the orders" of the Government.

Jan. 5: Amir Taymur Kalali, Interior Minister and acting Labor Minister, resigned after threats

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by the opposition in the Majlis to seek his impeachment and trial.

Jan. 6: Prime Minister Mosaddeq agreed, by letter, to accept technical economic assistance from the United States under the Mutual Security Act.

Jan. 7: Balloting began for the election of 136 members to the new (Seventeenth) Majlis.

Jan. 8: A deputation of women appeared in the Majlis to demand the suffrage.

Jan. 9: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presented a note to the British Ambassador threatening to take the most serious measures if the "open interference" of British Government officials in Iranian affairs did not cease.

Jan. 12: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that all British consulates must be closed by Jan. 21.

Feb. 4: The Government replied to Great Britain's complaint to the International Court of Justice. Its memorandum challenged the competence of the Court to consider the AIOC case.

Feb. 5: The Government issued a decree banning all foreign cultural institutions outside Tehran.

Feb. 9: Mountain tribesmen in the Zahidan-Zabol area beheaded "a Governor, the elections inspector, and two members of the electoral board." The trouble began as a protest against local election machinery. Thirty-five persons were injured in the ensuing riot.

Two persons were killed and many others injured at Damghan when rival political groups clashed.

Feb. 11: Sixteen students were injured in a riot between 400 Communist and 600 anti-Communist students in Tehran.

Feb. 15: Hosayn Fatemi, former Deputy Prime Minister under Dr. Mosaddeq, was seriously wounded by a gunshot fired by a member of Fedayan-i-Islam.

Feb. 19: Prime Minister Mosaddeq and representatives of the International Bank issued a joint statement that a partial settlement of the oil problem had been agreed upon.

Feb. 22: A mass demonstration was assembled in Tehran to protest against "intervention by the International Bank in Iran's oil affairs."

Iraq

(See also Jordan.)

1951

Dec. 1: Eighteen Deputies presented a petition to the Government urging it to "intervene by all means to restore security and end the recurrence of military uprisings [in Syria] and invite an immediate meeting of the Arab League Political Committee to consider the situation."

Dec. 2: It was announced that a group called the Nationalist Parliamentary Bloc had been formed in the Chamber of Deputies. (ANA, Dec. 8.)

Dec. 6: Meetings of Parliament were suspended for a month by royal decree. (ANA, Dec. 8.)

Dec. 15: The High Court tried 17 persons charged with espionage for Israel. (ANA, Dec. 15.)

Dec. 25: New agreements were concluded between the Government and the Khanaqin and Rafidayn Petroleum Companies, both subsidiaries of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. By the agreements the Government took over all oil marketing and refining in the country. In both cases the Companies' assets were bought by the Government at an agreed valuation; in both marketing and refining the Khanaqin Oil Company will, for a fixed fee, act as managing agent for the Government until 1961. (ANA, Dec. 29; *Petroleum Press Service*, Jan. 1952.)

1952

Jan. 27: Police and students clashed in Baghdad after mass meetings by 3 political parties had demanded "unity with the Egyptian people in the fight against foreign rulers."

Feb. 14: The Chamber of Deputies ratified the new oil agreement between the Government and the Iraq Petroleum Company, by a vote of 89 to 7.

Feb. 17: The Senate approved the oil agreement with IPC, retroactive to Jan. 1, 1951. The agreement provided that the Government would receive 50% of the Company's profits before deduction of foreign income taxes. A minimum of 22 million tons of crude oil would be produced by IPC and the Mosul Oil Co. annually by 1954 matter of reparations from Germany in accordance with the needs of the hour."

Israel

1951

Dec. 11: The Knesset (Parliament) appointed Speaker Joseph Sprinzak as acting President because of the illness of President Chaim Weizmann.

1952

Jan. 7: Police dispersed a demonstration of about 2,000 young men who were attempting to storm the Knesset in protest against Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion's proposal for direct talks with Germany on the question of reparations. About 350 people were injured.

Jan. 9: It was disclosed that the Government had requested \$126 million from the United States in support of its economy.

The Knesset voted 61 to 50 "to determine the final line of action [direct negotiation with Germany] in accordance with the circumstances and conditions." By the same vote it rejected an opposition motion against any contact with the Germans.

Jan. 10: 850 women teachers went on strike protesting against the failure of the Ministry of Education to restore 20% cuts in cost of living allowances to married women.

Jan. 15: The Foreign Affairs Committee of the Knesset authorized the Government to "act in the matter of reparations from Germany in accordance with the needs of the hour."

Jan. 19: Menachem Begin, leader of Herut (Freedom Movement), announced that he would call for a "civil disobedience" campaign throughout the country if the Government opened negotiations with Germany for war reparations.

Feb. 21: Two members of Mapam, Mrs. Hanna Lamdan, Deputy Speaker of the Knesset, and David Livishitz, resigned from the party which, they said, had become indistinguishable from the Communists.

Feb. 27: The Government disclosed that it had sent a note to the Soviet Union assuring it that Israel would not join any aggressive pact against it. The note also asked the Soviet Union to permit Soviet Jews to emigrate to Israel.

Jordan

1951

Dec. 8: A draft agreement for a British loan to Jordan was submitted to both governments for ratification.

Dec. 12: A debate was held in the Chamber of Deputies on the serious economic situation of the country. One solution proposed was a union with Iraq, and a resolution was passed requesting the Government to present a statement, at a secret session, on the proposal. (ANA, Dec. 15.)

Dec. 20: The Government signed an agreement with the United States for \$1 million worth of wheat.

Dec. 29: The leader of the Communist movement in Jordan, Fu'ad Nassir, and 3 of his associates were arrested. (ANA, Jan. 5.)

1952

Jan. 1: King Talal signed the new Constitution, which immediately came into force. (ANA, Jan. 5. For text see p. 228.)

Jan. 3: The Government approved the terms of the draft agreement for a loan from Great Britain of £1 million. (ANA, Jan. 5.)

Jan. 10: The first application to form a political party under the provisions of the Constitution was received by the Government. The name of the proposed party was the Resurrection Party. (ANA, Jan. 12.)

Jan. 22: Prime Minister Nuri Pasha Sa'id of Iraq declared that no talks on the governmental level concerning a union with Jordan had taken place since the death of King Abdallah and that the Iraqi Government had made no effort to reopen talks on the subject. (ANA, Jan. 26.)

Jan. 23: Defense Minister Sulayman Bey Tuqan arrived in Baghdad for official conferences with Iraqi officials. (ANA, Jan. 26.)

Jan. 24: Application was made to form a political party to be known as the Sha'b (People's) Party. It would be formed mainly of former ministers, deputies, and other well-known political figures. (ANA, Jan. 26.)

Feb. 12: The Government signed a Technical Assistance Agreement with the U.S. whereby the

latter would contribute \$2,780,000 for development projects designed to increase food production and the use of water resources, and to improve health and education, transportation, and certain industrial facilities. The Government would allocate \$1 million in dinars as its contribution to the fund.

Feb. 16: The Minister to Cairo, Awni 'Abd al-Hadi Bey, signed the Inter-Arab Collective Security Pact for the Government at Arab League headquarters in Cairo. (ANA, Feb. 23.)

Feb. 18: The newly appointed Minister from Great Britain, Mr. Geoffrey Furlonge, presented his credentials to King Talal. (ANA, Feb. 23.)

Feb. 20: Fu'ad Nassir was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment for Communist activities. Salim Elias Mitri, Gabir Husayn Gabir, and Elias Hanna Shamma were each sentenced to 6 years imprisonment. (ANA, Feb. 23.)

Kashmir Problem

(See also India, Pakistan.)

1951

Dec. 20: U.N. Mediator Frank P. Graham submitted a report to the Security Council which indicated optimism for agreement between India and Pakistan over the question of Kashmir.

1952

Jan. 17: The Soviet Union charged that British and U.S. attempts to settle the Kashmir disputes through a plebiscite was part of an imperialist plot to turn Kashmir into a military and strategic base. Through the Soviet delegate to the U.N. it also demanded that the people of Kashmir be allowed to determine their political future through a Constituent Assembly.

Jan. 30: The Government of Pakistan denied that the U.S. or any other power had asked it for military bases in Kashmir.

Jan. 31: The Security Council requested Dr. Frank Graham to make another attempt to bring about an early plebiscite in Kashmir.

Feb. 8: Two thousand people, mainly Praja Parishad party workers, demonstrated in Jammu.

Lebanon

1951

Dec. 19: A Point Four Mutual Assistance Agreement was signed with the U.S.

Dec. 20: A number of Communists were sentenced to 5-months' imprisonment on the charge of staging demonstrations. (ANA, Dec. 22.)

Dec. 28: Representatives of the Government resumed talks with Syrian officials. (ANA, Dec. 29.)

1952

Jan. 1: Compulsory military training was instituted in Lebanese schools. (ANA, Jan. 5.)

Jan. 6: Trade talks with Syrian officials were held at Shtoura. (ANA, Jan. 12.)

Jan. 15: Trade talks were resumed with Syrian officials at Shtoura. (ANA, Jan. 19.)

Jan. 24: The Director-General of the Department of National Economy arrived in Damascus with a draft agreement to re-establish economic relations. He stated that he was empowered to sign a final agreement with the Government settling economic differences. (ANA, Jan. 26.)

Feb. 4: An economic agreement was signed with Syria at Shtoura. It provided that royalties due to the two countries from the Iraq Petroleum Company and Tapline Company should be divided equally. Animal and agricultural produce would be exchanged between the two countries without payment of customs duties. Industrial products were divided into 3 categories: the first would be exempted from customs duties altogether; the second would be subject to reduced duties; and the third would be subject to the present customs duties. Barriers to the free passage of individuals between the two countries would be removed. (ANA, Feb. 16.)

Feb. 8: Prime Minister Abdallah Bey al-Yafi submitted the resignation of his Government. (ANA, Feb. 8.)

Feb. 11: A new Prime Minister and Cabinet was announced as follows:

Sami al-Sulh Bey — Prime Minister, Interior
Fu'ad al-Khuri — Deputy Prime Minister, Justice

Philip Taqla — Foreign Minister
Ahmad al-Husayni — Public Works
Amir Majid Arslan — Defense, Public Health
Michel Mommet — Social Affairs
Emile Lahud — Finance

Antoine Stafan — Education
Sulayman al-Sali — Agriculture, Economy
Husayn al-Abdallah — Communications

(ANA, Feb. 16.)

Feb. 19: The Chamber of Deputies passed a vote of confidence in the new Cabinet. Prime Minister Sami al-Sulh Bey said that his Government intended to reinforce the army, to amend the electoral laws on the basis of constituencies, to give women political rights, to ensure the rights of workers, and to support the new economic agreement concluded with Syria. (ANA, Feb. 23.)

Feb. 20: Finance Minister Emile Lahud announced that the entire issue of currency notes, totaling £L 136 million, would be called in because of the discovery that large quantities of forged 100-lira notes were in circulation. (ANA, Feb. 23.)

Libya

1951

Dec. 24: Independence was proclaimed by King Idris I. The following Cabinet was announced:

Mahmud Bey Muntasir — Prime Minister, Foreign Affairs
Ali Jarbi — Defense
Fathi Kakhid — Justice, Education
Mansur Bey Kadara — Finance

Muhammad Bey 'Uthman — Health
Ibrahim Bey Shayban — Public Works, Communications

The Government applied for membership in the United Nations.

1952

Feb. 1: The U.N. General Assembly voted in favor of a resolution recommending that Libya be admitted to the United Nations.

Feb. 7: It was announced that an agreement for technical assistance from the United States amounting to nearly \$1 million was concluded.

Feb. 19: Elections for members of Parliament were held.

Feb. 21: Clashes occurred at Tripoli between anti-Government demonstrators and the police. One Libyan was killed and 13 wounded.

Feb. 22: Bashir Bey Sadawi, leader of the opposition National Congress Party, was arrested and deported along with his immediate followers. He was charged with subversive activities against the Government including responsibility for the riots of the previous day.

Morocco

1951

Dec. 13: The U.N. General Assembly voted 28 to 23 to postpone placing the Moroccan case on its agenda. The Soviet Union, most of the Arab and Asian countries, and a number of Latin-American countries opposed the action.

1952

Feb. 17: Five thousand nationalists demonstrated on the occasion of the visit of 17 U.N. delegates from South America to Casablanca.

Pakistan

(See also India, Kashmir.)

1951

Dec. 6: Pakistan was elected to membership on the U.N. Security Council.

1952

Jan. 13: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that former Ambassador to the United States M.A.H. Ispahani had been appointed High Commissioner in London. Muhammad Ali, former High Commissioner in Canada, was appointed Ambassador to the United States.

Feb. 2: An agreement was signed with the United States that would make \$10 million for technical assistance available to the Government.

Feb. 14: The Government of East Pakistan banned publication of the *Pakistan Observer* of Dacca because of an editorial attack on Prime Minister Khwaja Nazimuddin. An official statement said the action was taken because of the "frankly subversive role of the paper and the anti-state activities and extraterritorial activity of those connected with the paper during the last two years."

Feb. 21-23: Riots took place in Dacca. Eight people were killed and more than 100 injured. Ostensibly the demonstrations called for the acceptance of Bengali as an official language along with Urdu.

Palestine Problem

1951

Dec. 7: Israeli officials confiscated from the French vessel *Champollion* a cargo of ammunition consigned to the Egyptian Air Force.

Dec. 11: The report of the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees was presented to the U.N. General Assembly. It proposed a \$250 million program that would by July 1954 have developed into a self-sustaining project. It listed 83,000 refugees in Syria; 107,000 in Lebanon; 467,000 in Jordan; 200,000 in Egypt (Gaza); and 21,000 in Israel.

Dec. 12: The U.N. Palestine Conciliation Commission, in a report to the General Assembly, stated that "while both parties expressed a desire to cooperate with the U.N. toward achievement of stability in Palestine, neither party is now ready to seek that aim through full implementation of General Assembly resolutions under which the Palestine Conciliation Commission is operating."

1952

Jan. 12: The Government of Jordan submitted a detailed memorandum to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and to representatives in Amman of the countries responsible for the tripartite declaration of 1950 on recent Israeli aggressions in the Bethlehem and Beit Jala areas. (ANA, Jan. 19.)

Jan. 26: The U.N. General Assembly approved the \$250-million refugee program to aid Arab refugees. It also adopted a resolution for the continuation of the Palestine Conciliation Commission.

Feb. 29: Israeli and Lebanese army leaders held a border conference "to discuss problems and matters concerning the armistice agreement between Israel and Lebanon."

Saudi Arabia

1952

Jan. 18: The Arabian American Oil Company announced that it was moving its operating headquarters from New York to Dhahran.

Sudan

1951

Dec. 4: Four members of the Ashigga Party were sentenced to imprisonment; their sentences varied from 2 to 6 months. Because of a demonstration on November 30, they were found guilty of being members of an unlawful assembly and acting in a manner likely to disturb the peace. (ANA, Dec. 8.)

Dec. 19: The Sudan Workers' Federation ended their 4-day conference at which it was resolved

that the Federation stands for immediate evacuation of the British and self-determination, without foreign intervention. It was asserted that it would not cooperate with the present Government in any political institutions. (ANA, Dec. 22.)

Dec. 20: A new party called the Socialist Republic Party was formed. (ANA, Dec. 22.)

Dec. 27: A coalition between the Sudan Workers' Federation, the Officials' Federation, and the Struggle Front was formed. It adopted the name of the United Front for the Liberation of the Sudan. (ANA, Dec. 29.)

1952

Jan. 3: The Umma Party gave its full support to the plebiscite agreement concluded between the Umma Party and Struggle Front delegates in Paris. (ANA, Jan. 5.)

Jan. 17: Proposals for a constitution providing for a Cabinet system of government consisting of a Governor-General and a Sudanese Council of Ministers for the transitional period before self-determination were placed before the Legislative Assembly. (ANA, Jan. 19.)

Jan. 19: Ismail Bey al-Azhari, leader of one faction of the split Ashigga Party, was arrested along with 20 others, following a demonstration at Medani in the Gezira area. (ANA, Jan. 26.)

Jan. 20-22: The Sudan Workers' Federation staged a general strike for salary increases. (ANA, Jan. 26.)

Feb. 10: It was reported that two new parties had been formed. The "Sudan Party" would seek a "middle way" favoring an independent regime in the Commonwealth of Nations; it aimed at self-determination by 1953. A "Republican Party" would advocate dominion status under the British Crown. (ANA, Feb. 16.)

Syria

(See also Lebanon.)

1951

Dec. 1: Ma'ruf al-Dawalibi resigned as Prime Minister along with his cabinet. President Hashim al-Atasi asked Hamid al-Khuja to form a new Government.

Dec. 2: President Hashim al-Atasi resigned. Colonel Adib Shishakli, Army Chief of Staff, took over sole executive authority and dissolved Parliament. Decree No. 1 stated that Parliament had been dissolved because it had proved unable to shoulder responsibility and that the people would decide the country's future.

Dec. 3: Colonel Adib Shishakli named Colonel Fawzi Silo Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, pending "restoration of normal parliamentary life." He declared, "I do not want to become a dictator. I am a simple colonel and my duty is Chief of Staff. All the country's responsibilities are in the hands of Silo."

Dec. 13: A military mission sent by Col. Adib Shishakli to explain the position in Syria to other

Arab states returned from visits to Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. (ANA, Dec. 15.)

Dec. 20: The Government announced the abolition of all civilian titles. Henceforth all Syrians would be addressed as "al-Sayyid."

1952

Jan. 5: It was reported that Prime Minister Fawzi Silo had approved a new budget retroactive to July 1, 1951, and continuing until the end of 1952. Income and expenditure was estimated at LS 265 million. Over LS 108 million were allocated for national defense.

Jan. 19: It was reported that students and army officers clashed at Damascus when the former demonstrated against the Government. Students also rioted at Aleppo; 27 persons were alleged to have been killed and 287 wounded.

Jan. 23: The Government ordered the suppression of the Arab Resurrectionist Party (Tazb al-Ba'th al-Arabi).

Jan. 27: Rioting of students at Aleppo resulted in the imposition of martial law throughout the city.

Jan. 30: Prime Minister Fawzi Silo issued a decree barring students from engaging in political activities. (ANA, Feb. 2.)

Feb. 1: A decree regulating ownership of all State domain land was issued. By Decree No. 96 no holdings of any State domain exceeding 50 hectares (an exception is the Jezira district where the maximum is 150) will be recognized as legal, even if ownership was acquired before the issuance of the decree. Land registered as State domain, and land reverting to the State from compliance with the above provision, may be sold or rented for a minimum return to individual farmers who satisfy certain requirements. No land so acquired may be sold by its new owner. By the terms of the decree the area of State domains was expanded to include vast areas beyond the so-called "desert-limit" line. (Syrian Review of Arab World Affairs, March 1952.)

Feb. 4: An economic agreement was signed with Lebanon. (For terms, see under Lebanon, p. 217.)

Tunisia

1951

Dec. 15: The French Government replied to Tunisian demands for greater internal autonomy by stating that municipal reform must be the first step toward greater independence.

Dec. 21: Nationalist leaders reported that in a conference with French Prime Minister Robert Schuman they had found him unwilling to concede the principle of an all-Tunisian Parliament, ministry, and local government.

1952

Jan. 24: A note signed by Prime Minister Muhammad Chenik was dispatched to the U.N. Security Council requesting it to intervene in what it described as its dispute with France over Tunisian efforts to obtain full autonomy. U.N. officials, how-

ever, declined to treat the appeal as that of an independent government and referred it to the permanent French delegate, Jean Chauvel.

Rioting broke out between police and several thousand trade union members and ex-servicemen outside Tunis Courthouse as 'Abd al-Aziz al-Mestiri, union leader, was tried for participating in a forbidden demonstration.

Jan. 16: Nine persons were injured in Bizerte when police moved to break up a demonstration by the Neo-Destour Party.

Jan. 17: Three nationalist demonstrators were killed and 30 wounded in rioting at Tunis.

Jan. 18: French authorities arrested Habib Bourguiba, leader of the Neo-Destour Party, and five other leading members of the party. Resident General Jean de Hautecloque charged Bourguiba with systematic agitation, "which from the day of the arrival of the Resident-General has attempted to bring about failure of the mission of conciliation given to him by the French Government, and which he is attempting to pursue."

Jan. 19: Eight Tunisians were killed and at least 20 wounded in clashes with French security forces at Mateur. The demonstrations were in protest over the arrest of Neo-Destour leaders.

Jan. 21: Three Tunisian nationalists were killed and 30 wounded in Tunis and other cities in clashes with French forces.

Jan. 22: Nine Tunisians were killed and 26 wounded at Sousse in clashes with French forces.

Jan. 23: Seven Tunisians were killed and 10 persons wounded in a clash with French Mobile Guards and sailors at Teboulba.

Jan. 25: Freight trains were derailed by saboteurs on two lines.

Jan. 26: Spokesmen for the Neo-Destour Party declared that the French had rounded up 4,000 of their members in the preceding week.

Jan. 28: French troops and police rounded up hundreds of Tunisian nationalists on the Cape Bon Peninsula.

Feb. 1: "Tunisia Day" was observed by the renewal of a nation-wide general strike.

Fifteen Arab, Asian, and African members of the United Nations charged that French military intervention in Tunisia and the arrest of local political leaders constituted a "threat to international peace and security."

Feb. 7: The Bey of Tunis, Sidi Muhammad al-Amin, presented a note to the French Government asking for an end of French repressive measures and the release of nationalist leaders held by police.

Feb. 8: About 400 Arabs were arrested in the Sousse area.

Feb. 9: The French Government announced that 48 Communists had been exiled to southern Tunisia and 150 nationalists arrested.

Feb. 11: A French official disclosed that 28,000 troops and special armed police had been sent to Tunisia from France and Algeria during the three preceding weeks.

Feb. 15: The French Government canceled the passports of Minister of Justice Salah Ben Youssef and Minister of Social Affairs Muhammad Badra after they had applied for U.S. visas in order to bring the Tunisian case to the attention of the U.N. Security Council.

Feb. 21: Twelve Tunisians were given sentences varying from 5 to 6 years and fines up to 100,000 francs (about \$280) for illegal possession of arms.

Feb. 29: Police fired on three columns of nationalist demonstrators trying to march on the French Government residency at Tunis.

The Yemen delegation to the U.N. appealed to the U.S. Government to give its support to the inclusion of the Tunisian problem on the agenda of the U.N. Security Council.

Turkey

1951

Dec. 2: It was reported that Bulgaria had repudiated its agreement to repatriate its Turkish minority in Turkey in retaliation for Turkey's adherence to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Dec. 5: The National Assembly passed legislation providing heavier penalties for those engaging in subversive activities. Leaders of subversive organizations could be sentenced to death. (*ANA*, Dec. 8.)

Dec. 8: George C. McGhee was appointed U.S. Ambassador to Turkey.

1952

Jan. 8: The Government, through its diplomatic representatives, notified the U.S., Great Britain, and France that unless its armed forces were placed under the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Powers in Europe it might have to reconsider its application to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Feb. 18: The Government formally became a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization when the National Assembly ratified the agreement. The North Atlantic Treaty Council agreed that the ground and air forces to be assigned by Turkey to the Atlantic Pact would operate under the over-all command of the Supreme Allied Command of Europe, through U.S. Admiral Robert B. Carney, the Commander-in-chief for Southern Europe.

Feb. 20: The formation of a Peasant's Party was announced. It was stated that it was being joined by people leaving the Republican People's Party and the Democratic Party. (*ANA*, Feb. 23.)

Feb. 29: The National Assembly approved a budget calling for expenditures of approximately TL 1,800 million (\$648 million), of which one-third was earmarked for the armed forces.

Yemen

1951

Dec. 13: The Hodeida branch of the Banque de l'Indochine closed.

Dec. 15: An agricultural training school was opened near Taizz. Twenty-one students began a 3-year course designed to cover the rudiments of modern agriculture.

1952

Feb. 12: The expedition of the American Foundation for the Study of Man concluded its archaeological work in the vicinity of Marib at the insistence of the Government. The Government accused Wendell Phillips, leader of the expedition, of violating several provisions of an agreement made with the Government by "failing to obtain a visa, meet time schedules, submit reports and films, or to deliver copies of the priceless rubber squeezes taken from the ruins." It also accused him of failure to repay a Government loan of 2000 riyals and to pay his workers before leaving.

DOCUMENTS

Constitution of the United Kingdom of Libya

Background and Summary

Ismail R. Khalidi

LIBYA, a former colony of Italy with an area of about 1,750,000 square miles and a population of about 1,250,000, emerged at the end of World War II as a country without a known future. Under Ottoman rule prior to the Italian conquest in 1911, when it was known as Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, Libya enjoyed no parliamentary institutions. It was administered as a *vilayet* (province) by a Turkish *wali* (governor; Arabic, *wali*) appointed directly by the Sultan. The views and interests of the vilayet were presented to the Turkish Mejlisi Mebusan (Parliament) through a few representatives of the territory as a whole.

It was only after World War I that self-rule was introduced in any degree. In June 1919 the Italian Government enacted an Organic Law in Tripolitania whereby an Italian wali was appointed to administer the civil and military affairs of the territory, assisted by an elected local council. A similar law was enacted in Cyrenaica in October of the same year. But with the advent of Fascism in 1922 and the accompanying rise of a spirit of colonialism, the Italian attempt to introduce parliamentary life into Libya collapsed. Military dictatorship prevailed for a quarter of a century.

Upon the British and French occupation of Libya in January 1943, the country, which had been a single unit under the Fascist regime, was divided for military purposes into three zones: Tripolitania and Cyrenaica were placed under British administration, and Fezzan under the French. Each of the territories had its Chief

Administrator and its own local government.

The victorious Allies, unable to agree among themselves on the disposal of Mussolini's lost empire, decided, in accordance with the terms of the Peace Treaty with Italy, to refer the entire problem to the United Nations for a decision. After considerable debate and compromise at its fourth session, the General Assembly decided in its resolution of November 21, 1949,¹ that Libya, comprising Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, and Fezzan, should be constituted an independent and sovereign state at a date not later than January 1, 1952.

The resolution also determined in paragraph 3 the steps and machinery for the implementation of this task, as follows:

That a constitution for Libya, including the form of government, shall be determined by representatives of the inhabitants of Cyrenaica, Tripolitania and the Fezzan, meeting and consulting together in a National Assembly;

That, for the purpose of assisting the people of Libya in the formulation of the constitution and the establishment of an independent Government, there shall be a United Nations Commissioner in Libya appointed by the General Assembly, and a Council to aid and advise him.

At the close of its session in December 1949, the General Assembly appointed Mr. Adrian Pelt, former Assistant Secretary-General for Conference and General Services of the United Nations, to the post of Commissioner. The following countries were elected to appoint representatives: Egypt, France, Italy, Pakistan, the

¹ U.N. General Assembly resolution No. 289 (IV).

♦ ISMAIL R. KHALIDI, a member of the United Nations Secretariat, was assigned in May 1950 to the United Nations Mission in Libya as a liaison officer for relations with the Libyan National Assembly in Tripoli.

United Kingdom, and the United States. There was also to be one representative for each of the three regions of Libya and one representative for the minorities in Libya.

THE COMMISSIONER'S PLAN

The United Nations Council for Libya met for the first time on April 25, 1950, in the city of Tripoli. A few months later, after the members of the Council had visited the three territories in order to study conditions there, the Commissioner submitted his first memorandum, outlining the steps to be taken toward the implementation of paragraph 3 of the General Assembly resolution, quoted above.

From the very outset the Council split into two camps, thus seriously impairing its usefulness as an international body to aid and advise the Commissioner. Mr. Pelt had always maintained that any Libyan body designed to work out a constitutional structure must be an elected one. This was opposed strongly by the representatives of Egypt, Pakistan, and Tripolitania, who maintained that no election could be held for any Libyan body until the two Administering Powers, France and the United Kingdom, had left the country.

After much debate a Pakistani draft resolution was adopted on June 14, 1950, by six votes to none, with three abstentions and one absent. This decision laid the cornerstone of the constitutional development of Libya. The resolution called for the creation of a committee of twenty-one members, representing equally the three territories and chosen by the appropriate authorities and parties in each. This Committee was to meet in the city of Tripoli not later than July 1, 1950, and prepare a plan whereby the representatives of the inhabitants of Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, and Fezzan should meet in a National Assembly for the purposes stated in paragraph 3 of the General Assembly resolution.²

THE COMMITTEE OF TWENTY-ONE

On July 27, 1950, the Committee of Twenty-One held its first meeting at the office

of the United Nations Commissioner in Tripoli. In his opening speech the Commissioner stated that he was "gratified to witness, as the United Nations Commissioner, the first meeting of a body representing all Libya for the first time in the modern history of this country."

After 22 meetings over a period of six months, the Committee of Twenty-One unanimously adopted a number of decisions on October 23, 1950. It decided that the National Assembly should be composed of 60 members and that the representation of the three territories should be on an equal basis and should be by means of selection; it also decided that the method of selection should be the same as that advocated by the Council for the creation of the Committee itself. The Committee decided against giving the Minorities the right of representation in the Assembly. In its resolution, however, the Committee pointed out that there was a genuine intention and a general feeling that all civil, religious, and social rights of minorities and foreigners should be safeguarded in the future constitution of Libya. The date for the convocation of the Assembly was set for November 25, 1950, in the city of Tripoli.

Toward the end of the meetings of the Committee, the leader of the Cyrenaican delegation introduced a resolution calling for the drawing up of a federal constitution, with a monarchical form of state, under the Crown of the Amir Sayyid Muhammad Idris al-Mahdi al-Sanusi. The majority of the Tripolitanian and Fezzanese delegations, however, opposed the motion on the grounds that this matter was outside the competence of the Committee. They pointed out that the General Assembly resolution of November 21, 1949, stated clearly that the form of government was to be determined by the National Assembly.

The work of the Committee of Twenty-One was subsequently severely criticized by both the Pakistani and Egyptian representatives on the Council. They asserted that the Committee had exceeded its terms of reference; that its main task had been to draw up a plan for the convocation of the National Assembly, including the recommendation for an elected body; and that, having done this, it should have reported back to the Council for further consultation. It should be pointed out, however, that

² Annual Report of the United Nations Commissioner. General Assembly. Official Records: Fifth session, Supplement No. 15 (A/1340) (New York, 1950), page 22, paragraph 145.

the Pakistani resolution adopted by the Council on June 14, 1950, calling for the creation of the Committee, did not make any such stipulation. It was assumed by the Committee that only in the case of failure to reach agreement on a plan would the Committee refer back to the Council for advice and consultation. At the same time, the Committee was guided by the underlying principle of the majority of the members of the Council that no election could be held for any truly representative body prior to the withdrawal of the British and French Administrations.

As a matter of fact, these criticisms of the Committee of Twenty-One came mainly from the most influential party in Tripolitania, the Congress Party of Bashir Bey Sa'dawi, who nevertheless agreed to participate in the work of the National Assembly. As further evidence of his approval of the formation of the National Assembly, Bashir Bey, upon his return from Saudi Arabia in December 1950, witnessed the official ceremony held by the National Assembly in Benghazi proclaiming the Amir Idris as the future king of Libya and establishing a federal democratic state. Later, it is true, when the Congress Party discovered that most of its members in the National Assembly were not genuine representatives of the Party, Bashir Bey issued an order requesting all members of the Party to withdraw from the Assembly. Only two heeded the call. From that moment there was conflict between the Congress Party on the one hand, supported by Pakistan and Egypt, and the National Assembly on the other.

In November 1950, when the First Annual Report of the Commissioner was under consideration by the U.N. General Assembly at its fifth session, Egypt and Pakistan, supported by the Arab states, put up a vigorous fight to change what the Committee of Twenty-One had decided. On November 16, in a dramatic last-minute attempt, the Commissioner appealed to the Assembly not to introduce a new element into the Libyan problem lest it should delay his mission and retard the creation of a Libyan constitution. The U.N. General Assembly in its resolution of November 17 called upon the National Assembly to convene not later than January 1, 1951, and to establish a provisional Government of Libya as early as

possible, bearing in mind April 1, 1951, as the target date. It further declared that all powers were to be progressively transferred to the Provisional Government by the Administering Powers by January 1, 1952.³ By this resolution the United Nations gave legal status to all the constitutional steps that had been taken up to that time by the United Nations Commissioner and the Council of Libya.

THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

In Libya, meanwhile, constitutional development was progressing. The newly constituted National Assembly convened for the first time on November 25, 1950, in the Palace of the former Italian Governor-General Balbo, all the sixty selected members from the three territories being present. Members of the Diplomatic and Consular corps of France, Greece, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States, and all the members of the United Nations Council, with the exception of the representatives of Pakistan and Egypt, attended the convocation ceremony.

The Assembly began its work by electing Shaykh Abu al-Is'ad al-'Alim of Tripoli, the Mufti of Libya, as its President and by adopting its rules of procedure.

On December 2, 1950, it opened its deliberations by unanimously establishing Libya as a democratic, federal, independent, and sovereign state, the form of government of which was to be a constitutional monarchy; and by proclaiming His Highness, Sayyid Muhammad Idris al-Mahdi al-Sanusi, the Amir of Cyrenaica, the constitutional King-Designate of the United Kingdom of Libya. The Amir felt that as long as the transfer of powers by the two Administering Powers had not been accomplished, it would be premature to proclaim himself the constitutional monarch of Libya. Nevertheless, on December 17 he signified his acceptance in a reply to the National Assembly, stating that in due course he would formally make public his decision — presumably upon the promulga-

³ Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly during the period September 19, 1950, to December 15, 1950. General Assembly Official Records, Fifth Session, Supplement No. 20 (A/1775) (New York, 1950), page 17 (387 (V)).

tion of the Constitution and the declaration of independence.

ADVICE OF THE COUNCIL ON QUESTIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT

On March 12, 1951, the U.N. Commissioner submitted to the United Nations Council for Libya a request for advice on certain questions of Libyan constitutional development in connection with the statement he had made before the General Assembly the previous November 16. After considerable debate the Council adopted a United States draft resolution by 5 votes to 3 with 2 abstentions.⁴ The underlying principle of the United States proposal was to bring about a compromise between the two political tendencies in Libya, that of federation and that of unitarianism, the former supported by the members of the National Assembly and the latter by the influential opposition Congress Party of Tripolitania, led by Bashir Bey Sa'dawi, and such lesser known groups as the National Bloc and the Liberal and Egyptian-Tripolitanian Parties.

In a letter dated April 3, 1951, to the President of the National Assembly transmitting the text of the advice tendered to him by the United Nations Council for Libya, the Commissioner made the following observations:

Firstly, it seemed advisable to provide in the Libyan Constitution for the possibility of enabling the Crown to appoint a limited number of members to the Upper Chamber. It would be preferable for the Lower Chamber to be elected in accordance with the principle of proportional representation directly related to the population or the number of voters.

Secondly, in view of the fact that Libya would be a new state with no experience in constitutional government, the Commissioner suggested that it might wish to give itself an opportunity, after a fixed number of years, to look back over its recent experience to determine through a democratic procedure whether the state required structural changes. However,

⁴ Those in favor were: Cyrenaica, Fezzan, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States; against were: Egypt, Pakistan, and Tripolitania; those abstaining were Italy and the Minorities.

there was no suggestion in any part of the United Nations resolutions that the constitution to be drawn up by the National Assembly was to be considered merely a "draft constitution."

In the third place, the Libyan Constitution should contain the principle of political responsibility of Ministers and should make the Cabinet responsible to the Lower Chamber only.

Fourthly, on the question of the competence of the Lower Chamber to have exclusive control over the state budget, the Commissioner said that he still held the view that it should have that competence, but that since the National Assembly had decided on December 2, 1950, that Libya was to be a federal state, the question of the competence of the Upper Chamber in such matters would have to be considered.

Meanwhile, the National Assembly had on February 21 adopted a second resolution calling upon Idris I, the King-Designate of Libya, to request the Administering Powers—the United Kingdom and France—to transfer the powers held by them and to cooperate in the establishment of provincial governments in Tripolitania and Fezzan as a prelude to the formation of the Libyan Provisional Government. In Cyrenaica, the United Kingdom had already transferred powers on all internal matters to the Amir Idris al-Sanusi on September 16, 1949, and on September 18, 1949, a constitution had been proclaimed providing for a Council of Ministers and a unicameral legislature and naming the Amir Head of the Government. In Tripolitania, the United Kingdom, on March 8, 1951, proclaimed the transfer of powers on internal matters to a government of Tripolitania having the powers of a Council of Regency and consisting of a President of the Council, holding also the portfolios of the Interior, Justice, and Education, and Ministers of Finance, Public Works, Communications, and Agriculture. In Fezzan, the French Resident, in the name of the French Government, announced on March 29, 1951, the formation of a local government headed by the Chief of the Territory, Ahmad Bey Sayf al-Nasr, with three Ministers under him.

A historic decision was adopted by the National Assembly on March 29, 1951, when it established as from that day the Provisional

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Federal Government of Libya and appointed five ministers to the offices of State.⁵

DRAFTING OF THE CONSTITUTION

The National Assembly now began its primary task of determining the Constitution of Libya. On December 4, 1950, it had decided to set up two groups in order to facilitate its work: the first was to be a Working Group of 6 members, two from each territory; and the second a Committee on the Constitution, to be composed of 18 members, six from each of the three territories.

The procedure followed in drafting each section of the Constitution was the following: first it was referred to the Working Group for purposes of study, analysis, and drafting, after which the Committee on the Constitution received it for appraisal, checking, and final drafting. If, however, any of the articles needed further explanation, they were referred back to the Working Group for revision and redrafting. The draft Constitution as a whole, with the exception of the chapter on the Powers of the Federal Government, was submitted to the National Assembly for three readings and adoption.⁶

In preparing the Constitution, the Working Group held 96 meetings and made full use of the various federal and unitary states of the East and West: the Arab states of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq; the Asiatic states of Afghanistan, Iran, Indonesia, India, and Burma; the European states of Belgium, Switzerland, Greece, Norway, Germany (Government of Bonn); some of the states of the

Americas: the United States, Mexico, Canada, Venezuela, and Brazil; and the constitutions of the Union of South Africa and Australia. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was also studied and consulted. The Committee on the Constitution held 25 meetings before it finally submitted its draft text of the Constitution to the National Assembly.

The Libyan Constitution⁷ contains twelve main chapters covering all constitutional matters of the Libyan state. They are as follows: the form of the state and its system of government; the rights of the people; the powers of the Federal Government; general federal powers; the King; the ministers; the parliament; the judiciary; federal finances; the provinces; general provisions; transitional and temporary provisions.

FORM OF THE STATE AND ITS SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT

This section states that Libya is an independent, free and sovereign State and that its sovereignty is indivisible (Art. 1); that Libya is a hereditary constitutional monarchy, its form is federal, and its system of government representative (Art. 2); it is called "The United Kingdom of Libya" (Art. 2); the religion of the state is Islam (Art. 5).

RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE

In this chapter the general provisions for Libyan citizenship are set forth and the civil and personal rights of the people are enumerated (Arts. 8-35).

After considerable debate, the National Assembly arrived at a middle-of-the-road solution on the knotty question of the Italian minority. It must be remembered that, prior to the Allied occupation of Libya in 1943, most of the Italian population had left the country (with the exception of about 45,000, who remained in Tripolitania). There are now practically no Italians in Cyrenaica and Fezzan has no minority problem whatsoever. It is to those Ital-

⁵ The ministers in question were the following: Sayyid Mahmud al-Muntasir (of Tripolitania), Prime Minister and Minister of Justice and Education; Sayyid 'Ali al-Jarbi (of Cyrenaica), Minister of Foreign Affairs and Health; Sayyid 'Umar Shanib (of Cyrenaica), Minister of Defense; Sayyid Mansur Bin Qaddarah (of Tripolitania), Minister of Finance; Sayyid Ibrahim Bin Sha'ban (of Tripolitania), Minister of Communications; Sayyid Muhammad Bin 'Uthman (of Fezzan), Minister of State and later, on April 17, 1951, Minister of Health.

⁶ At the request of the U.N. Commissioner, the National Assembly approved Chapter III of the Constitution on the Powers of the Federal Government on August 18, 1951.

⁷ Unofficial English translation, U.N. Document A/AC 32/Council/ R. 174, 17 Oct. 1951. For full official text see the Official Gazette of the United Kingdom of Libya, Number extraordinary, 7 October 1951, pp. 35-54. Ministry of Justice. Tripoli.

ians who remained in Libya after 1943 that the question of Libyan citizenship is most directly related.

The provision concerning this important matter in the Constitution stipulates that every person residing in Libya who has not been a subject of a foreign country or acquired foreign citizenship shall be considered a Libyan national provided he was born in Libya or one of his parents was born in Libya. He must also have had normal residence in Libya for not less than ten years (Art. 8). All other conditions for acquiring citizenship are to be defined by law. Special facilities for acquiring citizenship will be accorded those Libyans and their children who migrated from the country during the Fascist regime and also to citizens of Arab countries who may wish to apply for Libyan citizenship (Art. 9).

All Libyans are equal before the law and in the enjoyment of civil and political rights, without distinction as to religion, sect, race, language, position, or political or social beliefs (Art. 11). Personal liberty is guaranteed and all persons are equally entitled to protection before the law (Art. 12). Any person accused of a crime shall be considered innocent until proved guilty by law (Art. 15). No person may be arrested, detained, imprisoned, or searched except under conditions specified by law (Art. 16). Freedom of religion is unrestricted. The state shall respect all religions and sects and shall guarantee such freedom to citizens and foreigners alike (Art. 21). Freedom of thought and of the press are also guaranteed. (Arts. 22-23). Every citizen has a right to education and the state will encourage education with all the means at its disposal (Art. 28). Education in the lower grades is free, and is compulsory to all Libyans of both sexes (Art. 30). The family is the principal pillar of society and is protected by the state. The state encourages marriage and protects its sanctity (Art. 33). Labor being one of the principal elements in the economic life of the state, the state will work toward according to every citizen and his family a decent standard of living (Arts. 34-35). The State guarantees to non-Muslims respect for their systems of personal status (Art. 192).

POWERS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

In drafting this chapter the National Assembly decided to adopt the method of defining only the powers of the Federal Government in matters of legislation and execution and in those common matters that fall within the legislative competence of the Federal Government but are executed by the local governments.

In the former classification the following fields are included: foreign affairs, national security and defense, economic development, communications, finance, international trade, immigration (Art. 36). In the latter classification the following are included: interstate commerce and financial institutions, the establishment of a general judicial system, labor and social security, the general system of education and public health (Art. 38).

PREROGATIVES OF THE KING

The constitutional sovereignty of the United Kingdom of Libya is vested in the nation and is a trust held by King Muhammad Idris al-Mahdi al-Sanusi and his male successors. The throne of the kingdom is hereditary in the family of King Idris I (Arts. 44-45).

The King is the Chief of the State (Art. 58); he performs his duties through his Ministers, who are held responsible (Art. 60). The King may introduce legislation (Art. 138). He promulgates the laws and affixes his seal to them (Art. 62). He also enjoys a limited veto power over legislation (Art. 136). The King appoints one half of the members of the Senate (Art. 95). He can dissolve Parliament and convene it in extraordinary sessions (Arts. 65-67). He is the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of Libya (Art. 68). The King shall declare war, make peace, and conclude treaties with the consent of Parliament (Art. 69).

THE CABINET

There shall be a Prime Minister and a Cabinet, to be appointed by the King (Art. 72). The Cabinet is collectively responsible to the House of Representatives (Art. 86). Its members may be removed from office by the King,

or by the House of Representatives by an absolute majority (Arts. 72, 87).

THE PARLIAMENT

The Parliament consists of two Chambers: The Senate and the House of Representatives (Art. 93).

Half of the members of the Senate and its President shall be appointed by the King and the other half chosen by the provincial legislative councils (Arts. 95, 97). Membership in the Senate shall be based on equal representation from the three territories: 8 from each of the three provinces, or a total of 24 (Art. 94). The Senate may introduce legislation except on financial matters (Art. 138).

Membership in the House of Representatives is based on proportional representation of the people living in each Province (Art. 101).⁸ The terms of reference and powers of the House of Representatives are defined; they include the introduction of legislation, the consideration of budgetary matters, and the removal of the Cabinet (Arts. 87, 138).

The term of office of members of the Senate is 8 years, one-half of its membership being elected or appointed each 4 years (Art. 98).⁹ The term of office of members of the House of Representatives is 4 years (Art. 104). Sessions of the Senate and the House run concurrently, opening in November of each year (Arts. 112, 113). Elections of members of Parliament are held in accordance with a federal electoral law to be promulgated by the National Assembly.¹⁰

THE JUDICIARY

There shall be a Supreme Court whose Chairman and members shall be appointed by the King until retirement age (Arts. 143, 146); a judge may be removed by the King only with the approval of a majority of the Court. (Art. 147).

⁸ Until the taking of a census, it will be as follows: Cyrenaica, 15; Tripolitania, 35; Fezzan, 5. (Art. 206). Elections were held on Feb. 19, 1952.

⁹ The first Senate is to be completely appointed for a period of 4 years.

¹⁰ For full official text, see the Official Gazette of the United Kingdom of Libya, November 6, 1951. Vol. 2, No. 3. Ministry of Justice. Tripoli. The electoral law provides for election by universal male suffrage.

The Court shall have jurisdiction in all cases dealing with the interpretation of any provisions of the Constitution (Arts. 152, 153); in disputes between the Federal Government and any province or between one province and another (Art. 151); as well as in cases brought to it from a lower court (Art. 154).

FEDERAL FINANCE

The general budget shall be submitted to Parliament for study and approval at least two months before the beginning of the financial year (Art. 159). The House of Representatives shall be the first to study the question (Art. 160). Parliament may not be terminated before the annual budget has been approved (Art. 161). The Federal Government must allocate to the provinces sufficient funds to discharge their obligations, and in proportion to the growth of federal resources and the provinces' developmental needs (Art. 174).

THE PROVINCES

Each province shall formulate its own organic law (Art. 177) and Legislative Council, at least three-quarters of which shall be elected (Art. 183). The governor (*wali*) for each province shall have an Executive Council (Art. 182).

GENERAL PROVISIONS

The United Kingdom of Libya has two capitals: Tripoli and Benghazi (Art. 188). The official language is Arabic (Art. 186).

No proposal may be made to review the provisions relating to the monarchical form of government, the order of succession to the Throne, the representative form of government, or the principles of liberty and equality guaranteed by the Constitution (Art. 197). All amendments to other parts of the Constitution must be made by a majority of two-thirds of the members present (quorum: two-thirds) in each of the two Chambers and must be sanctioned by the King (Art. 198). In the event of a review of the provisions concerning the federal form of government, such review must be approved, in addition to the provisions laid down for the amendment of

other articles of the Constitution, by the Legislative Councils of the Provinces (Art. 199).

On October 7, 1951,¹¹ and in the presence of

¹¹ Second Annual Report of the United Nations Commissioner in Libya General Assembly Official Records: Sixth Session, Supplement No. 17 (A/1949). Paris, 1951.

Constitution of the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan¹

PART I

The State and Its Form of Government

1. The Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan is an Arab sovereign State, independent and free. Its territories shall not be partitioned, and no part thereof shall be ceded. The people of Jordan form part of the Arab nation. The Government is a hereditary monarchy, and its form is representative.

2. Islam is the religion of the State, and Arabic its official language.

3. The city of Amman shall be the capital of the Kingdom, but the capital may be moved by special law to another place.

4. The Jordan flag shall be of the following form and dimensions: Its length shall be double its breadth, and it shall be divided horizontally into three parallel and equal stripes, the uppermost being black, the center white, and the lowest green. It shall have superimposed, at the flagstaff end, a red triangle, of which the base shall be equal to the breadth of the flag and the altitude equal to half the length of the flag. In this triangle shall be a white seven-pointed star of such size that it may be contained within a circle of which the diameter is one-fourteenth the length of the flag and so placed that its center is at the intersection of the lines bisecting the angles of the triangle, and the axis through one of its points is parallel to the base of the triangle.

PART II

The Rights and Duties of Jordanians

5. Jordanian nationality shall be defined by law.

6. (1) Jordanians are equal before the law, and whatever difference may exist amongst them in race,

¹ The Constitution was published in the Official Gazette of the Jordan Government, No. 1093, January 8, 1952, pp. 3-15, and became immediately effective. Acknowledgments are due to the Legation of the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan in Washington, D. C., and to Mr. E. Theodore Mogannam, member of the Jordan and Palestine bars, for their assistance in securing the text of the Constitution and in preparing and checking its translation.

the King-Designate and the Prime Minister of the Provisional Libyan Government, the National Assembly adopted and promulgated the Constitution, containing 213 articles. It came into force upon the declaration of independence on December 24, 1951.

language or religion, no differentiation shall be made in their rights and duties.

(2) The State shall guarantee, within its possibilities, employment and education, and shall safeguard security and equal opportunity for all Jordanians.

7. Individual liberty is guaranteed and protected.

8. No person may be arrested or imprisoned except in accordance with the provisions of the law.

9. (1) No Jordanian may be deported out of the realm of the Kingdom.

(2) No Jordanian may be prohibited from residing in any particular area nor obliged to dwell in any specified place, except in the circumstances prescribed by the law.

10. Places of residence are inviolable. No person may enter them except in the cases and in the manner prescribed by the law.

13. No forced or compulsory labor shall be except for the purpose of public utility and on condition that adequate compensation shall be paid therefor as provided by law.

12. There shall be no forced loans or confiscation of movable or immovable property except in accordance with law.

13. No forced or compulsory labor shall be exacted from any person, provided that provision may be made by law: (1) For the exaction of work or service from any person in case of emergency, that is to say, in the event of war, or the occurrence of general danger, fire, flood, famine, earthquake, violent epidemic, or epizootic disease, invasion by animal, insect, or vegetable pest or any other like calamity, or in any other circumstances which would endanger the well-being of the whole or part of the population.

(2) For the exaction of work or service from any person as a consequence of a conviction by a court, such work or service being carried out under the supervision and control of an official authority, and the person convicted not being hired to, or placed at the disposal of, any person, company, association or public body.

14. The State shall protect the free exercise of religious ceremonies and beliefs in accordance with the customs observed in the Kingdom, unless detrimental to public order or contrary to morals.

15. (1) The State shall guarantee the freedom of

opinion. Every Jordanian may express his opinion freely whether by word, writing, picture, or in any other manner of expression, within the limits of the law.

(2) The freedom of the press and publication is guaranteed within the limits of the law.

(3) Newspapers may not be suspended nor their licenses canceled except in accordance with the provisions of the law.

(4) During the period when Martial Law or a state of emergency is declared, the law may impose on newspapers, pamphlets, publications and on broadcasting a limited censorship in respect of matters pertaining to public security and national defense.

(5) The law may regulate the manner of censorship on the sources of the press.

16. (1) Freedom of assembly shall be accorded to all Jordanians within the limits of the law.

(2) Jordanians shall have the right to form associations and political parties; provided that their objects are legal and not contrary to the provisions of this Constitution, and the means by which they are to be executed is peaceful and organized.

(3) The law may regulate the manner in which associations and political parties may be formed and the mode of supervising their resources.

17. All Jordanians are entitled to address the public authorities respecting matters concerning their persons, or concerning public affairs, in such manner and under such conditions as may be prescribed by law.

18. All postal, telegraphic, and telephonic communications shall be treated as secret, and shall not be subject to censorship or to discontinuance except in the circumstances prescribed by law.

19. Any community shall have the right to establish and maintain schools for the education of its own members provided that they conform to the general requirements prescribed by the law and submit to Government supervision in their curriculum and orientation.

20. Primary education is obligatory for Jordanians, and is free in Government schools.

21. (1) Political refugees shall not be extradited because of their political principles or for their defense of freedom.

(2) International agreements and laws shall regulate the procedure for the extradition of ordinary criminals or offenders.

22. (1) Every Jordanian shall be entitled to hold public appointments in accordance with the conditions provided in the law and regulations.

(2) Appointments to public offices in the government, its departments, or municipalities shall be made in accordance with merit and qualifications.

23. (1) Work is the right of every resident and the State shall facilitate and provide employment for Jordanians by directing and promoting the national economy.

(2) Labor shall be protected by the State and it

shall enact therefor legislation embodying the following principles:

(a) The payment of adequate wages to workmen in proportion to amount and kind of work.

(b) The limitation of the hours of work per week, provision for a paid weekly day of rest and a paid annual leave.

(c) Provision for special compensation to workmen supporting families, for dismissal from work, sickness, old age, and accidents arising out of their employment.

(d) Regulating special conditions for the employment of women and juveniles.

(e) Adherence of factories to public health requirements.

(f) Free operation of trade unions, within the limits of the law.

PART III

Powers — General Provisions

24. (1) The people are the source of all powers.

(2) The people shall exercise their powers in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution.

25. The Legislative power is vested in the National Assembly (Majlis al-Ummah — Council of the People) and the King. The National Assembly shall be constituted of a Council of Notables and a Council of Representatives.

26. The Executive Power is vested in the King who shall exercise it through his Ministers in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution.

27. The Judicial powers shall be exercised by the various Courts of competence and jurisdiction, which shall pass judgments in the name of the King in accordance with law.

PART IV

The Executive Power

SECTION I

The Prerogatives of the Crown

28. The Crown of the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan is hereditary and is vested in the male heirs in direct line of King Abdallah son of al-Husayn in accordance with the following provisions: (a) The right to the throne shall pass from the King to his eldest son, and from the latter to his eldest son and so on generation after generation; provided that if the eldest son shall die before he ascends the throne, the Crown shall devolve upon the latter's eldest son even though the deceased may have brothers.

(b) If the heir apparent has no son, then his eldest brother shall inherit the Crown; and if he has no [living] brothers, then the eldest son of his eldest brother; and if his eldest brother has no son,

then the eldest son of his other brothers, precedence being given to age among them.

(c) In the event that the heir apparent does not have any brothers or sons of brothers, the right to the throne shall pass to the paternal uncles and their male descendants in accordance with the provisions specified in paragraph (b) above.

(d) If the last King shall die without an heir as provided hereinbefore, the Crown shall descend to the person chosen by the National Assembly from the family of the founder of the Arab renaissance, the late King Husayn son of Ali.

(e) No person shall ascend to the throne unless he is sane, a Muslim, the child of a legal wife and the son of two Muslim parents.

(f) No person shall ascend to the throne who has been excluded by a Royal Decree (Irada) from the succession on the ground of unsuitability; such exclusion shall not of itself include the descendants of such person; provided that this Royal Decree shall be countersigned by the Prime Minister and at least four other Ministers, two of whom shall be the Ministers of Interior and Justice.

(g) The King shall attain his majority upon the completion of his eighteenth year calculated in accordance with the lunar calendar; and if the throne descends to a minor, the powers of the King shall be exercised by a regent or council of regency. Such regent or council of regency may be appointed by Royal Decree by the reigning King, but if he dies without making such appointment, the same shall be made by the Council of Ministers.

(h) In the event of the King being incapacitated by illness from performing his duties, his powers shall be exercised by a deputy or body of deputies. Such deputy or body of deputies may be appointed by a Royal Decree; and if the King shall be incapable of so appointing, by the Council of Ministers.

(i) If the King shall desire to leave the country, he shall before his departure appoint by Royal Decree a deputy or body of deputies of the throne to exercise his powers during his absence. Such Deputy or Body of Deputies to the throne shall comply with any conditions prescribed in the said Royal Decree of appointment. If the absence of the King shall exceed the period of four months, and the National Assembly was not in session, it shall immediately be called to assemble to inquire into the matter.

(j) A regent or deputy or member of a council of regency or a member of the body of deputies of the throne shall not act or enter upon his office until he has taken the oath provided for in Article 29 of this Constitution, before the Council of Ministers.

(k) If a regent or deputy or member of a council of regency or a member of the body of deputies of the throne shall die or become incapable of performing the functions of his office, the Council of Ministers shall appoint a suitable person to act in his stead.

(l) [Provided that] the age of a regent or

deputy to the throne or any member of the council of regency or body of deputies of the throne, must not be less than thirty years of age, calculated according to the lunar calendar, but a male relative of the King who has completed his eighteenth lunar year may be appointed.

(m) If the heir-apparent is unable to reign due to a mental illness, the Council of Ministers shall in the first place verify such condition and if satisfied shall then immediately call the National Assembly into session. If it is proved beyond doubt that the said illness exists, the National Assembly shall order the termination of the right to the throne of the said heir-apparent, and such right to the throne shall descend to the next person in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. If at such time the National Assembly had been dissolved or its term had terminated and the elections for a new council had not been completed, then the previous Council of Representatives shall be called to a session to decide this matter.

29. On his ascension to the throne the King shall take an oath before the National Assembly, which shall meet under the presidency of the president of the Council of Notables, that he will safeguard the constitution and be loyal to the people.

30. The King is the head of the State and shall be immune from all liability and responsibility.

31. The King sanctions and promulgates all laws and orders the enactment of regulations necessary for their execution; provided that such regulations shall not contain any provisions which are contrary to the provisions of the said laws.

32. The King is the commander in chief of the army, navy, and air force.

33. (1) The King declares war, makes peace, and concludes treaties.

(2) Treaties of peace, alliance, trade, or navigation, and any other treaties the provisions of which would change the territories of the Kingdom or diminish its sovereign rights or involve the Treasury in any expenditure or would encroach on private or public rights of Jordanians, shall not be effective except after they have been approved by the National Assembly; provided always that the secret conditions of any treaty may not be in contradiction to the declared provisions of the same.

34. (1) The King issues orders for the holding of elections to the Council of Representatives in accordance with the provisions of the law.

(2) The King convenes the National Assembly, opens it, adjourns it, and prorogues it, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.

(3) The King may dissolve the Council of Representatives.

35. The King appoints the Prime Minister, dismisses him, and accepts his resignation. The King also appoints and dismisses the Ministers on the recommendation of the Prime Minister, and accepts their resignation.

36. The King appoints the members of the Council of Notables, and appoints from its members a

President of their resigna

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President of the Council of Notables, and accepts their resignation from office.

37. (1) The King creates, grants, and withdraws civil and military rank, medals, and other honorable distinctions, and he may delegate this authority to another person by special law.

(2) The coinage shall be struck in the name of the King, as provided for by law.

38. The King shall have the right of special pardon, and the reduction and remission of sentences. General amnesty may only be declared by special law.

39. No sentence of death shall be carried out except after confirmation by the King. Every such sentence shall be passed to him by the Council of Ministers with an expression of their opinion thereon.

40. The King shall exercise his powers by Royal Decree (Irada). This Royal Decree shall be signed by the Prime Minister and the Minister or Ministers concerned. The King shall signify his assent by signing his name above the aforementioned signatures.

SECTION II

The Ministers

41. The Council of Ministers shall be constituted of a Prime Minister and as many Ministers as occasion and public interest demand.

42. No person may hold office as Minister except a Jordanian.

43. The Prime Minister and Ministers before commencing their official duties shall swear the following oath in the presence of the King: "I swear by the Almighty God, that I shall be loyal to the King, safeguard the Constitution, serve the people, and shall perform the duties of my office in all integrity."

44. A Minister may not buy or lease any Government property, even though it may be sold or leased by public auction. A Minister may not also, during his appointment in the Ministry, be a member of the board of directors of any company, engage in any financial or commercial enterprise, or draw a salary from any company.

45. (1) The Council of Ministers shall administer all the internal and foreign affairs of the State except those matters which have been or will be entrusted to some other person or body by this Constitution or any law or regulation enacted thereunder.

(2) The respective powers of the Prime Minister, the Ministers, and the Council of Ministers shall be defined by regulations made by the said Council and confirmed by the King.

46. A Minister may be entrusted with more than one Ministry as will be provided in the Order of his appointment.

47. (1) A Minister is responsible for the conduct of all matters affecting his ministry. He shall refer to the Prime Minister all other matters not within his powers.

(2) The Prime Minister shall dispose of all matters within his powers and shall refer the others to the Council of Ministers for making the necessary decisions thereon.

48. Decisions of the council of ministers shall be signed by the Prime Minister and Ministers and shall be submitted to the King for approval in cases where this Constitution or any law or regulation enacted thereunder so requires. Such decisions shall be executed by the Prime Minister and each Minister within the limits of his jurisdiction.

49. The verbal or written commands of the King shall not relieve the ministers from their responsibility.

50. Upon the resignation or dismissal of the Prime Minister all the other Ministers shall automatically be considered as dismissed.

51. The Prime Minister together with the Ministers shall be collectively responsible to the Council of Representatives for the general policy of the State. In addition, each Minister is responsible to the Council of Representatives for the actions of his ministry.

52. The Prime Minister or any Minister who is a member of either the Council of Notables or Representatives shall have the right to vote in the council to which he belongs and is entitled to address both Councils. Ministers who are not members of either Council have the right to address each council, but shall not have the right to vote. The Ministers or their deputies shall have priority over members of both councils to address either council. A Minister who draws a Minister's salary shall not be entitled at the same time to receive his membership allowances in either Council.

53. A vote of confidence in the Council of Ministers or any Minister shall be held in the Council of Representatives. If the Council of Representatives decides by a two thirds majority of its members on a vote of non-confidence, the Council of Ministers or the Minister, as the case may be, shall resign.

54. (1) A vote of confidence in respect of the Council of Ministers or any Minister may be taken in the Council of Representatives either upon the request of the Prime Minister or upon the written request of not less than ten members of the Council of Representatives.

(2) The Council of Ministers or the Minister concerned may only once, and for a maximum period of ten days, adjourn the taking of a vote of confidence.

(3) If the Council of Representatives is in session, every Council of Ministers when appointed shall submit to the Council of Representatives a statement of its policy and shall ask for a vote of confidence to be taken thereon.

55. Ministers may be tried by the Supreme Council for offenses alleged to have been committed by them in the course of the execution of their official duties.

56. The Council of Representatives is authorized to impeach Ministers, and no order of impeachment

may be taken except by a two thirds majority of the members of the said council. The Council of Representatives shall appoint from its members the person who shall submit and support the said charges before the Supreme Council.

57. The Supreme Council shall be constituted of a President and eight members. The President shall be the President of the highest civil court, four members shall be members of the Council of Notables elected to such office by secret ballot of the said Council, and the remaining four shall be judges of the said highest court according to seniority. In case of need the number may be completed by appointing the Presidents of the next court in seniority, according to seniority.

58. The Supreme Council shall enforce the current Criminal Code in all offenses contrary to it. In other cases where no provision is found in the said Code, a special law shall define the offenses pertaining to the liability of Ministers.

59. Judgment of the Supreme Council shall be given by a majority of six votes.

60. Until such time as a special law shall be enacted regulating the procedure to be followed before the Supreme Council, the Council shall regulate its own procedure in the trial of Ministers.

61. Every Minister who is impeached by the Council of Representatives shall be suspended from performing the duties of his office until his case has been adjudicated by the Supreme Council. The resignation of a Minister from his office shall not prevent the institution of the case or the continuance of his trial.

PART V

The Legislature

The National Assembly

(Majlis al-Umma)

62. The National Assembly shall be constituted of two Councils: the Council of Notables and the Council of Representatives.

SECTION I

The Council of Notables

63. The Council of Notables shall consist, including its Chairman, of a number not exceeding half the number of the Council of Representatives.

64. In addition to the requirements provided for in Article 75 of this Constitution, a member of the Council of Notables must have completed forty solar years of age and belong to any of the following categories of persons: Prime Ministers, Ministers and former Ministers, persons who have held the office of Ambassador or Minister in the foreign service, Chairmen of the Council of Representatives, Presidents and Judges of the Court of Cassation and Civil and Shari'ah Courts of Appeal, retired Army Officers of the rank of Colonel and above,

former members of the Council of Representatives who had been elected as such not less than two times, and like distinguished personalities who have gained the confidence and trust of the public with regard to their work and service to the people and the fatherland.

65. (1) The term of membership in the Council of Notables is eight years. The appointment of half of them shall be made every four years. Any member of the Council of Notables whose term expires may be reappointed.

(2) A secret ballot shall take place at the end of the first four years to determine which members of the Council of Notables shall be eliminated from the Council. Such balloting shall include the Chairman in his capacity as a member. A Notable who has been eliminated by such ballot may be reappointed.

(3) The period of appointment of the Chairman of the Council of Notables is two years, and he may be reappointed.

66. (1) The Council of Notables shall meet at the same time as the Council of Representatives, and the opening and termination of the sessions of both Councils shall be the same.

(2) When the Council of Representatives is dissolved the sessions of the Council of Notables shall be suspended.

SECTION II

The Council of Representatives

67. The Council of Representatives shall be constituted of members elected by direct general elections by secret ballot in accordance with the electoral law, which shall guarantee the following principles:

(1) The regularity of elections.

(2) The right of candidates to supervise the elections.

(3) The punishment of persons tampering with the will of the electors.

68. (1) The duration of the Council of Representatives is four solar years beginning from the date of the publication of the results of the general elections in the Official Gazette.

(2) Elections shall be held during the four months preceding the termination of the term of the Council. In the event that the elections have not been completed at the end of the Council's term or were delayed for any reason, the Council shall remain in office until the new Council is elected.

69. (1) At the beginning of each ordinary session, the Council of Representatives shall elect a Chairman for a term of one solar year, who may be reelected.

(2) In the event of the Council meeting in extraordinary session, when it did not have a Chairman, it shall elect a Chairman for a period expiring at the beginning of the next ordinary session.

70. In addition to the requirements of Article 75 of this Constitution, a member of the Council of Representatives shall have completed thirty solar years of age.

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71. The Council of Representatives is empowered to decide the legality of the election of its members. Every elector may, within fifteen days of the publication of the result of the elections in his district, submit to the Secretary of the Council an objection setting out the legal grounds for alleging the illegality of any particular Representative. The decision to vacate the seat shall only be taken by a two thirds majority of the Council.

72. Any member of the Council of Representatives may resign by letter addressed to the Chairman of the Council. The Chairman shall put the said resignation before the Council, which shall either accept or reject it.

73. (1) If the Council of Representatives is dissolved, general elections shall be held so that the new Council will meet in extraordinary session within a period not exceeding four months from the date of the dissolution. This session shall be considered as if it were an ordinary session in accordance with Article 78 of this Constitution, and the conditions for extension and adjournment shall apply to it.

(2) If the elections have not been completed at the termination of the said four months, the dissolved Council shall regain all its constitutional powers and shall meet immediately as if there had not been an order for its dissolution. It shall continue in office until the new Council is elected.

(3) In any event, this extraordinary session must terminate on the 31st day of October, so that the first ordinary session of the Council will be held on the 1st of November. But if it occurs that the extraordinary session is held in the months of November or December, it shall be regarded as the first ordinary session in the term of the Council of Representatives.

74. If the Council of Representatives is dissolved for any reason the new Council may not be dissolved for the same reason.

SECTION III

General Provisions for both Councils

75. (1) No person shall be a member of the Councils of Notables or Representatives: (a) who is not a Jordanian;

(b) who claims foreign nationality or foreign protection;

(c) who has been adjudged bankrupt and has not been discharged;

(d) who has been placed under interdiction and has not been released;

(e) who has been sentenced to imprisonment for more than one year for an offense other than a political offense and has not received a free pardon in respect thereof;

(f) who has a material interest in any contract other than a contract of lease of land with any Government Department; this provision shall not

apply to a person who is a shareholder in a company whose members are more than ten persons;

(g) who is a lunatic or an imbecile;

(h) who is related to the King within such degrees of consanguinity as shall be prescribed by special law.

(2) If any of the disqualifications provided for in the preceding subsection apply to any member of the Council of Notables or of Representatives during his term of membership, or such disqualification shall become known after his election, his seat shall be vacated by a decision of a two thirds majority of his Council; provided that if such decision is taken by the Council of Notables, it shall be submitted to the King for approval.

76. Subject to the provisions of Article 52 of this Constitution, no person shall be a member of either the Council of Notables or of Representatives and hold public office. Public office means any appointment the holder of which draws a salary from public funds, including municipalities. Furthermore, a person may not be at the same time a member of both Councils.

77. Subject to the provisions of this Constitution in regard to the dissolution of the Council of Representatives, the National Assembly shall hold one ordinary session during every year of its term.

78. (1) The King shall summon the National Assembly to convene for its ordinary session on the first day of November of each year; or if such day is an official holiday, then on the day following which is not an official holiday; provided that the King may by Royal Decree published in the Official Gazette postpone for a period not exceeding two months the convening of the Assembly to such date as may be specified in the said Royal Decree (Irada).

(2) If the National Assembly is not summoned in accordance with the preceding subsection, it shall assemble of its own accord as if it had been so summoned.

(3) The ordinary session of the National Assembly shall begin on the date upon which it is required to assemble in accordance with the two preceding subsections, and shall extend for three months unless the Council of Representatives be sooner dissolved by the King; provided that the session may be prolonged by the King for a further period not exceeding three months for the dispatch of any pending business. At the expiry of the said three months or any such extension thereof, the King shall prorogue the session.

79. The King shall open the ordinary session of the National Assembly by delivering the Speech from the Throne at a joint meeting of both Councils. He may delegate the Prime Minister or any other Minister to perform the ceremonies of the opening of the National Assembly and the delivery of the Speech from the Throne. Each Council shall deliver its written reply to it.

80. Every member of the Council of Notables and Representatives shall, before taking his seat, take the following oath in the presence of his Council:

"I swear by the Almighty God to be loyal to the King and Nation, to uphold the Constitution, to serve the people, and faithfully to perform the duties entrusted to me."

81. (1) The King may by Royal Decree adjourn the sessions of the National Assembly for three times only, or, if he shall have postponed the meeting of the National Assembly by virtue of paragraph (1) of Article 78, then twice only; provided that the period of such adjournment together with the period of postponement during any one session shall not exceed in the aggregate two months. In computing the period of such session the periods covered by the adjournment shall not be taken into account.

(2) Both the Council of Notables and of Representatives may adjourn its sessions from time to time in conformity with its standing orders, or internal regulations.

82. (1) The King may summon the National Assembly to meet in extraordinary sessions of unlimited duration for the purpose of deciding specific matters, which shall be stated in the Royal Decree of summons. This session shall be prorogued by Royal Decree.

(2) The King shall also summon the National Assembly to a meeting in extraordinary session when an absolute majority of the Council of Representatives makes such a request in writing, setting out the matters to be discussed.

(3) The National Assembly may only discuss in its extraordinary session the specified matters stated in the Royal Decree of summons, issued for such session.

83. Both Councils shall make the standing orders for the regulation and administration of their internal affairs and their own proceedings, and these regulations shall be submitted to the King for confirmation.

84. (1) No session of any Council shall be legal unless such session is attended by two thirds of the members of the Council.

(2) Unless it is otherwise provided in this Constitution, decisions shall be taken by the majority of votes of the members present other than the Chairman; in case of an equality of votes, the Chairman shall cast the deciding vote.

(3) If voting is on a matter connected with the Constitution or on a vote of confidence in the Ministry or any particular Minister, each member shall give his vote aloud on his name being called.

85. The meetings of both Councils shall be open to the public, provided that, upon the request of the Government or five members of a Council, a meeting may be held *in camera*. Each Council may reject or approve such request, and a session *in camera* can only be held by decision of the Council.

86. (1) No member of the Councils of Notables and Representatives shall be detained or tried during the session of the Assembly, unless the Council of which he is a member shall, by resolution given by absolute majority, declare that there is a good

reason for his arrest or trial, or unless he is apprehended in the act of committing a felony, and in such a case the Council shall be notified immediately.

(2) If a member is for any reason detained during the period when the National Assembly is not in session, the Prime Minister shall inform the Council to which such member belongs, when it re-assembles, of the action taken, with any necessary explanation.

87. Every member of the Councils of Notables and Representatives shall have complete freedom of speech and expression of opinion within the provisions of the internal regulations of the Council to which he belongs. No legal proceedings shall be taken against such member in respect of any vote, or opinion expressed, or speech made by him during the sessions of the Council.

88. If a seat in either the Council of Notables or of Representatives becomes vacant by reason of death, resignation, or any other cause, it shall be filled within two months from the date of the Council giving notice of such vacancy to the Government. If such seat is of a Notable it shall be filled by appointment, and if of a Representative, by subsidiary elections. The term of office of the new member shall terminate with the expiration of the term of his predecessor.

89. (1) Both Councils shall meet in a joint session, in addition to the occasions provided for in Articles 29, 79, and 92 of this Constitution, upon the request of the Prime Minister.

(2) When both Councils meet in a joint session the Chairman of the Council of Notables shall be Chairman of the joint councils.

(3) Decisions made by the joint Councils, in accordance with this Article, shall be legal if taken by an absolute majority of the members present.

90. No member may be dismissed from the Council of Notables or Representatives except by decision taken by the council to which he belongs. The order for dismissal shall be made by a two thirds majority of the members of the council, except in the cases provided for in this Constitution and the electoral law. If the order of dismissal pertains to a Notable the decision of the council shall be submitted to the King for approval.

91. Every proposed law shall be laid before the Council of Representatives by the Prime Minister. The said Council has the power to accept the draft, amend it, or reject it. In all cases the draft shall be laid before the Council of Notables. No law shall be promulgated except if passed by the two Councils and confirmed by the King.

92. If any Council rejects a draft law twice, and it was accepted by the other Council, whether in its original or in an amended form, both Councils shall meet in a joint session under the Chairmanship of the Chairman of the Council of Notables, to discuss the matters in dispute. For such draft to be accepted it must be passed by a two thirds majority of the members present at the joint session. If the draft is

rejected in the Assembly

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reason for his arrest or trial, or unless he is apprehended in the act of committing a felony, and in such a case the Council shall be notified immediately.

(2) If a member is for any reason detained during the period when the National Assembly is not in session, the Prime Minister shall inform the Council to which such member belongs, when it re-assembles, of the action taken, with any necessary explanation.

87. Every member of the Councils of Notables and Representatives shall have complete freedom of speech and expression of opinion within the provisions of the internal regulations of the Council to which he belongs. No legal proceedings shall be taken against such member in respect of any vote, or opinion expressed, or speech made by him during the sessions of the Council.

88. If a seat in either the Council of Notables or of Representatives becomes vacant by reason of death, resignation, or any other cause, it shall be filled within two months from the date of the Council giving notice of such vacancy to the Government. If such seat is of a Notable it shall be filled by appointment, and if of a Representative, by subsidiary elections. The term of office of the new member shall terminate with the expiration of the term of his predecessor.

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(2) When both Councils meet in a joint session the Chairman of the Council of Notables shall be Chairman of the joint councils.

(3) Decisions made by the joint Councils, in accordance with this Article, shall be legal if taken by an absolute majority of the members present.

90. No member may be dismissed from the Council of Notables or Representatives except by decision taken by the council to which he belongs. The order for dismissal shall be made by a two thirds majority of the members of the council, except in the cases provided for in this Constitution and the electoral law. If the order of dismissal pertains to a Notable the decision of the council shall be submitted to the King for approval.

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(2) Unless it is otherwise provided in this Constitution, decisions shall be taken by the majority of votes of the members present other than the Chairman; in case of an equality of votes, the Chairman shall cast the deciding vote.

(3) If voting is on a matter connected with the Constitution or on a vote of confidence in the Ministry or any particular Minister, each member shall give his vote aloud on his name being called.

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86. (1) No member of the Councils of Notables and Representatives shall be detained or tried during the session of the Assembly, unless the Council of which he is a member shall, by resolution given by absolute majority, declare that there is a good

reason for his arrest or trial, or unless he is apprehended in the act of committing a felony, and in such a case the Council shall be notified immediately.

(2) If a member is for any reason detained during the period when the National Assembly is not in session, the Prime Minister shall inform the Council to which such member belongs, when it re-assembles, of the action taken, with any necessary explanation.

87. Every member of the Councils of Notables and Representatives shall have complete freedom of speech and expression of opinion within the provisions of the internal regulations of the Council to which he belongs. No legal proceedings shall be taken against such member in respect of any vote, or opinion expressed, or speech made by him during the sessions of the Council.

88. If a seat in either the Council of Notables or of Representatives becomes vacant by reason of death, resignation, or any other cause, it shall be filled within two months from the date of the Council giving notice of such vacancy to the Government. If such seat is of a Notable it shall be filled by appointment, and if of a Representative, by subsidiary elections. The term of office of the new member shall terminate with the expiration of the term of his predecessor.

89. (1) Both Councils shall meet in a joint session, in addition to the occasions provided for in Articles 29, 79, and 92 of this Constitution, upon the request of the Prime Minister.

(2) When both Councils meet in a joint session the Chairman of the Council of Notables shall be Chairman of the joint councils.

(3) Decisions made by the joint Councils, in accordance with this Article, shall be legal if taken by an absolute majority of the members present.

90. No member may be dismissed from the Council of Notables or Representatives except by decision taken by the council to which he belongs. The order for dismissal shall be made by a two thirds majority of the members of the council, except in the cases provided for in this Constitution and the electoral law. If the order of dismissal pertains to a Notable the decision of the council shall be submitted to the King for approval.

rejected in the like manner it may not be laid before the Assembly a second time during the same session.

93. (1) Every proposed law passed by the Councils of Notables and Representatives shall be laid before the King for confirmation.

(2) A law shall become effective by the King ordering its issue and after the lapse of one month from the date of its publication in the Official Gazette, except when it is especially provided that the law shall take effect from any other date.

(3) If the King did not deem fit that he should confirm a law he shall, within six months from the date of its submission to him, return it to the Assembly with a statement of the reasons for dissent.

(4) If a proposed law (except the Constitution) is returned within the time limit provided for in the preceding subsection, and is passed by the Council of Notables and Council of Representatives for a second time, by a two thirds majority of the members of each council, this law shall be promulgated. If on the other hand the proposed law was not sent back within the period provided in paragraph 3 of this Article, such law shall be considered effective as if it had been confirmed by the King.

If the bill (on the said second voting) does not obtain the required two thirds majority, it may not be put up for reconsideration during that session. However, the National Assembly may reconsider the same bill at its next ordinary session.

94. (1) When the National Assembly is not in session, the Council of Ministers with the approval of the King may enact temporary laws to face the following emergencies: (a) general calamities;

(b) a state of war or emergency;

(c) the need for urgent expenditure which cannot be postponed.

These temporary laws, which shall not contravene the terms of the Constitution, shall have the force of law, and shall be submitted to the [next] Assembly at the beginning of its first session. If the Assembly does not ratify any such law the Council of Ministers with the approval of the King shall immediately nullify it. From the date of this action it shall cease to have any more the force of law, provided that such declaration of nullity shall not affect contracts and acquired rights made or obtained thereunder.

(2) Temporary laws shall become operative in the like manner that laws become operative in accordance with the provisions of Article 93 of this Constitution.

95. (1) Any member or group of members of either the Council of Notables or Council of Representatives has the right to submit draft laws for proposed enactment. These drafts shall be referred to a special committee for examination and opinion. If the Council accepts the proposed law, it shall be referred to the Government to put it in the form of a draft. The Government shall submit it to the Assembly in the same or the following session.

(2) A draft law proposed by a member of either the Council of Notables or of Representatives,

which has been rejected by the Assembly, may not be submitted again in the same session.

96. Every member of the Council of Notables and Council of Representatives has the right to put questions and demand explanations from Ministers on public matters, in accordance with the internal regulations of the Council to which the member belongs; provided that question, answer, and discussion shall not take place until eight days have passed from the day on which such questions were received by the Minister, except in urgent cases and with the consent of the Minister to shorten this period.

PART VI

The Judiciary

97. Judges shall be independent and subject to no authority except the law in their administration of justice.

98. Civil and Shari'ah judges shall be appointed and dismissed by Royal Decree in accordance with the provisions of the law.

99. The Court shall be divided into three types:

(1) Civil Courts

(2) Religious Courts

(3) Special Courts

100. The different types of courts, their constitution, grade, divisions, jurisdiction, and administration shall be determined by special law, which law shall provide for the establishment of a High Court of Justice.

101. (1) The courts shall be open to all and shall be free from interference.

(2) All trials shall be public, except where the court finds that [it is] in the interest of public order or for the protection of morality it may order that a trial be held *in camera*.

102. The civil courts shall have jurisdiction over all persons in the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan in all matters civil and criminal, including cases of claims by and against the Government, except in those matters which, under the provisions of this Constitution or any other law at the time in force, shall be assigned to the jurisdiction of the religious courts or special courts.

103. (1) The civil and criminal jurisdiction of civil courts shall be exercised in accordance with the law at the time in force; provided that, in matters regarding the personal status of foreigners, or in other matters of a civil and commercial nature in which it is customary by international usage to apply the law of another country, such law shall be applied in the manner prescribed by law.

(2) Matters of personal status are those matters which the law declares to be such, and accordingly are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Shari'ah Courts if the parties are Muslims.

104. Religious Courts shall be divided as follows:

(1) Shari'ah Courts

(2) Councils of the other religious communities

105. The Shari'ah Courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction, in accordance with their special laws, in

the following matters: (1) matters of personal status of Muslims;

(2) cases of "blood money" (*diya*) if both parties are Muslim, and if only one of the parties is a Muslim, then if both parties agree that the case is to be tried by a Shari'ah Court;

(3) matters connected with Muslim waqfs (trusts).

106. The Shari'ah Courts shall enforce the provisions of the Holy Muslim Religious Law (Shari'ah).

107. The organization and the financial and other administration of Muslim waqfs shall be prescribed by law.

108. Religious councils shall be councils of such non-Muslim religious communities as are or shall be recognized by the Government as being established in the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan.

109. (1) Religious community councils shall be composed in the manner provided in a special law regulating the same. Such laws shall define their jurisdiction regarding matters of personal status and waqfs constituted for the benefit of the community concerned. Matters of personal status for such communities shall be the same as matters of personal status for Muslims which are within the jurisdiction of the Shari'ah Courts.

(2) Such laws shall determine the procedure to be followed by the religious community councils.

110. The Special Courts shall exercise their jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of their special laws.

PART VII

Financial Matters

111. No taxes or fees may be imposed except by law; provided that this shall not apply to the different kinds of income² collected by the Treasury in consideration of services rendered to members of the public by the Government departments or for the enjoyment of Government property. When imposing taxes the Government shall take into consideration the principles of a graduated scale of taxation, the safeguarding of social justice and equality, and that such taxes should not exceed the capabilities of the taxpayer or the financial needs of the State.

112. (1) The proposed General Budget Law shall be laid before the National Assembly for discussion at least one month before the beginning of the fiscal year, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.

(2) Voting in respect of the general budget shall be made chapter by chapter.

(3) No amount may be taken from any chapter in the expenditure column of the General Budget and transferred to another chapter except by the provisions of a law.

² The word "income" is used here in a very general sense, as the original Arabic word, *ajur*, includes any kind of consideration, whether for rent of property, goods, or wages, or payment for services rendered.

(4) The National Assembly, while discussing the general budget or the temporary laws connected therewith, may reduce the expenditure under the several chapters as it sees fit in the general interest, but shall not increase such expenditure either by amendment or by way of a proposal submitted separately; but it may, after completing the discussion, suggest or propose the making of laws for the introduction of new expenditure.

(5) While discussing the general budget no suggestion shall be accepted for the repeal of an existing tax or the creation of a new tax or for the amendment of existing taxes whether by way of increase or decrease as fixed by the financial laws in force. No suggestion shall be accepted for the amendment of expenditure or revenue fixed by contracts.

(6) The budget estimates for every fiscal year shall be sanctioned by the General Budget Law, which shall include the estimated revenue and expenditure for that fiscal year. This law may provide for the assignment of specified amounts for more than one year.

113. If the Budget Law is not promulgated before the beginning of the new fiscal year, the general budget of the preceding year shall be followed, except that if the expenditure appearing in the draft of the new fiscal year's budget is less than the expenditure for the previous year, then disbursement shall be limited to the amount of the new budget until it is confirmed.

114. The Council of Ministers with the approval of the King may enact regulations for the supervision of public expenditure, whether such expenditure is being made in conformity with the appropriations of the budget, and for the control and regulation of Government warehouses.

115. All taxes collected and other revenue of the State shall be paid into the Treasury and accounted for in the budget of the State, except where the law provides to the contrary. No amount out of the funds of the General Treasury may be earmarked or expended for any purpose whatsoever, except by law.

116. The King's allowances shall be paid from the general revenue and shall be fixed by the General Budget Law.

117. No monopoly or concession shall be granted for utilizing mines or minerals or public services except if ratified by law.

118. No person may be exempted from the payment of fees or taxes except in the cases provided for by law.

119. An Audit Department shall be established by law for the supervision of the revenue and expenditure of the State and the manner in which it was expended.

(1) The Audit Department shall submit a yearly report to the Council of Representatives, embodying its opinion and remarks and a statement of the contraventions committed and the liability resulting therefrom, at the beginning of every or-

dinary representative

(2) for the interest of the government.

120. The King may appoint various names, and the appointment of the jurisdiction of the prescribed of Ministers.

121. The Councils of the Corporations of the special

122. The provisions of the law shall be taken by decision in the Council of Ministers.

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127. The provisions of the law shall be taken by decision in the Council of Ministers.

inary session, or whenever the Council of Representatives shall request it.

(2) The Audit Law shall include a provision for the immunity of the Head of the Audit Department.

PART VIII

General Provisions

120. The administrative districts of the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan; the establishment of the various government departments; their classes, names, mode of administration; the procedure for the appointment, dismissal, supervision, limits of jurisdiction and competence of its officials, shall be prescribed by Regulations enacted by the Council of Ministers with the approval of the King.

121. The affairs of Municipalities and Local Councils^a shall be administered by each Municipal Corporation or Local Council in accordance with the special laws.

122. The Supreme Council established by Article 57 (of this Constitution) is empowered to interpret the provisions of the Constitution, if required to do so by a decision of the Council of Ministers or by a decision of either council of the National Assembly, taken by an absolute majority; provided that such decision shall only be operative after its publication in the Official Gazette.

123. (1) The Special Board (Diwan Khass) shall be empowered to interpret a provision of any law, which had not been interpreted by a Court of Law, if requested to do so by the Prime Minister.

(2) The Special Board shall be composed of the President of the highest civil court as its president and its members shall be two members of the said highest court, a very senior administrative official appointed by the Council of Ministers, and a very senior official of the Ministry concerned with the question under interpretation appointed by the Minister.

(3) The Special Board shall only give its ruling on such question if it considers that the point is worthy of its consideration.

(4) Decisions given by the Special Board and published in the Official Gazette shall have the force of law.

(5) All other questions concerning the interpretation of laws shall be decided as they arise by the Courts in the ordinary way.

124. If in emergency anything occurs which might make necessary the defense of the country, a law shall be passed which will be known as the [National] Defense Law, which shall empower a person to be specified therein with full authority and jurisdiction

to take all the necessary steps, ways and means, including the power to order the suspension of the ordinary laws of the realm, for securing the defense of the country. This National Defense Law shall only come into force by declaration issued by Royal Decree made upon the decision of the Council of Ministers.

125. (1) In the event of an emergency being of so serious a nature that the action which would be taken under the preceding Article of this Constitution would not be sufficient for the defense of the Kingdom, the King may, by Royal Decree issued upon the decision of the Council of Ministers, declare Martial Law in all or any part of the Kingdom.

(2) When Martial Law has been declared the King may by Royal Decree give any instructions as may be necessary for the defense of the Kingdom, notwithstanding the provision of any law in force. All persons executing such instructions shall be legally liable for all acts done by them against the law of the country until they have been indemnified by a special law passed for the purpose.

126. (1) The provisions provided for in this Constitution for the enactment of draft laws shall be applicable to a proposal for the amendment of this Constitution; provided that a decision to be carried for any amendment shall be taken by a two thirds majority of the members of each Council of Notables and Representatives. If both Councils are in joint session in accordance with Article 92 of this Constitution, such amendment shall only be passed if taken by a two thirds majority of the members of both Councils. In either case, the amendment shall not be effective unless confirmed by the King.

(2) During a period when a regency is appointed over the throne, no amendment may be made in the Constitution in respect of the prerogatives of the King or his succession.

127. The duties of the Army shall be limited to the defense and protection of the country.

(1) Military conscription, army regulations, and rights and duties of military personnel shall be defined by law.

(2) The regulation and jurisdiction of the Police and Gendarmerie Forces shall be defined by law.

PART IX

Laws in Force and Repeals

128. All laws, regulations, and other legal enactments in force in the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan at the date of the coming into force of this Constitution shall remain in force until repealed or amended by law.

129. (1) The Jordan Constitution issued on the 7th of December 1946 together with all its amendments shall be repealed.

(2) The Palestine Order in Council of 1922 together with all its amendments shall be repealed.

^a Local Councils are special bodies similar to Municipalities, their members elected by the townsmen, for administering the internal affairs of a town which is not big enough to have the status of a Municipality. They are governed in their powers and procedure by the Local Councils Ordinance of 1941 enacted by the Palestine Government.

(3) The said repeals provided for in the preceding two paragraphs shall not affect the legality of any law or regulation enacted thereunder or any act executed thereby prior to the enforcement of this Constitution.

130. This Constitution shall come into force from the date of its publication in the Official Gazette.

131. The Council of Ministers is responsible for the execution of the provisions of this Constitution. January 1, 1952

Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation Treaty between the States of the Arab League¹

The Governments of:

H.M. THE KING OF THE HASHIMITE
KINGDOM OF JORDAN

H.E. THE PRESIDENT OF THE SYRIAN RE-
PUBLIC

H.M. THE KING OF THE IRAQI KINGDOM
H.M. THE KING OF THE SAUDI ARABIAN
KINGDOM

H.E. THE PRESIDENT OF THE LEBANESE
REPUBLIC

H.M. THE KING OF THE KINGDOM OF
EGYPT

H.M. THE KING OF THE KINGDOM OF
YEMEN

In view of the desire of the above mentioned Governments to consolidate relations between the States of the Arab League; to maintain their independence and their mutual heritage; in accordance with the desire of their peoples, to cooperate for the realization of mutual defense and the maintenance of security and peace according to the principles of both the Arab League Pact and the United Nations Charter, together with the aims of the said Pacts; and to consolidate stability and security and provide means of welfare and development in the countries.

The following government delegates of . . . , having been duly accredited and fully authorized by their respective governments, approve the following:

Article 1

The Contracting States, in an effort to maintain and stabilize peace and security, hereby confirm their desire to settle their international disputes

by peaceful means, whether such disputes concern relations among themselves or with other Powers.

Article 2

The Contracting States consider any [act of] armed aggression made against any one or more of them or their armed forces, to be directed against them all. Therefore, in accordance with the right of self-defense, individually and collectively they undertake to go without delay to the aid of the State or States against which such an act of aggression is made, and immediately to take, individually and collectively, all steps available, including the use of armed force, to repel the aggression and restore security and peace. In conformity with Article 6 of the Arab League Pact and Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, the Arab League Council and U.N. Security Council shall be notified of such act of aggression and the means and procedure taken to check it.

Article 3

At the invitation of any one of the signatories of this Treaty, the Contracting States shall hold consultations whenever there are reasonable grounds for the belief that the territorial integrity, independence, or security of any one of the parties is threatened. In the event of the threat of war or the existence of an international emergency, the Contracting States shall immediately proceed to unify their plans and defensive measures as the situation may demand.

Article 4

The Contracting States, desiring to implement fully the above obligations and effectively carry them out, shall cooperate in consolidating and coordinating their armed forces, and shall participate according to their resources and needs in preparing individual and collective means of defense to repulse the said armed aggression.

Article 5

A Permanent Military Commission composed of representatives of the General Staffs of the armies of the Contracting States shall be formed to draw

¹ The Treaty was drawn up in Cairo on April 13, 1950. It was signed by Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen on June 17, 1950; by Iraq on February 2, 1951; and by Jordan on February 16, 1952. The Treaty was ratified by Syria on May 30, 1951; by Egypt on June 4, 1951; by Jordan on or about March 25, 1952; and by Iraq on March 28, 1952. In accordance with Article 13, the Treaty would come into force in April 1952. Certain amendments and reservations of the ratifying States are not currently available. The text as here given is an unofficial translation from the Arabic.

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up plans of joint defense and their implementation. The duties of the Permanent Military Commission, which are set forth in an Annex attached to this Treaty, include the drafting of necessary reports on the method of cooperation and participation mentioned in Article 4. The Permanent Military Commission shall submit to the Joint Defense Council, provided hereunder in Article 6, reports dealing with questions within its province.

Article 6

A Joint Defense Council under the supervision of the Arab League Council shall be formed to deal with all matters concerning the implementation of the provisions of Articles 2, 3, 4, and 5 of this Treaty. It shall be assisted in the performance of its task by the Permanent Military Commission referred to in Article 5. The Joint Defense Council shall consist of the Foreign Ministers and the Defense Ministers of the Contracting States or their representatives. Decisions taken by a two-thirds majority shall be binding on all the Contracting States.

Article 7

The Contracting States, in order to fulfill the aims of this Treaty and to bring about security and prosperity in the Arab countries, and in an effort to raise the standard of living in them, undertake to cooperate in the development of their economies and the exploitation of their natural resources; to facilitate the exchange of their respective agricultural and industrial products; and generally to organize and coordinate their economic activities and to conclude the necessary inter-Arab agreements to realize such aims.

Article 8

An Economic Council consisting of the Ministers in charge of economic affairs, or their representatives if necessary, shall be formed by the Contracting States to submit recommendations for the realization of all such aims as are set forth in the previous article. The Council may, in the performance of its duties, seek the cooperation of the Committee for Financial and Economic Affairs referred to in Article 4 of the Arab League Pact.

Article 9

The Annex to this Treaty shall be considered an integral and indivisible part of it.

Article 10

The Contracting States undertake to conclude no international agreements which may be contradictory to the provisions of this Treaty, nor to act, in their international relations, in a way which may be contrary to the aims of this Treaty.

Article 11

No provision of this Treaty shall in any way affect, or is intended to affect, any of the rights or obligations devolving upon the Contracting States from the United States Charter or the responsibilities borne by the United Nations Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 12

After a lapse of 10 years from the date of the ratification of this Treaty, any one of the Contracting States may withdraw from it providing 12 months' notice is previously given to the Secretariat General of the Arab League. The Secretariat General of the League shall inform the other Contracting States of such notice.

Article 13

This Treaty shall be ratified by each Contracting State according to the constitutional procedure of its own government. The Treaty shall come into force for the ratifying States 15 days after the receipt by the Secretariat General of the instruments of ratification from at least four States. This Treaty is drafted in Arabic in Cairo on April 13, 1950. One signed copy shall be deposited with the Secretariat General of the Arab League; equally authentic copies shall be transmitted to each of the Contracting States.

Military Annex

1. The Permanent Military Commission provided for in Article 5 of the Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation Treaty between the States of the Arab League, shall undertake the following:

(a) in cooperation with the Joint Defense Council, to prepare plans to deal with all anticipated dangers or armed aggression that may be launched against one or more of the Contracting States or their armed forces, such plans to be based on the principles determined by the Joint Defense Council;

(b) to submit proposals for the organization of the forces of the Contracting States, stipulating the minimum force for each in accordance with military exigencies and the potentialities of each State;

(c) to submit proposals for increasing the effectiveness of the forces of the Contracting States in so far as their equipment, organization, and training are concerned; so that they may keep pace with modern military methods and development; and for the unification and coordination of all such forces;

(d) to submit proposals for the exploitation of natural, agricultural, industrial, and other resources of all Contracting States in favor of the inter-Arab military effort and joint defense;

(e) to organize the exchange of training mis-

sions between the Contracting States for the preparation of plans, participation in military exercises and maneuvers and the study of their results, recommendations for the improvement of methods to ensure close cooperation in the field, and for the general improvement of the forces of all the Contracting States;

(f) to prepare the necessary data on the resources and military potentialities of each of the Contracting States and the part to be played by the forces of each in the joint military effort;

(g) to discuss the facilities and various contributions which each of the Contracting States, in conformity with the provisions of this Treaty, might be asked to provide, during a state of war, on behalf of the armies of such other Contracting States as might be operating on its territory.

2. The Permanent Military Commission may form temporary or permanent subcommittees from among its own members to deal with any of the matters falling within its jurisdiction. It may also seek the advice of any experts whose views on certain questions are deemed necessary.

3. The Permanent Military Commission shall submit detailed reports on the results of its activities and studies to the Joint Defense Council provided for in Article 6 of this Treaty, as well as an annual report giving full particulars of its work and studies during the year.

4. The Permanent Military Commission shall establish its headquarters in Cairo but may hold meetings in any other place the Commission may specify. The Commission shall elect its Chairman for two years; he may be reelected. Candidates for the Chairmanship shall hold at least the rank of a high commanding officer. Each member of the Commission must have as his original nationality that of the Contracting State he represents.

5. In the event of war, the supreme command of the joint forces shall be entrusted to the Contracting State possessing the largest military force taking actual part in field operations, unless, by unanimous agreement, the Commander-in-Chief is selected otherwise. The Commander-in-Chief shall be assisted in directing military operations by a Joint Staff.

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ECONOMIC REVIEW

Investment in the Petroleum Industry of the Middle East

Mohammed Yeganeh

THE ENORMOUS development of the petroleum industry in the Middle East has involved large expenditures in a wide variety of fields, such as geological surveys, exploration work, drilling activities, creation of plant facilities for storing and handling oil, construction of pipelines and port facilities, and erection of refineries and workshops. In addition to these undertakings, local conditions have required further expenditures on roads, houses, sewage systems, hospitals, and schools for the use of petroleum workers.¹ Due to the shortage of available capital in the Middle East itself and the nature of the oil concession agreements, all petroleum investment funds (except for \$10-\$12 million invested by the Governments of Egypt, Iran, and Turkey) have come from abroad. Moreover, practically all machinery, equipment, and

other manufactured supplies for these investments, not to mention the technical skill, has had to be imported from remote countries. Nearly one-half of this investment outlay has been made during the postwar period, especially in the last four years. However, indications are that unless new large-scale projects (such as construction of the 34-36-inch Middle East Pipeline, expansion of refining capacity, or investment for utilization and conservation of natural gas by-products) are undertaken, the rate of investment will decline in the near future.

Factors affecting the influx of foreign capital into the petroleum industry have mostly been favorable in the Middle East. Among these are the amazingly high productivity of the oil wells; the extremely low cost of extracting crude; the abundance of cheap labor; and the favorable concessionary agreements (despite recent increases in terms of payments). In addition, such inherent factors of the petroleum industry as exploration risks and time-lag in initial returns are more favorable in the Middle East than elsewhere because of the high probability of finding oil, especially in the Persian Gulf area, and the relatively small amount of capital which must be invested before the production of crude in commercial quantities.

On the other side of the balance sheet, one must reckon the serious current political and strategic risks. These are quite high in the Middle East in view of the geographical loca-

¹ William S. Rodgers, Chairman of the Board of Directors of The Texas Company, testified before a U.S. Senate investigating committee in 1947 that "there is a formula used in Saudi Arabia for many years: for every dollar you put into the producing end or [handling of] oil, you have to put another dollar into such facilities as houses, hospitals, schools and so forth. . . ." *Investigation of the National Defense Program*, S. Res. 46, U.S. Government Printing Office (Washington, 1948), p. 24840. When this statement was made there was no heavy investment in large pipelines, and refining capacity represented 20% of production; moreover, it must be pointed out that these expenditures have been heavier in Saudi Arabia and Iran than in most of the other oil producing countries of the Middle East. See also Arabian American Oil Company, *Arabian Oil* (New York, 1948).

♦ MOHAMMED YEGANEH, a citizen of Iran, received his advanced degree from Columbia University's Department of Economics. For the past three years he has been engaged in research work on petroleum economics.

tion of the oil-producing area, present world tension, and local political developments.

Very little authoritative data have been published on the amount of investment in the oil industry of the Middle East. It is therefore difficult to give the exact amount for different countries, various branches of the industry, or given years. Most of the companies operating in the region present their accounts only to their holding companies; others, while publishing their balance sheets, give only consolidated accounts covering their worldwide activities. Devaluation, revaluation, and increases in prices create additional statistical problems to be overcome. Furthermore, the question of definition of investment has to be carefully considered. However, in spite of these and other difficulties, an attempt can be

made to arrive at figures on original and new capital investment, gross capital investment (i.e., original capital increased by reinvestment of earnings), gross capital investment after depreciation, and the present value of fixed assets. Estimates of the value of capitalized (as distinct from fixed) assets, such as the concessions themselves, would border on the speculative.

Working from both the extremely fragmentary data available on the value of investments and the relatively abundant material presenting physical descriptions of the fixed assets of the industry in different years, we arrive at the figures presented in Table I for the region as a whole² at the beginning of 1952.

² Countries included in this and succeeding estimates are Iran, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Bahrain, Ku-

Table I: FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY OF THE MIDDLE EAST

(In millions of dollars(a))

	Approximately
Original capital brought into the region as a whole (b).....	500
Gross capital investment (original capital plus reinvestment of earnings) (c).....	1,850
Gross capital investment, less depreciation (d).....	1,100
Replacement cost of fixed assets (present value) (e).....	2,100

(a) Allowance has been made for devaluation, but the decline in purchasing power of currencies has not been taken into account. The sources for most figures used as a basis for this Table appear in the footnotes; where no actual figures are available, estimates have been made.

(b) 95% of the total for original capital is based on official figures; the remaining 5% on estimates. Since the Middle East has been considered as a unit, the intra-regional movement of capital is not taken into account.

(c) About 80% of the total for gross capital investment is actual and 20% estimated. The latter portion is based on the physical descriptions of the investments and their comparative cost in other countries at a given period. Since this table was prepared, an estimate made by the Arabian American Oil Company has been published which sets the gross investment in properties, plant, and equipment before depreciation in the petroleum industry of the Middle East at \$1.9 billion for the end of 1951, as compared with \$1 billion at the end of 1945, and \$350 million and \$100 million at the end of 1935 and 1925 respectively. See Arabian American Oil Company, *Middle East Oil Developments* (New York, 1952).

(d) Approximately one-third of the total for depreciated capital investment is estimated. This portion has been arrived at after taking into account the actual or estimated original cost of the investments, their period of service, and the depreciation policy of a major oil company (e.g., that of the Standard Oil Company of California — see *Moody's Industrials*, 1951). Since the rate of depreciation applied by the oil companies operating in the Middle East is high, the actual value of gross investment before depreciation may be somewhat lower than the estimate given here.

(e) Replacement cost of investments has largely been estimated on the basis of the physical description of the investments, present cost of such new investments, and their period of service. For refineries, after considering their type, their capacity, and their period of service, an average figure of \$18 per ton capacity has been used. The greater part of the investment on pipelines, harbors, and storage facilities was made recently and actual figures of expenditures are available; the remainder has been estimated. For exploration and wells an average of \$250,000 per well has been used. For construction of roads, airports, housing, and other buildings, the formula applied in Saudi Arabia, as quoted in footnote 1, has been used, after making allowance for conditions in other countries. The result has been checked against the major items of physical investment and their present cost of construction. No allowance has been made for underground crude petroleum reserves.

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Of the original capital brought into the region, about 40% came before World War II; of the cumulative capital investment, only close to 30% was made in the corresponding period. The size of the gross investment, which comes to over 350% of the original capital, was brought about by the reinvestment of the whole or a part of the earnings, including part of profits, and by provisions for depreciation, amortization, and depletion. The large discrepancy between the replacement cost of the fixed assets and the depreciated capital investment is largely due to the gradual increase in prices of capital goods in the postwar period, as well as to a conservative depreciation policy.

It is interesting to compare the amount of gross capital investment after depreciation in the petroleum industry of the Middle East with that of Venezuela, an equally important oil producing country, where the capital investment (apparently after depreciation) was around \$1,900 million in early 1951.³ Despite the fact that development of transportation facilities (including pipelines and port facilities) in the Middle East required an investment several times greater than in Venezuela, the Middle East oil industry has been more remunerative per dollar of investment. Refining capacity in the Middle East is nearly three times as large as in Venezuela, and the potential crude-producing capacity with the present investment is nearly twice as large.⁴

wait, Qatar, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, and Turkey. Also included is the Iraq Petroleum Company's investment in the 26-32-inch pipeline from Iraq to the Mediterranean coast at Baniyas, Syria, scheduled to be completed in late 1952. Excluded are the still nonproductive activities of the American Independent Oil Company and the Pacific Western Oil Company in the Kuwait-Saudi Arabia neutral zone; the now abandoned operations of Standard Oil of New Jersey and IPC subsidiaries in Egypt, Israel, and Syria; and nonproductive operations in Cyprus, Jordan, the Trucial Coast, and other parts of the Arabian Peninsula. Unless otherwise indicated, all estimates are for early 1952. Investment in transportation and marketing outside the region are excluded.

³ Walter J. Levy Associates (New York), *Venezuelan Oil in the Framework of Western Hemisphere Supplies: An Economic Survey for the Government of the United States of Venezuela*, March 26, 1951, p. D-8.

⁴ In this statement, the producing and refining capacity of Iran, the refining capacity of Israel,

United States interests control about 42% of the present value of investment in the petroleum industry of the Middle East, i.e., about \$900 million as against \$1,400 million, or 74%, in Venezuela in early 1951.⁵

Percentages of investment in the oil industry of the Middle East by countries is summarized in Table II. The pattern of investment in the Middle East as a whole compared with investment in the U.S. is shown in Table III. The difference between investment in refineries, pipelines, and transportation in the Middle East as against production (especially exploration and drilling) in the U.S. is readily apparent.

The distribution of investment among the different countries of the Middle East is summarized in Table IV. In addition, about \$90 million has been spent without success in other countries up to the present time. The Neutral Zone between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia has absorbed over one-third of this figure and exploration is still going on. In Egypt, Israel, and Syria, nearly one-half of this amount was spent by the Standard Oil Company of New

and the throughput capacity of all Iraqi pipelines are included.

⁵ According to the figures of the U.S. Department of Commerce, of \$3,671-million value of investment of American oil companies abroad at the end of 1949, about 26% was in "East of Suez countries, excluding ERP dependencies." (See Walter J. Levy, "Foreign Investment of International Oil Industry," *Oil Forum*, November 1951.) This estimate includes investment by the oil companies in the Far East, but its magnitude there is much smaller than in the Middle East. Further substantial investment made in the Middle East in the last two years should also be taken into account.

Table II: NATIONAL OWNERSHIP OF PRESENT VALUE OF INVESTMENT IN FIXED ASSETS

(In %)

United States	42
Iran (a)	35
United Kingdom (b)	14
Netherlands	4
France	4
Egypt, Iran, Turkey	1

(a) Since nationalization.

(b) Approximately 49% previous to nationalization of AIOC properties in Iran.

Jersey and by the subsidiaries of the Iraq Petroleum Company; all have abandoned their activities. The rest was used in Cyprus, Jordan, Trucial Coast, and other parts of the Arabian Peninsula.

The actual gross investment of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company⁶ in Iran (in refinery,

⁶ The Company is owned by the British Government, 52.5%; Burma Oil Company 25%; individuals 22.5%. See *World Oil*, July 15, 1951.

Table III: PATTERN OF PETROLEUM INVESTMENT

	(In %)	
	Middle East (Value of fixed assets, end of 1951) (a)	United States (Gross invest- ment, end of 1951) (b)
Refining	40	18.4
Transportation	33	13.2 (c)
Production	11	55.6
Marketing	11.6
Other (d)	16	1.2

Source for column 2: Chase National Bank, *Capital Formation in the Petroleum Industry* (New York), February 1952.

(a) Investment in marketing and transportation outside the Middle East not included.

(b) Gross investment in property, plant, and equipment of the petroleum industry in the United States was estimated at about \$25 billion at the end of 1950; net investment amounted to about \$12.7 billion in the corresponding period.

(c) Including 4.4% in marine.

(d) Including complementary facilities for the Middle East, such as housing, roads, airports, and other buildings.

Table IV: LOCATION OF PRESENT VALUE OF INVESTMENTS

	(In %)
Iran	35
Saudi Arabia (a)	25
Iraq (b)	15
Bahrein	8
Kuwait	7
Egypt	3.5
Israel	3.5
Qatar	2
Lebanon, Turkey	1

(a) Includes investment in the Trans-Arabian pipeline.

(b) Includes investment in the pipelines to the Mediterranean coast at Haifa, Tripoli, and Banias.

tank installations, pipelines, buildings, and land) up to the end of 1950 was £90.1 million, which was written down by depreciation to £28.7 million.⁷ The capital of the Anglo-Iranian Oil company (invested in the whole Middle East and its subsidiaries outside the Middle East) was given at £32.8 million, of which £11.2 million was drawn from dividends and distributed as stock to the ordinary shareholders in 1926 and 1937.⁸ Thus, the original capital of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company was £21.6 million, the major portion of which was invested in Iran. The value of the fixed assets of the Company in Iran when it was nationalized in the spring of 1951 was around \$750 million.⁹ An official of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company is reported to have estimated the actual value of the Company's asset's in Iran, after depreciation, at \$840 million.¹⁰ Apparently, a part of this difference is due to the inclusion of material inventories and supply petroleum products in storage tanks when the industry was turned over to the Iranians.

Gross investments made by the Arabian American Oil Company and Trans-Arabian Pipeline Company¹¹ in connection with the production of Saudi Arabian oil was nearly \$600 million in late 1951.¹² The present value of the fixed assets of this investment, after depreciation, is probably around \$550 million. The original capital of the Arabian American Oil Company was \$700,000. By the end of 1945 the Company had accumulated an earned surplus of \$8.7 million and had borrowed

⁷ Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, *Annual Report and Accounts as of 31 December 1950* (London, 1951).

⁸ *Moody's Industrials*, 1951.

⁹ U.S. Government officials in Tehran, including former American Ambassador Henry F. Grady, have also used an estimate of \$750 million. (See Henry F. Grady, "What Went Wrong in Iran," *Saturday Evening Post*, Jan. 5, 1952.)

¹⁰ *Oil and Gas Journal*, Nov. 8, 1951, p. 179.

¹¹ The companies are owned by the Standard Oil Company of California (30%), Standard Oil Company of New Jersey (30%), The Texas Company (30%), and the Socony-Vacuum Oil Company (10%).

¹² This figure was given by R. G. Follis, Chairman of the board of Standard Oil Company of California, *Petroleum Press Service*, Dec. 1951, p. 401.

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about \$91 million from its parent companies, putting in all an investment of \$100.3 million into Saudi Arabia.¹³ For the construction of the Trans-Arabian Pipeline another loan of \$125 million was arranged with U.S. insurance companies bearing 2.55% interest and payable in semi-annual installments up to 1962.¹⁴ The construction of this pipeline required an investment of about \$230 million.

The investment by oil companies in connection with oil industry of Iraq has been close to £90 million,¹⁵ mostly by the Iraq Petroleum Company and its subsidiaries.¹⁶ The Company was formed in 1925; by 1934, when Iraqi oil started to flow to the world's markets and bring in revenues, total expenditures had reached about \$62 million.¹⁷ Immediately after World War II, the construction of two 16-inch pipelines was undertaken. One of these lines, extending to Tripoli, Lebanon, was completed in mid-1949; the other, destined to go to Haifa, was constructed up to the Israeli border, where work was discontinued. Early in 1951 the construction of a 26-32-inch pipeline extending to Baniyas, on the Syrian coast of the Mediterranean, at an estimated cost of \$120 million, was underway; it is scheduled for completion in late 1952. Another major development in the petroleum industry of Iraq has been the opening up of the Zubair oilfield in southern Iraq, which required an investment of £18 million by the end of 1951.¹⁸ By the end of 1950 the Iraq

Petroleum Company had increased its capital from £50,000 (in 1925) to £83.5 million.¹⁹ The present value of investment in the oil industry of Iraq has been estimated at \$320 million.

The Bahrein Petroleum Company²⁰ began its operation in Bahrein in 1929 with a capital stock of \$100,000. Oil was discovered in 1932 and exports started in the following year. For marketing oil, a subsidiary, called California Texas Oil Company, Ltd., was formed in 1936 with a capital stock of \$1 million. By the end of 1946 these two companies had built up reserves and surplus amounting to \$118.8 million from the original capital, but had paid no dividends to their holding companies.²¹ The capital stocks of the Bahrein-Caltex group had increased to \$7.2 million by the end of 1950 as a result of the purchase of certain refineries in Europe; in the corresponding period their capital surplus stood at \$254.2 million, covering their worldwide activities.²² The present value of investment in the oil industry of Bahrein is in the neighborhood of \$170 million.

Investment in the oil industry of Kuwait was around \$150 million at the end of 1951, practically all made during the postwar pe-

¹⁹ Walter E. Skinner, *Oil and Petroleum Yearbook* (London, 1951). The Iraq Petroleum Company has several subsidiaries operating in Iraq and other countries of the Middle East. The most important and their capital at the end of 1950 were as follows:

In millions
of £

Mosul Petroleum Company.....	12.6
Basrah Petroleum Company.....	12.4
Petroleum Development (Qatar), Ltd.	11.2
Syria Petroleum Company, Ltd.....	5.7
Petroleum Development (Palestine) Ltd.	1.6
Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast), Ltd.	1.6
Lebanon Petroleum Company, Ltd....	0.8
Petroleum Development (Transjordan), Ltd.	0.6

²⁰ The Company is owned by The Texas Company and Standard Oil Company of California, equally.

²¹ U.S. Senate Hearings, *Investigation of the National Defense Program*, S. Res. 46, pp. 25029-31.

²² *Moody's Industrials*, 1951, p. 2244.

¹³ U.S. Senate Hearings, *Investigation of the National Defense Program*, S. Res. 46, U.S. Government Printing Office (Washington, 1948), pp. 25-101.

¹⁴ *Moody's Industrials*, 1951, p. 2241.

¹⁵ International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *The Economic Development of Iraq* (Washington, 1952), p. 34.

¹⁶ Iraq Petroleum Company, Ltd., is owned by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (23.75%); Shell group (23.75%); Compagnie Française des Pétroles (23.75%); Standard Oil Company of New Jersey (11.875%); Socony-Vacuum Oil Company (11.875%); C. S. Gulbenkian (5%).

¹⁷ *Report of the Group of American Petroleum Interests in Foreign Countries, Submitted to the Special Senate Committee Investigating Petroleum Resources* (Washington, 1945) vol. 2, p. 8.

¹⁸ Statement by H. S. Gibson, Managing Director of the Company. *Oil and Gas Journal* Jan. 21, 1952, p. 69.

riod. The original capital of the Kuwait Oil Company,²³ operating in Kuwait, was £200,000, but by the end of 1950 it had borrowed about £33 million in interest-free loans from its parent companies.²⁴ At the end of 1950 the equity share of the Gulf Exploration Corporation (half-owner) in the Kuwait Oil Company stood at about \$65 million.²⁵

The Anglo-Egyptian Oil fields, Ltd. (Shell

interest), the main operator in the Egyptian oil industry (producing about 75% of crude output and owning about 80% of the refining capacity of Egypt) had an original capital of £676,000 which was increased later to £1,808,000.²⁶ At the end of 1950 the value of total fixed assets of the Company, after depreciation, was £8 million,²⁷ but the replacement cost of these assets exceeded twice that amount.

²³ The Company is owned by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and Gulf Exploration Corporation, equally.

²⁴ *Oil and Gas Journal*, Dec. 14, 1950, p. 68.

²⁵ Argus Research Corporation, *Oil Companies in the Middle East* (New York), July 3, 1951.

²⁶ Walter E. Skinner, *Oil and Petroleum Yearbook* (London, 1951).

²⁷ *L'Économiste Égyptien* (Alexandria), July 8, 1951.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Literature on Arab Libya

James W. Crudgington

UNTIL THE Italian landings in Tripoli in 1911, Western Europe had little knowledge of the mysteries that might lie hidden in the expanses of the Libyan desert. Such information as did exist came from accounts of 18th and 19th century voyagers who had visited the land and returned to write of their travels. The violent xenophobia of the Bedouin tribes and the jealousy with which they guarded the profitable caravan routes to the interior of Africa succeeded in restraining all but the most intrepid travellers from visiting their country. In 1797 the British African Association, an institution organized "for the purpose of exploring the interior of Africa," sponsored the journey of Frederick Horneman from Cairo to Murzuch in the heart of the Libyan desert. He returned to write *The journal of Frederick Horneman's travels from Cairo to Mourouk in the years 1797-1798* (London, 1802). There followed Captain George Lyon with *A narrative of travels in northern Africa in the years 1818, 1819, and 1820* (London, 1821); Denham, Clapperton, and Oudeney with *Narrative of travels and discoveries in northern and central Africa* (Boston, 1826); and Pacho with *Relation d'un voyage dans la Marmarique, la Cyrenaïque et les oasis d'Audjelah et de Maradeh* (Paris, 1827). The German explorer, Gerhard Rohlfs, who managed to reach the remote sacred oases of Kufra in 1878, added *Kufra* (Leipzig, 1881). This feat was not repeated until 1921 when the undaunted Rosita Forbes, fresh from her wanderings in the South Pacific, became the second Christian

and first woman to visit the oases. The account of her achievement appeared in *The secret of the Sahara: Kufra* (London, 1921). A good bibliographical essay on the works of the 18th and 19th century explorers, "Viaggi di esplorazione (Tempi moderni)," by Attilio Mori appeared in *Archivio bibliografico coloniale* between 1915 and 1918.

Western knowledge of the interior of Libya continued based on such fragmentary sources until after Italy succeeded in establishing its authority throughout the territory. This was finally accomplished in 1932 with the capture of Kufra. There followed a procession of scientific expeditions to discover the exact nature of the colony. Such studies as the three-volume report of the Royal Academy of Italy, *Missione scientifica delle Reale Accademia d'Italia a Cufra* (Rome, 1934-1939), and the Royal Italian Geographic Society's *Il Sahara italiano* (Rome, 1937) provide detailed geological and topographical information.

The existing literature on Libya at the time of the Italian occupation and for the next decade was adequately treated in the bibliographies of Federico Minutilli, *Bibliografia della Libia* (Turin, 1903); Ugo Ceccherini, who carried on with his *Bibliografia della Libia in continuazione . . . di F. Minutilli* (Rome, 1915); and the four-volume *Archivio bibliografico coloniale (Libia)* (Florence, 1915-1921) published by the Italian Society for the Study of Libya. Under the Fascist regime the responsibility for maintaining colonial bibliographies was assumed by various parastatal institutes. During this era exhaustive

© JAMES W. CRUDGINGTON served with the British forces in the Middle East, including Libya, in 1941-42 and with the Civil Affairs section of the U. S. Army in Cairo during 1942-43. For the remainder of the war he was with Allied Military Government in Italy and returned to Florence in 1950-51 for research at the Centro di Studi Coloniali on Italo-Arab relations from 1908 to 1923.

amounts were published, but little of the material catalogued relates to subjects which concern Arab Libya. The best bibliography in English is Professor E. E. Evans-Pritchard, "A selected bibliography on writings on Cyrenaica," which appeared in *African Studies*, 4 (Sept. 1945), pp. 146-50 and 5 (June 1946), pp. 189-94. While this work deals primarily with material on Cyrenaica, it also contains many of the principal sources for the entire country. Among the bibliographies which touch at least in part on Libya are Douglas H. Varley, *A bibliography of Italian colonisation in Africa* (London, 1936), and *A list of references on the Italian colonies in Africa* (Washington, 1947) [typewritten], compiled by Grace H. Fuller of the U. S. Library of Congress.

At the time of the Italian landings in 1911, Tripoli was nominally a part of the Ottoman Empire. Ottoman rule, however, had never been very effective and even after the fall of the hereditary Caramanli beys in 1835, the Porte was unable to establish any real authority beyond the city of Tripoli and the few coastal towns. Anthony J. Cachia, *Libya under the second Ottoman occupation: 1835-1911* (Tripoli, 1945), and Francesco Corò, *Settantasei anni di dominazione turca in Libia* (Tripoli, 1937), cover this period of the nation's history, while the earlier Caramanli era is considered in Rodolfo Micacchi, *La Tripolitania sotto il dominio dei Caramanli* (Intra, 1936). From the middle of the 19th century, however, the real control and administration of the interior was exercised by the growing religious confraternity of the Sanusiya. By the time of the Italian occupation, it was the Sanusiya who had become the effective authority among the Bedouin tribes of the desert. It was in the name of the order that organized Arab resistance was mustered in 1912, and it was under the banner of the Sanusi that the long struggle against the Italians continued until 1932. Again it is under the Sanusi family that the country has been unified and the present head of the order, Sayyid Idris, has been chosen the first ruler of the independent state. The modern history and evolution of the new state of Libya is, therefore, closely associated with this religious confraternity.

E. E. Evans-Pritchard, *The Sanusi of Cyrenaica* (Oxford, 1949), presents an excellent history of the Sanusi from the founding of the first lodge in Cyrenaica in 1843 through the defeat of the Italians in 1943. The work is the best study on the subject. C. C. Adams, "The Sanusiya Order," Part X of the British Military Administration *Handbook on Cyrenaica* (Cairo, 1945), is a good brief discussion of the order. Evans-Pritchard, *Bibliographical notes on members of the Sanusi family* (Benghazi, 1945), is a useful reference on individual members of the family. The long-accepted standard book, Henri Duveyrier, *La confrérie Musulmane de Sidi Mohammed ben'ali es-Senoussi et de son domaine géographique* (Paris, 1886), is badly dated and suffers from an overemphasis of the political threat of Mahdism which was current at that date. Enrico Insabato, *L'Islam et la politique des alliés* (Paris, 1920) [translated from Italian by Magli-Boisnard], considers the Sufist aspects of the confraternity and gives a detailed description of the rites of the order to prove the absence of any fundamental conflict with Christianity.

As a result of the prolonged struggle against the Arabs in which Italy found itself engaged, Italian writers began to re-examine the nature of the Sanusiya order. Bruno Ducati in his article "Lo stato senussita," *Rassegna Italiana*, 11 (Feb. 1928), pp. 175-82, maintained that the Sanusiya acquired the role of a state within the state through its mystic teachings. Filippo Lo Bello refuted this thesis in "La confraternità dei senussi," *Rassegna Italiana*, 11 (July 1928), pp. 650-56, pointing out that it was not until after the Turco-Italian war that the order assumed a definitely political role. Bruno Aglietti, writing after World War II and when the ultimate fate of Libya was still undecided, sought to show in his article "La confraternità senussita," *Oriente Moderno*, 26 (1946), pp. 2-12, that the influence and prestige attributed to the Sanusi was largely a British fabrication created for their own interests. By far the most objective recent Italian treatment of the subject is the series of articles by Insabato entitled "La senussia" which appeared in *Africa* in 1950 and 1951. Insabato, one of the original agents in touch with the Sanusi before the Tripoli

landings, nistic con had char The c Italian terminin subjects. policy is the subje ings and oppositio populatio liberator in spite of Italian C basis for Fascists Arab res Santa L'Islam di Caste that the dicted th with the of the C the probj subjects in 1913) with the the new Italian importan Savino senussita kingdom only pra tion wa Accord history o and too permit i politiani avvento discuss work (v series sp tute) is objectiv D. C. Cyrenai book on The

landings, tried to dispel many of the antagonistic concepts concerning the Sanusi which had characterized Italian writings.

The occupation of Tripoli presented the Italian Government with the problem of determining a policy toward its new Muslim subjects. The gradual development of such a policy is clearly seen in the works written on the subject between the time of the first landings and the final repression in 1932 of Arab opposition. Italy had expected that the local population would welcome its soldiers as liberators from the misrule of the Porte, and in spite of severe disillusion on this point, the Italian Government attempted to introduce a basis for cooperation until the advent of the Fascists resulted in vigorous suppression of all Arab resistance.

Santa Maria Bourbon del Monte stated in *L'Islam e la confraternità dei senussi* (Città di Castello, 1912) that there was no evidence that the Sanusi were anti-Italian and predicted that good relations could be established with the order. Professor Malvezzi, an official of the Colonial Office at the time, discussed the problem of European rule of Muslim subjects in *L'Italia e l'Islam in Libia* (Milan, 1913) and advocated Italian collaboration with the Sanusi as the best means of governing the new colony. Continued resistance to the Italian occupation served to emphasize the importance of obtaining Arab cooperation. Savino Acquaviva, *Il problema libico e il senussismo* (Rome, 1917), proposed a Sanusi kingdom under an Italian protectorate as the only practicable course of action. Such a solution was attempted to some extent with the Accord of Regima in 1920, but the course of history of the postwar world moved too swiftly and too many external factors were at work to permit it a fair trial. Ottone Gabelli, *La Tripolitania dalla fine della guerra mondiale all'avvento del fascismo* (2 vols., Intra, 1937-39), discusses developments of the period, but this work (which is part of the "History of Libya" series sponsored by the Fascist Colonial Institute) is extremely biased. A briefer and more objective account is contained in Brigadier D. C. Cumming, "The modern history of Cyrenaica," a section of the B. M. A. *Handbook on Cyrenaica*.

The March on Rome in 1922 brought a

reorientation toward the problems in Libya. Francesco Meriano, a Fascist journalist, still maintained in his *La questione di Giarabub* (Bologna, 1926) that the fundamental error in the occupation had been not to recognize the importance of the Sanusi and to deal with them from the start; and Roberto Cantalupo, an undersecretary for the colonies under the Fascists, in his *L'Italia musulmana* (Rome, 1928), stressed the importance of the influence that the Sanusi exerted upon the life of the desert Bedouin. But in spite of such counsel, the advocates of force in dealing with Arab resistance prevailed. Colonel Serra, of the General Staff, presented their case in *Italia e senussia* (Milan, 1933). Other works supporting this thesis are Guiseppe Macaluso Aleo, *Turchi, senussi e italiani in Libia* (Benghazi, 1930), and Carlo Giglio, *La confraternità senussita* (Padua, 1932). And thus the 20 years of Italo-Arab relations ended with the crushing of all opposition by military might and the creation of a colony in which the native population had only a secondary role. Two German discussions of Italian colonial policy are Richard Pfalz, *Bei Fascisten und Senussi: Mussolinis Kolonialpolitik in der Cyrenaika* (Leipzig, 1933), and Oskar Schneider and Herbert Wilhelmy, *Die faschistische Kolonisation in Nordafrika* (Leipzig, 1939).

Most of the modern history of Libya is the story of the Arab struggle against the Italians. Accounts of the actual military engagements are contained in the official Ministry of War reports. The five-volume *Campagna di Libia* (Rome, 1922-27) is the official history of the Turco-Italian war, and official versions of the conquest of the colony during the following 20 years are found in the histories of the different campaigns against the Arabs. General Graziani, who succeeded in conquering the colony, describes his contribution to final victory in *Verso il Fezzan* (Tripoli, 1929), *Cirenaica pacificata* (Milan, 1932), and *La riconquista del Fezzan* (Milan, 1934). Colonel Guido Fornari, *Gli italiani nel sud libico* (Rome, 1941), relates in detail the negotiations with the Arab leaders for the first Italian occupation of Tripolitania and Fezzan and ascribes the undertaking to the defeat of Colonel Miani at Gasr-bu-Hadi in

1915 and the subsequent evacuation of the interior. An Italian survivor of that engagement, Enrico Petragani, recounts his four years of imprisonment by the Arabs in *Il sahara tripolitano* (Rome, 1928). This work has an interesting account of Turkish reoccupation of the territory and of the activities of the Turks and Germans there during World War I. Fornari, in his article "La senussia in Tripolitania," *Rassegna Italiana*, 27 (Mar. 1950), pp. 169-77, discusses the internal conflict among the various Arab factions and the futile attempt of the Sanusi to extend their authority into Tripolitania between 1913 and 1922. Of the numerous Italian colonial histories, an essential reference work on the Italo-Arab struggle is Gennaro Mondaini, *Manuale di storia e legislazione coloniale del regno d'Italia* (2 vols., Rome, 1924-1927). Volume I is a well-documented history of the period from 1911 to 1926 which covers all formal relations of the Italian Government with the Arabs. The second volume contains a discussion of the important judicial and administrative decrees issued from the landings until 1921, including the Statutes for Tripolitania and Cyrenaica which established local parliaments and selfgovernment in the two provinces.

Among the studies on the sociological aspects of Arab Libya are the two works by Colonel Enrico di Agostini, *La popolazione della Tripolitania* (2 vols., Tripoli, 1917), and *La popolazione della Cirenaica* (Bengasi, 1922-23). These volumes are the first Italian attempt at a census of the native population and contain detailed figures on the tribes and their location. Although the data is somewhat speculative, di Agostini's work has remained a classic and has been heavily drawn upon by subsequent writers. An interesting study of the effect of climate on socio-economic habits of a population is *La Libia settentrionale* (Bengasi, 1930) by the Swedish geographer Hans Wilson Ahlmann (first published in Swedish in 1928). This work is part of a series of studies on this subject made from Scandinavia to Libya. Ahlmann is largely indebted to di Agostini for his data. Other works include Torquato Curotti, *Gente di Libia* (Tripoli, 1928), and Arsenio Berladinelli, *La Ghible* (Tripoli, 1935). The French geographer, Jean Despois, presents a good study of

the Ibadite Berbers and the Malikiite Arabs of the Tripolitanian Gebel in *Le Djebel Nefousa* (Paris, 1935). The studies of Professor Scarin based on his several expeditions to the interior oases provide good material on sociological conditions there. These works—*Le oasi del Fezzan* (2 vols., Florence, 1934); *Le oasi cirenaiche del 29° parallelo* (Florence, 1937); *La Gofra e Zella* (Florence, 1938); and *L'insediamento umano nella Libia occidentale* (Rome, 1940)—remain a valuable source in spite of their date. More recent works are J. Lethielleux, *Le Fezzan: ses jardins, ses palmiers* (Tunis, 1948), which gives a good insight into the life of the Fezzan natives, and the studies of the French Scientific Mission of Fezzan (1944-45), which include Volume I, *Anthropologie et Ethnologie*, by M. E. LeBlanc, and Volume III, *Géographie humaine* (Paris, 1946), by Jean Despois. The latter volume contains a thorough study of the problems of the region.

The operation of land laws in Libya, an all-important question to a primarily agrarian population, is discussed in Alberto Gnecco, *Aspetti di diritto agrario libico* (Milan, 1939). Adolfo Klitsche de la Grange's article, "La proprietà fondiaria in Libia," which appeared in *Rassegna Sociale dell'Africa Italiana*, 2 (1939), pp. 1327-36, and 3 (1940), pp. 121-29, considers Muslim and Ottoman land laws in effect at the time of the Italian occupation and their subsequent changes. Massimo Colucci, *Il regime della proprietà fondiaria nell'Africa Italiana*, Volume I, *Libia* (Bologna, 1942), provides a comprehensive study of Italian land policy as it functioned in Libya.

World War II saw the Italians finally driven from Libya in 1942 and a British-French military occupation of the territory. The official account of British Military Administration is told in Lord Rennell of Rodd, *British military administration of occupied territories in Africa: 1941-1947* (London, 1948), which describes the occupation and administration of the former colony. The two B. M. A. handbooks on the separate provinces are good brief reference works and have the added advantage of being among the few in English. *Handbook on Tripolitania* (Tripoli, 1947) presents a short history of the province and postwar conditions. A. J. Steele-Greig,

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History of education in Tripolitania from the time of the Ottoman occupation to the fifth year under British military occupation (Tripoli, 1948), gives a report on recent progress in native education. *Handbook on Cyrenaica* (Cairo, 1945) is composed of eleven separate booklets by various authors dealing with the history and tribes of the region: Part I: "Geology," by O. H. Little; Part II: "Prehistory," by O. H. Meyers; Part III: "The classic period," by A. Rowe; Part IV: "The Christian period," by A. S. Atiya; Part V: "Modern history (a)," by D. C. Cumming; Part VI: "Modern history (b)," by D. C. Cumming; Part VII: "Tribes (Habitat and way of life)," by E. E. Evans-Pritchard; Part VIII: "Tribes and their divisions," by E. E. Evans-Pritchard; Part IX: "Kufra Oasis," by K. D. Bell; Part X: "The Sanusiya order," by C. C. Adams; Part XI: "Italian colonisation," by D. H. Weir. This series provides a comprehensive survey of the area.

Material on the French administration of Fezzan is contained in *Notice sur le Fezzan*, *Notice sur la circonscription de Ghadames*, and *Notice sur la région de Ghat et Serdeles* (Paris, 1948) prepared for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the Documentation Center. These three pamphlets give a brief account of the region and its administration.

The end of the last war and the conclusion of a peace treaty with Italy brought the problem of the future of Libya to the fore. The lengthy and tortuous negotiations which culminated in the decision of the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1949 that the territory should be created a unified independent nation by 1952 is the story of the birth of the new state. C. Grove Haines, "The problem of the Italian colonies," *Middle East Journal*, 1 (1947), pp. 417-31, discusses the elements of

the problem that confronted the Italian peace conference. F. E. Stafford, British member of the Four Power Commission to Libya in 1947, reports political conditions and aspirations observed at that time in his article, "The ex-Italian colonies," *International Affairs*, 25 (1949), pp. 47-55. The official findings of this commission are in *Report on Libya* (2 vols., London, 1948), which constitutes Volume III of the report of the Four Power Commission of Investigation for the Former Italian Colonies.

Brigadier Cumming in his article, "The nationalist movement in Libya," *World Today*, 2 (1946), pp. 330-39, describes the development of national consciousness in Libya, while Benjamin Rivlin, in "Unity and nationalism in Libya," *Middle East Journal*, 3 (1949), pp. 31-44, considers the internal problems facing unification of the country. Rivlin also presents an account of the United Nations' deliberation on the question and its ultimate decision in *The United Nations and the Italian colonies* (New York, 1950). Ann Dearden, in "Independence for Libya," *Middle East Journal*, 4 (1950), pp. 395-409, reviews developments toward unity and selfgovernment from the time of the U. N. decision to July 1950.

The official documents for the two-year period leading to the independence of the nation are the *Annual report of the United Nations Commissioner in Libya*, U. N. General Assembly, Fifth Session, Supplement No. 15 (A1340) and Sixth Session, Supplement No. 17 (A1949) and Supplement No. 17 A (A/1949/Add. 1); and the British and French annual reports on their administration to the Secretary General of the U. N. for 1950 (A1387 and A1390) and 1951.

The Middle East Journal will order on behalf of its subscribers any book reviewed or listed in the following pages of the Book Review section. *Books published in the United States*: Supplied at list price at time of purchase, postpaid. Mail check with order or request invoice. *Books published abroad*: Supplied at list price at time of purchase at current rate of exchange, plus cost of handling. Payment due upon receipt of invoice; all payments to be made in dollars. Service guaranteed on books published in the United States only. Address all orders to Book Service, The Middle East Institute, 1830 Nineteenth Street, N.W., Washington 9, D. C.

GENERAL

Near Eastern Society and Culture, edited by T. Cuyler Young. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951. 250 pages. \$4.00.

Reviewed by Francis W. Anderson

This latest volume in the Princeton Oriental Studies series is a timely and rich contribution toward that mutual understanding without which East and West cannot hope to resolve the conflicts that divide them. The subtitle indicates the pattern of the book, "A Symposium on the Meeting of East and West." Eleven eminent scholars from both worlds contribute studies in the fields where intellectual, cultural, and spiritual forces have exercised a mutual impact on the East and West. Drawing on their deep knowledge of the past and their sensitive appreciation of present trends, the authors find reason to regard the future of East-West relations with a qualified optimism.

The area of East-West relations, however, is so vast that some limitation of its range was found necessary. These studies are therefore restricted to the Muslim Middle Eastern countries: the Arab states, Turkey, and Iran. In the light of current events in this area of ferment, the importance of this book is obvious to those who wish to penetrate below the surface of the present explosive situations, for it is the scholar rather than the statesman or the politician who is the surer guide.

There are many elements in the present situations in Iran and Egypt, particularly the latter, that recall the turmoil of 1882 resulting in the British military occupation of Egypt. Lord Cromer himself was to admit that his Government had misconceived the real nature of the Egyptian revolutionary movement of that day. Seventy years later the men who shape foreign policies in London and Washington are repeating this misconception. They would do well to weigh the message of this book before their present policies beget further errors.

As noted by the editor in his introduction, limitations of space precluded a study of Arab-Israeli relations. Though it is a *lucuna* imposed by circumstances, it is regrettable. Israel has been something of a catalyst in precipi-

tating recent critical reactions between East and West, and the problem is of vital concern not only to the Arabs and Israelis but to the West as well.

There is one disconcerting note in the symposium. Turkey is the only Middle Eastern country where a separation between religion and government (i.e. church and state) has been the law for a quarter-century. Dr. Calverley holds that the separation of religion and government will free the Middle East from its alleged medievalism. Yet Lewis Thomas, in his chapter on "The National and International Relations of Turkey," blandly states, "It is probable that the ultimate solution for Turkey's non-Moslem minorities will have to be emigration or assimilation [linguistically and religiously]" (page 182). Are we to conclude that non-Muslim minorities fare worse in Turkey than in other Muslim countries of the Middle East? Is apostasy to Islam, then, the price that Christian or Jewish subjects in Turkey must pay for citizenship? If this is admitted it means that in the last analysis "rapprochement" is impossible, and if it is impossible in Turkey how can it be effected between East and West?

♦ FRANCIS W. ANDERSON, is a Jesuit educator who has worked in Iraq, Jordan and Egypt from 1935 to 1949.

Strange Lands and Friendly People, by William O. Douglas. New York: Harper, 1951. 336 pages. \$4.00.

Reviewed by Charles Issawi

Justice Douglas presents an unusual combination of romantic sensibility and clear, practical intelligence. This has enabled him to provide his readers with both an exciting tale of travel and a penetrating analysis of some of the basic social problems of the Middle East. Most of the book is devoted to Iran and to the countries of the Fertile Crescent, i.e. Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, and Jordan. The picture he gives is brought out more clearly by a description of two border zones in which it is framed: Greece and Cyprus on the one hand, and India on the other.

Justice Douglas' sensibility and his gift for storytelling have produced some unforgettable scenes: the Persian goatherd who said, "My

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hut is poor and dirty but you may sit in the light of my eyes"; the riding and shooting contest organized by the Qashqais; the sonorous speech of the young Druze which so moved his Arab and American listeners; the little Indian basketseller who was deeply offended by the gratuity offered to her by the overburdened author — all these and many more will be remembered by every reader. But Justice Douglas, who can appreciate the best that Asia has to offer, is also keenly aware of the worst, so often forgotten by romantics, and he does not mince his words when discussing famines, usury, disease, tyranny, and corruption. He is aware of the changes that are taking place in men's minds and of the new forces that are being released. He realizes perfectly well that the status quo cannot be preserved, even if its preservation were desirable. He appreciates the appeal of Soviet propaganda with its promise of the elimination of Western imperialism, redistribution of land, industrialization, education, and — a point often forgotten — the emancipation of women. At the same time he does not overlook the fact that there are liberal, as well as conservative, forces of resistance to the Soviets, and that these progressive forces could be greatly strengthened by carrying out certain political, social, and economic reforms — above all land reform.

The book may be criticized from two angles. On the one hand it contains some slips that could have been avoided with a little care. Thus, to take a few examples, it is highly improbable that 10,000 out of Iran's 150,000 radios are in the town of Khoi (population 40,000). Justice Douglas may have seen a fakir perform in Beirut; if so, he was more fortunate than the present reviewer. The inhabitants of Hadeth, in Lebanon, have often handled larger sums than LL 85 and higher daily wages than LL 5. Most Druzes would be surprised to learn that to them "Mohammed was Lucifer." It is not true that "under Moslem law a wife cannot get a divorce for any reason." But perhaps the most surprising error is the statement on page 231 that Saint Paul fled Damascus to escape the Christians (see Acts 9:23).

In the second place, even a vision as keen as the author's is not without its blind spots. No reader unacquainted with the region would

guess from Justice Douglas' description that Lebanon is a land of singular beauty, that well over half of its inhabitants are literate, that three-quarters of its children attend school, and that most of its mountain villages can stand comparison with those of Eastern, Southern, and even parts of Central Europe. Conversely, while rightly impressed by the achievements of Israel, Justice Douglas passes too lightly over the cost — both the financial cost, which he does not mention, and the human cost in terms of Arab displaced persons, whose plight is treated somewhat casually.

But these are minor criticisms of an excellent book. The last 12 pages, entitled "In Summary," contain the best short analysis of the situation and the best program of action known to the present reviewer. The rest of the volume should be read by all those who enjoy a good travel book, but these pages should be read by anyone who is in the least interested in the vast revolution that is sweeping Asia and may well shape the destiny of the world.

♦ CHARLES ISSAWI, author of *Egypt: An Economic and Social Analysis*, is a Middle Eastern specialist on economic matters with the United Nations Secretariat.

Eternal Stranger, by Lawrence Resner. Foreword by Bartley C. Crum. New York: Doubleday, 1951. 216 pages. \$3.00.

Reviewed by Siegfried Landshut

This is a most impressive and deeply moving story of the fate of the Jewish communities scattered among the Arab population throughout the countries of the Middle East and of their helpless exposure to the vexatious arbitrariness of Arab rulers. Any reader would be moved by the author's report; if this was the author's aim, he has no doubt attained it.

If, however, it was Mr. Resner's intention to give a true and well balanced account of the sudden outburst of anti-Jewish hostility in the whole Middle East (with the exception of Turkey and Iran), its intricate connection with the aspirations of Zionism, Arab nationalism, and anti-Western animosity, and all this on the background of the age-old relationship between the Muslims and the Jewish minority — if this was the author's intention, he has certainly failed. Indeed, it

would be strange if he had not. He who has never breathed the oriental atmosphere before, who comes from a part of the world far removed from the orient, will hardly be able to collect in the course of a short trip the necessary experience which is indispensable for any well-founded judgment.

The author seems to have been well aware of his handicap. Seldom in his report does he give any account of his personal experience or of facts he has seen or collected himself. This is particularly true of his chapters on Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. All the facts are taken from other publications written on the subject, and for the rest he relies on occasional conversations, on the remarks of people met in various places, or on the personal impressions of some members of the crews of planes which took the Jewish immigrants from Aden or Baghdad to Israel.

Wherever Resner does come out with his own opinion, it is only too obvious that it is biased by his general intent to arouse sympathy for the Jews living in the Arab world. It is surely this intention that induced the author to trace back the latest signs of anti-Jewish persecution to the oldest Biblical times. In the beginning of his chapter on Iraq Resner mentions the law of February 1950 by which any Jew willing to renounce his citizenship is allowed to leave the country. "Welcome news," the author comments, "the best, in a historical sense, that had come their way in twenty-five hundred years." And again in Egypt, there was — according to the author — no change from the time of Moses on to the latest events: "The enmity of Egyptian toward Jew and Jew toward Egyptian has never subsided." (p. 111.)

This kind of wholesale history prevents the author from analyzing the particular blend of psychological reactions that turned the ever growing feeling of frustration (economical, social, and political) in the Arab world into glowing resentment. It is the rise of Zionism and the resulting creation of Israel which has directed the rising flood of resentment toward the Jews.

The influence of Nazi propaganda in Iraq is highly exaggerated. Only a person far removed from the scene will accept the author's statement that "the Iraqi aristocracy and the Iraqi masses became the Nazis of the Middle East."

On the whole the comparisons of the author are apt to distort the true proportions. On pages 78-79 he tries to explain the difference between the anti-British sentiment among the Arabs and their hostility against the Jews. There is no intrinsic enmity, says Resner, between the Arabs and the Western foreigner, whereas "generally the average Arab feels that the Jew is his natural enemy." Such generalities, every word of which is wrong, only disclose the fact that the author has not the faintest idea of the working of the oriental mind. If there is any difference between the attitude of the Arabs toward the Jewish minority in their midst and toward the Western foreigner, it is the result of the Jew being helpless and at his mercy, whereas the foreigner is backed by power. The less the Arabs feel the strength of such a power, the more they will reveal their hostility. If there is any conclusion which can be drawn from the experience of the last thirty years, it is certainly this: that the more the British relaxed their rule, the more such retreat was understood as weakness and the more Arab hostility became aggressive.

Stubborn British reluctance to throw open the doors of the "Jewish National Home," denying thereby a refuge and haven to the uprooted and debased Jewish masses, can arouse indignation. But the way the author tries to attain the same effect with his readers seems to me to be somewhat too cheap. He tells a story about the late Foreign Secretary Bevin, who asked a Colonial Office expert to list Israel's most vexing difficulties. "Overcrowding, inadequate housing, food shortages," came the reply. "What?" exclaimed Bevin. "Open up Tripoli at once!" (p. 99.) Stories of this kind are no recommendation for the correctness and soberness of the report.

Generally speaking, it can be said that apart from such hear-say gossip most of the facts collected and reported by the author are correct. But there is so much wrong emphasis, slightly shifted accents, and arbitrary distribution of light and shadow that the story as a whole cannot serve as a source of reliable information. However, it does make the reader realize the predicament of the Jewish minorities in Arab countries.

✧ SIEGFRIED LANDSHUT is author of *Jewish Communities in the Muslim Countries of the Middle East*.

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Thiers et Mehemet-Ali, by François Charles-Roux. Paris: Librairie Plon, 1951. 320 pages. 495 fr.

Reviewed by P. J. Vatikiotis

This book deals specifically with French diplomacy of the eight-month period (March 1-Oct. 28, 1840) during which Louis Adolphe Thiers was head of the French Government and Minister of Foreign Affairs. The author recapitulates briefly the situation at the beginning of 1839. He describes French efforts under Soult to bring about a direct settlement between Mehemet Ali and the Porte, and also mentions the preliminary agreement among the Powers with regard to the Eastern Question. The author does not, however, go into a detailed analysis of the important Anglo-French clash that began to crystallize in 1839. He only mentions it at the outset as the "fundamental difference" that was to be inherited by Thiers from his predecessor.

Charles-Roux presents a detailed and most illuminating discussion of Thiers' speech of January 13, 1840, wherein the latter distinguished between his famous "system" and "conduct" in foreign policy. The "system" meant that the Ottoman Empire's integrity was to be supported, while as a "conduct" it meant employing means profitable to France (not including necessarily the partition of the Empire). This is extremely important because it gives the underlying bases of the policy Thiers was to adopt unsuccessfully during this period of crisis. The concerted policy of Britain and Russia in 1840 and 1841 is mentioned but the author, nevertheless, fails to explain fully the motives behind this British rapprochement with Russia. Further, he hardly touches upon the concurrent British parliamentary crisis arising from pro-French opposition to Palmerston's policy.

The chapter on the cleavage between Thiers, King Louis Philippe, and Ambassador Guizot that eventually led to the dismissal of the Prime Minister is one of the most valuable interpretations of the effect of domestic politics on foreign policy. The author discusses the rifts between King and Minister with a clear understanding of the weak monarch, and the determined, but often lukewarm, tenacity of a minister challenging Europe to war. Charles-

Roux also describes very aptly the pathetic defense by Thiers of his policy through a series of apologies that at times became moronic and an expression of personal chagrin against his successor, Guizot.

Thiers et Mehemet-Ali is fundamental: the sources are all primary, and the historical analysis and interpretation are excellent. It may very profitably be read in conjunction with the recent longer work by Charles Webster, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston*. Not only does Charles-Roux present the diplomatic history of this period in relation to a specific phase of the Eastern Question, the 1839-1841 crisis, but also an over-all picture of French domestic politics at the time, the weaknesses of the July Monarchy, and the character of a Prime Minister who was later to become president of the French Republic.

♦ P. J. VATIKIOTIS is a former instructor at the American University at Cairo.

EGYPT

L'Évolution de l'Égypte, by Marcel Colombe. Paris: Maisonneuve, 1951. 361 pages.

Reviewed by M. Rifaat

Marcel Colombe herein presents methodically, objectively, and concisely, an excellent treatise on the history of Egypt during the last twenty-five years. The author, however, being more of an orientalist than a historian, has stressed the local Arab or Islamic influences on the course of Egyptian history, thus minimizing the impact of world affairs and international politics.

For example, in dealing with the Muslim Brotherhood the author takes pains to attribute its growth in influence to the teachings of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Shaykh Muhammad Abduh, and Rashid Rida. However, they were religious thinkers who belonged to the late 19th and early 20th century, and while they no doubt had strong political views, their influence on the movement was only doctrinaire. The main reason for the growth and influence of the Brotherhood and other newly established religious bodies in the Arab world must be sought elsewhere—in the field of

international politics. In this connection the author fails to stress the effect of the Jewish thrust into Palestine. The creation of Israel has not only contributed to that effusion of religious militant enthusiasm now prevalent among the peoples of the Middle East; it has also illustrated to them the ways and means by which subjected peoples can fight their way to liberty against authority. The terroristic methods used by the former Haganah, the Stern gang, and Irgun Zvai Leumi in Palestine both before and after World War II opened the eyes of the Arabs to the effectiveness of such methods.

Although there are other instances in the book where the author rivets his attention on purely local forces and loses sight of the influences emanating from outside, in all fairness it must be stated that in general the book reveals a profound and thorough understanding of the influence of these forces on the domestic and foreign policies of Egypt.

M. Colombe seems to feel that Islam and Western culture are incompatible and he thus expresses surprise that a Western-educated Muslim should remain true to his religious faith. Speaking of the Liberal Constitutionalists he has this to say: "Leurs chefs, tout en étant nourris de culture occidentale, restèrent fidèles à la religion mussulmane." Why in the eyes of some westerners can cultured people be devout Christians but not true Muslims?

This reviewer would take exception to various statements by the author that the fusion between Muslims and Copts in national affairs is still incomplete. He says that Liberal Constitutionalists used to accuse the Wafd of "Coptisme," and referring to the appointment of two Copts (Makram Pasha and Ghali Pasha) as ministers in the Nahhas Pasha government of 1930 says, "Ainsi se reveillèrent les vieilles haines entre les deux éléments de la population dont la fusion aujourd'hui encore, est loin d'être complète." In the opinion of this reviewer unity between Muslims and Copts has prevailed since 1919 and Liberal Constitutionalists are no less proud of their Coptic colleagues than are the Wafd or any other party, for that matter.

In dealing with the Azharites it is noted that during the late reform movement delega-

tions for missionary work were sent to Japan and Africa. It might also have been added that Shaykhs from al-Azhar were also sent to Europe to study philosophy, history, and law in the universities of France, England, and Germany. A correction is also in order here: the author places the college of Dar al-'Ulum and the Elementary Training Colleges under the direction of the Rector. These have always been under the Ministry of Education.

Why should the author contest the idea supported by several writers that Mehemet Ali and Ibrahim were the first promoters of pan-Arabism? We agree with him that at that time there could have been no public opinion clamoring for Arab unity. But the absence of public opinion never blocked the way of reformers or statesmen. National leaders and pioneers of thought usually anticipate the general public by many years. Mehemet Ali was the first in modern times to recruit both Muslims and Christians side by side in his armies. When one considers that he and his son were mustering the peoples east of the Taurus Mountains against the Ottoman Turks, one cannot agree with the author that "le panarabisme d'Ibrahim Pasha ne fut qu'une manœuvre diplomatique destinée à rendre favorable une Europe généralement hostile, en faisant état du sentiment national pour légitimer des ambitions uniquement politiques et territoriales."

The author makes the statement that "dans la certitude qu'il suffisait d'imiter l'Europe pour se hausser du même coup à son niveau, elle n'a retenu que les formes et les aspects extérieurs de sa civilisation. Elle n'a pas tenté d'en pénétrer de d'en assimiler l'esprit." What has been happening in Egypt, as in many other countries, is that the scientific, social, and material progress of the West has been adapted more than copied in a country that is already heir to an ancient civilization which bequeathed many spiritual values. We have been borrowing from the West for over a century and a half and are trying to evolve in literature, art, and industry a cultural pattern of our own unifying the best in both East and West, thus carrying out in the words of the author himself "un mariage de raison entre l'Islam traditionnel et le modernisme occidental."

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The author is mistaken in ascribing to Egypt any intention of exercising hegemony in the Arab world. Egypt, because of its resources, its population, and its important strategic position naturally occupies an important position vis-à-vis the other Arab states. But it is devoid of any ambitions, or dynastic or territorial claim, on any land belonging to the latter. It may even be said that in the opinion of many Egyptians, pan-Arabism for Egypt is more of a liability than an asset.

The above are merely observations and comments after an instructive and delightful survey of the book. It should serve as a scholarly, standard work for those outside Egypt who seek information on the local forces at work in the country. The appendices and bibliography are excellent.

♦ M. RIFAAT, author of *The Awakening of Modern Egypt*, is an adviser to the Egyptian Ministry of Education.

Old and New Forces in Egyptian Education, by Abu Al-Fatouh Ahmad Radwan. New York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1951. 192 pages. \$3.00.

Reviewed by C. Worth Howard

In view of the current concern about the position of Egypt and the Arab world in their relations with the West, Dr. Radwan's assertion in this respect should be noted. The author states that "Egypt has deliberately chosen to be a part of the modern world" and has a "present commitment to science and democracy." Recognizing that Egypt's "culture is undergoing a process of transition and transformation," he, as an educator, is concerned that there be developed "an indigenous civilization that will carry the stamp and characteristics of the land and the people" at the same time that the "benefits of science and democracy" are sought. He warns against both an uncritical glorification of the past and an unappraised adoption of Western materials and methods.

Dr. Radwan first explores the cultural tradition of the country. He shows that in ancient times an essentially scientific attitude prevailed; problems were recognized, solutions sought, and knowledge addressed to practical ends, but theorizing was at a minimum. In the Islamic

period, however, conflicting views about science are discernible — a repudiation of science by recourse to orthodoxy or an acceptance through religious reinterpretation. The author urges that in any talk of modern Egyptians wanting to maintain their Islamic pattern of living and at the same time adopt Western science, there should be certainty about which Islamic pattern is meant.

In both the ancient and Islamic traditions certain principles pointing toward democratic theory and living seem to be implied. It is not argued that the dignity and worth of man or individual freedom was ever fully realized in either system; rather it is admitted that despotic practices too frequently belied these tenets. Dr. Radwan's point is that, fundamentally, Egypt has, in its tradition, viewpoints and beliefs which should make the adoption and development of democratic practices possible.

The second part of the study is an assessment of the country's educational traditions and practices. This is probably the most informative section of the book in spite of the listing of the frequently lamented shortcomings of present-day public education: the lack of initiative, social intelligence, critical powers of thought, and readiness to apply knowledge. In the review of the educational practices preceding the rise of Mehemet Ali Pasha, it is emphasized that only a minute part of the population had any chance of formal education either at the mosque school or at the hands of the Mameluke ruling class, nor did either type of education produce critical thinking and enlightened leadership. For the children of the masses the training given in the field or in the village was sufficient to turn them into "illiterate tools" to continue the status quo.

With the ascendancy of Mehemet Ali, there was no effort to develop a scheme of universal education, even though some improvement in educational methods was made. The Pasha, it is true, was eager to introduce scientific practices and promote industry, as well as to gain military power. Thus a select few were chosen for special training so that they might contribute to the welfare of the state. Dr. Radwan traces what he regards as the development of a more democratic outlook in education after the time of Mehemet Ali, a

development which the British occupation checked and destroyed. The customary charge is made that the British tolerated a scheme of education to provide "submissive government officials" only; nor was this education provided at government expense.

Noting that the history of education since Egypt became independent manifests many negative influences because of viewpoints and practices of the past, the author claims that progress has been made toward a universal system, with free schooling on the primary and secondary levels already assured to boys and girls alike. In his zeal to argue for a complete break, in the earlier stages, between secular and religious education, Dr. Radwan states: "The future of the country . . . makes it desirable that all the children of the nation have one type of education under the supervision and direction of the government. No other agency should share this responsibility with the state." Perhaps the author does not mean this to be as totalitarian as is implied, for surely under the democratic philosophy of education, which he otherwise upholds, it would seem possible and desirable to permit other approaches to education of the young besides that of the state which may not, itself, be certain of its goals, nor consistent or wise. The shortcomings of present-day education in Egypt are not all charged to the schools; the author maintains that society itself has not fully awakened to the needs and demands of modern living.

The third section of the book is devoted to a further analysis of the adjustments of school and society which are necessary if the challenge of the present and future is to be met. Many changes in educational theory and practice are recommended, yet the author fails to make clear how he expects these changes to be effected.

Certainly Dr. Radwan presents clearly and effectively many "old and new forces" which figure in the educational program of present-day Egypt. But by his failure to chart a course for gaining the goals he advocates for the "reconstruction of the program of Egyptian education," and in the light of the tremendous tasks facing the Ministry of Education in offering free and universal education for a

population with a very high percentage of illiteracy, will he not become just one more "voice crying in the wilderness?"

♦ C. WORTH HOWARD is Dean of the American University at Cairo.

INDIA

Education in India, by Aubrey A. Zellner.
New York: Bookman Associates, 1951. 272 pages. \$3.50.

Reviewed by S. G. Khaliq

Dr. Aubrey Zellner's book, *Education in India*, is a fascinating study which can be read profitably by the general reader in this country as well as in the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent. Although the author has a special interest in Bengal, he has narrated the history of the growth and development of educational systems in the whole country from the time of Warren Hastings down to the present day. No important detail has been ignored, and the author has given the political background of the period for the benefit of those who do not know much about it.

This book is welcome because it embodies fresh and impartial views on the subject by a writer who is free from both the old imperialistic bias of the British and the one-sided viewpoint of the Indians who chafed under a foreign domination and therefore looked upon every reform movement with suspicion and distrust. Thus, Dr. Zellner has given credit to the British for establishing many institutions in the country which have imparted permanent benefits; at the same time, he has not hesitated to state that when educational "reform was inaugurated in England, it was not reflected in India except after a long delay." Again, Dr. Zellner believes that "English is a part of Indian culture," but at the same time lays due emphasis on the "rich contribution which the Orient has to make to our troubled Western world."

In this book of less than 300 pages, the author could not go into too many details, but nevertheless he has succeeded in diagnosing the evils of the present-day educational system. In his last chapter, Dr. Zellner analyzes the

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♦ S. G. Khaliq
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problem involved in reorganizing the system and makes some suggestions. Thus, for instance, the author advocates the establishment of open-air schools on a large scale in the country. Considering that in many parts of India the climate is warm throughout most of the year — and this is equally true of Pakistan — it would, perhaps, be worthwhile to try this experiment. Again, Dr. Zellner has very rightly pointed out that there is a lack of coordination between the work done in the school and the country's requirements. As an example he calls attention to the fact that too many lawyers are produced in the country. I would say that this is also true of many other professions.

Another problem encountered is that many children continue to study right up to the matriculation stage without worrying about what they are going to do afterwards. Nor do the teachers have any idea how best to advise the parents about the future careers of their children. However, I believe that educationists in India are already paying attention to this matter.

The problem of handicapped children has received little or no attention from the authorities in the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent so far. In Western countries today such children are assured of getting a suitable education and are also trained for a livelihood. Dr. Zellner has, therefore, very rightly emphasized that this important matter should receive due consideration. The author has also stressed the need for more women teachers in elementary schools. This important need is fully realized by India and Pakistan and one may hope that in the near future more and more women will be forthcoming to run these schools.

*S. G. KHALIQ is an educator who has served as Inspector of Schools in India and Pakistan.

India and British Imperialism, by Gorham D. Sanderson. New York: Bookman Associates, 1951. 383 pages. Index, bibliography. \$4.50.

Reviewed by Taraknath Das

The author of the work under review seeks to fathom the character of British imperialism in India. His main thesis is that British capitalist imperialism kept India politically, eco-

nomically, and culturally fettered and enslaved and thus retarded its progress. Mr. Sanderson begins his study with a chapter entitled "Mother India Before the British Conquest," in which he gives us a summary of the social, economic, and political condition of India — with information gathered from Greek, Chinese, French, and other sources. His conclusion is to the effect that the condition of Hindu India before the advent of the Muslim invasion and domination was that of a prosperous civilized state.

In the chapters "The Genius of British Imperialism" and "Merchants of London Become Mercenary Moguls," Mr. Sanderson, with substantial documentation, exposes the destruction of Indian industries, especially cotton, and the draining of India's wealth under the rule of the East India Company. The author contends that the real intention behind such British projects as the development of tea plantations, railways, irrigation, and public works — to the cost of which the Indian taxpayer contributed — was to make greater profits for the British capitalists. However, this reviewer believes that these British ventures bestowed certain benefits on the Indian people, although British capitalists profited most.

The chapter "The Cleft in the Rock" deals with the rise of Indian nationalism, the struggle for Indian freedom, and the end of British rule in India. It is shocking to read the account of brutal and barbaric measures used by the British authorities to crush the Indian spirit. It also throws some light on the interest of American authorities in extending "dominion status" to India during World War II although Mr. Churchill was opposed to it. Ultimately the British had to withdraw from India because there was no other alternative but to fight it unsuccessfully.

The book is neither a thorough-going economic history of India nor a systematic study of Indian nationalism and the freedom movement. The author has concentrated on his main thesis that the consequences of British imperialism were disastrous for the Indian people. To understand the nature and development of nationalism in India, which is a result of British imperialism, one must have a correct

estimate of the latter. The reviewer feels that the contents of the book will serve as a corrective to those who still think that Britain was in India primarily "to civilise the natives" and "to bear the white man's burden." Thus the work is a valuable contribution toward understanding modern India.

♦ TARAKNATH DAS is Professor of Public Affairs at New York University and Lecturer on Oriental History at Columbia University.

Kingdoms of Yesterday, by Sir Arthur Lothian. London: John Murray, 1951. 228 pages. 21s.

Reviewed by Paul Knaplund

This is a record of experiences, observations, and reflections based on thirty-five years of service in India. From 1910 until 1915 the author held appointments in the provincial government of Bengal. After that he belonged to the Political Department of the Government of India; this meant that he was attached in various capacities and in an ascending scale of importance to the Indian states. At first he held posts in the smaller states of Central India; later he was advanced to Kashmir and Hyderabad. He retired on November 26, 1946, less than a year before Indian independence.

In accordance with the best traditions of the famous Indian civil service, Sir Arthur Lothian took his work seriously; and he seems to have been genuinely devoted to the task of promoting the welfare of the peoples of India. He presents much information about the duties of the British political agents to the princely states and the relations of these states to the Government of India. The book provides revealing glimpses of the problems which beset the British *raj* in India during the eventful years from 1910 to 1946, but little is said about the activities of the Congress Party and Mohandas K. Gandhi. The greatest value of Sir Arthur's story lies in the light which it throws on conditions and personalities. The author writes well and with a certain gusto — his descriptions of Indian scenery are excellent and many of his stories amusing and illuminating. He evidently loved the country. He appreciated that the governments in the princely states had many defects, but that they also had human qualities which helped to ease the

tribulations of their subjects. With considerable bitterness he discusses the betrayal of the Indian princes by the British Government, which abandoned them to the ruthless treatment of the present Government of India.

As the book's title indicates, the author has a sentimental attachment to a vanished era, but his work deserves to be read by all who are interested in India.

♦ PAUL KNAPLUND, author of *The British Empire, 1815-1939*, is Professor of History at the University of Wisconsin.

ISRAEL

My Mission in Israel, by James G. McDonald. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1951. 303 pages. \$3.50.

Reviewed by Kenneth Bilby

The first American ambassador to Israel lived in the midst of great drama for two and a half years. He had an unsurpassed vantage point from which to witness, and participate in, the historic recreation of a Jewish state in the Holy Land. Yet there is little in this recounting of his mission that conveys the color, the excitement, the tumultuous interplay of conflicting events and personalities during Israel's formative years. For this reason, if none other, his book is a disappointing one.

Mr. McDonald reveals himself as uninterested in the grays of life. He is a black and white man. In his book the blacks are the late Ernest Bevin, British Foreign Secretary, and the faceless young men in the U. S. State Department who opposed certain basic Israeli policies. The whites, of course, are all those who saw eye-to-eye with his ardently pro-Israeli beliefs.

One cannot find fault with Mr. McDonald for his admiration of the country and its doughty leaders. Like many other observers, he was gripped by the courageous qualities of the Jewish people in what was certainly one of the most uphill fights that history has known. But, unlike some others, he does not temper his admiration with an impartial analysis of the state's shortcomings (the Israelis, like everybody else, have them). His vignettes of its leaders, for example, are so fulsome, so

lacking the excitement, and even to life in them.

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lacking in rounded character assessment (with the exception of a fine report on Dr. Weizmann, President of Israel), that the Sharett's and Eytan's and Shiloah's simply do not come to life for anyone who has known and observed them.

Most of the author's report deals with his official activities, although he gives ample space, perhaps justifiably, to the perils which confronted him and his family. In describing the routine of his office — the stream of incoming and outgoing reports, the top secret documents, the high level conferences — Mr. McDonald constantly emphasizes the informality of his dealings, the absence of striped pants and protocol.

There is much truth in this, particularly in regard to his dealings with his superiors in the U. S. State Department. He wins for himself a unique niche in ambassadorial annals for the number of end runs he made around the Department. When it adopted a policy that the Ambassador opposed, he simply wrote the President directly — using a personal courier to prevent interception — urging that it be changed. When the State Department supported the Bernadotte Plan before the U. N. General Assembly, he wangled a trip to Paris and opened fire on his bosses by going after people who could influence them.

Ambassador McDonald was amazingly successful in these, and other, circumventions. And if the end justifies the means he was right in his maneuvers, because the policies he opposed were wrong. Nonetheless, one wonders whether the State Department would not soon dissolve in anarchy if the "McDonald Strategy" were pursued by other heads of mission.

In many ways the book is noteworthy for its omissions. Mr. McDonald skirts clear of many internal conflicts, as perhaps an ambassador should, but on such far-ranging issues as the rights or wrongs of terrorist and underground movements, one looks in vain for any forthright conclusions. And on his dealings with the press, normally an important section of ambassadorial memoirs, Mr. McDonald bestows not a line. The fact is, Mr. McDonald generally distrusted the working foreign press, and this distrust was reciprocated.

From the beginning of his mission he strove to maintain an Iron Curtain between his staff and the foreign press. Fortunately for the reporters, many of his underlings felt differently and offered themselves as trustworthy news sources.

Mr. McDonald indicates, without coming right out and saying it, that his mission was a success. The Jewish people, on the whole, and their leaders viewed him as a trusted friend — which indeed he was. He succeeded in preventing any enduring policy breaks between the United States and Israel. He was a staunch and faithful supporter of Zionist aspirations.

The weakness of his mission, a weakness reflected to some extent in the book, stemmed from his ardor for the cause. A professional pro-anything sacrifices a certain freedom of action and decision. And Mr. McDonald is undeniably a professional pro-Zionist. For years he has supported, and been supported by, this cause. Thus, when Mr. McDonald went to Israel as the representative of a foreign power, he actually occupied a dual role — ambassador on the one hand, old-time fighter in the higher councils of Zionism on the other. This ambiguity was noted by more than one Israeli realist who privately yearned for a professional American diplomat who, while friendly, would be a more accurate barometer of State Department and government views. Certainly, the dominant tone of Mr. McDonald's book, apart from its very sincere expressions of admiration for Israel, is one of studied caution in his analysis of the historical events in which he participated. He seems determined not to give the slightest reason for offense to those whom he supports. As an expression of friendship, his book is excellent; as a picture of an exciting and turbulent era, it is poor reporting.

♦ KENNETH BILBY, author of *New Star in the Near East*, was *New York Herald Tribune* correspondent in the Middle East from 1948 to 1949.

Milk and Honey, or Israel Explored, by George Mikes. London: Wingate, 1951. 160 pages. 7s. 6d.

Reviewed by Victor Danon

With utmost tact and finesse, George Mikes performs the delicate operation of analyzing

the composite of an intensely nationalistic people. His only instruments are a keen observation and a sharp sense of humor. The result is a delightful, absorbing account of the state of Israel.

It is to Mr. Mikes credit that during a short stay he grasped many basic characteristics of the new conglomerate of Israel. He is obviously impressed by what he sees but does not hesitate to criticise. The Israeli has done much and is proud of his achievements, but he is irritatingly conceited and refuses criticism. In learning much that is new to him, the Jew seems to have lost his age-old sense of humor. The Israeli is trying to build a distinct way of life, but subconsciously he is copying. And though he devotes himself to his country, that spirit and energy exhibited by the Israeli prior to the attainment of the goal — the creation of the state — has somewhat waned. Thus Mr. Mikes observes, understands, and writes. The reader chuckles and recognizes that the author is no propagandist, that his greatest contribution is his refusal to treat the Israelis with any special consideration. What about treating the Jews, he suggests, neither better nor worse than any other nation in the world?

But however keen an observer Mr. Mikes may be, a four-weeks' stay is not long enough to enable anyone to provide an adequate picture. And indeed Mr. Mikes falls, at times, into the carelessness of a tourist. Nevertheless *Milk and Honey* is a funny book, dealing simply with a subject made unnecessarily touchy. It is a welcome relief from the cumbersomeness of much current literature on the Middle East.

♦ VICTOR DANON, a *sabra* from Israel, is currently a graduate student in the United States.

NORTH AFRICA

Invitation to Morocco, by Rom Landau. London: Faber, 1950. 309 pages. 18s.

The Sultan of Morocco, by Rom Landau. London: Robert Hale, 1951. 108 pages. 7s. 6d.

Reviewed by Benjamin Rivlin

Rom Landau, a prolific British journalist who has written 1 book on art criticism, 2 biographies, 3 works of fiction, 4 autobiographical

works, 5 books on world affairs, and 6 books on philosophy and religion, has in the past two years added two books on Morocco to this voluminous and diverse list.¹ They are the result of three months of travel in Morocco, during which Landau visited most of the country's important cities and picturesque sights with the possible exception of the eastern Oujda district.

Invitation to Morocco is an account of this trip through Morocco. It describes the places he visited, the people he spoke with, and the scenes he witnessed. As a chronicle of a trip through a strange and beautiful country, this book makes fascinating and informative reading. The author's very accurate and discriminating reportorial eye succeeds in conveying what Morocco holds in store for a foreign visitor — from the babel of the city of Tangier to the magic of Marakesh's Place d'Anfa, and from the medieval atmosphere of Fez to the 20th century tempo of Casablanca. It must be admitted that however accurate the descriptive sections of the book may be, they hardly measure up to the exotic charm and beauty of the country. But then — what book could?

It is difficult to consider *Invitation to Morocco* as much more than a book of impressions and descriptions by an observant and thinking traveller. The jacket of the book correctly claims the work to be "far from . . . a tourists' handbook" that travels over "well-trodden ways." However, it fails to live up to the other claims contained on the jacket, namely that as a result of the author's "rare opportunities . . . for comparing the views of the highest and the lowest in the land . . . his assessments of Morocco's present and future importance in the modern world, as well as his enlightened estimates of the French, are of particular value." True, the author's opportunities, including interviews with the Sultan, General Juin, the Pasha of Marakesh (El Glaoui), and the nationalist leader Alal el-Fasi, are certainly rare. But Landau has hardly presented an assessment of Morocco in the modern world. Considering the wide range of the author's interests as manifested by the list of his writings, it is

¹ A third volume on Morocco by Rom Landau, *The Beauty of Morocco* (London: Evans, 1952), has been published since the two under review. (Ed.)

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perhaps too much to have hoped that he would live up to these expectations.

Nevertheless, the book does have merit beyond its very substantial value as a highly readable account of the author's fascinating trip. This added merit lies in the fact that Landau succeeds in touching upon some of the thorny problems of Franco-Muslim relations that are prevalent in Morocco today, and in conveying the general atmosphere of the country. Although his sympathies are clearly with the nationalists, he presents the French point of view fairly. Since the literature on modern Morocco is very thin outside the French language, Landau's touching upon these questions even superficially makes the book valuable and therefore commendable.

With this in mind, Landau's second book, *The Sultan of Morocco*, is much more commendable. This small volume is nothing more than an account of last year's crisis in Morocco and of some of the background leading up to the events which almost culminated in the deposition of the Sultan. Much too little information is available to the general reader about the very important developments that have been taking place in Morocco. Landau's work in part makes up for this dearth of material. In its 100-odd pages he briefly describes the transformation of the present Sultan, Mohammed V, from a young, docile figurehead under complete French domination to a mature, forceful, and independent-thinking sovereign symbolizing and actively fighting for the evolution and independence of his country. He discusses the relationship of the Sultan with the nationalist Istiqlal Party and the cat-and-mouse game that French Resident General Juin played with the Sultan in 1951. It might be argued that in this book Landau lets his pro-nationalist sympathies run free and that the French emerge in none too favorable a light. But the fact is that French behavior during this crisis was not something forthright or praiseworthy.

Despite its meritorious features, *The Sultan of Morocco* has some serious shortcomings. It is extremely superficial. It does not attempt to scratch below the surface to discover what underlying factors may be involved in the crisis. Furthermore, in a book dealing with the Sultan of Morocco it would seem desirable to find

some discussion of the office and role of the Sultan apart from the person who is its present incumbent. The Sultan as a Sharif and his consequent prestige as a religious personage as well as his relationship with the Berber tribes might well have been gone into in greater detail. Landau does not dwell on any subject long enough to develop it adequately. This holds true of both books. Their episodic nature frequently leaves one with the feeling of being left dangling in mid-air. Yet aside from these deficiencies it must be recognized that the author has performed a very useful service in producing these books. He has made it possible for English-speaking persons to be introduced to a country that is attracting more attention each day.

◆ BENJAMIN RIVLIN, a member of the Political Science Department of Brooklyn College, toured French North Africa in the summer of 1951 on a Social Science Research Council travel grant.

SAUDI ARABIA

Tents and Towers of Arabia, by Robert Shaffer. New York: Dodd, Mead Company, 1952. 276 pages. \$4.00.

Reviewed by Jane S. Hart

Robert Shaffer is one of perhaps a hundred Americans to have been a "Jiddawi." Sent to Arabia in 1945 "to help administer the Anglo-American economic program," he fell under the peculiar charm of Jidda and its environs but never overcame his astonishment at the form his life took there. The best of this book contains varied accounts of personal brushes with sand, heat, camels, sharks, servants, and local customs. With relish and some evocative skill, the author recalls Jidda's hot, humid nights, a public execution, the adoption of a gazelle, and an unexpected meeting with King Ibn Saud, to whose strong and benign character he, like so many others, pays tribute.

Jidda has furnished material for many a tall and entertaining tale, and Mr. Shaffer might have done best to specialize in this field. His observations at al-Kharj and Dhahran are neither penetrating nor complete enough to be reliable, and descriptive sections of the Yemen

and the Hajj rely largely on insufficient second-hand material. The book, therefore, fails in analysis, and is only half successful at historical narrative, rich in sensory appeal as it may be. Most readers will wish that it had been more severely edited to refine its style and sharpen its purpose.

◆ JANE S. HART has lived in Saudi Arabia for several years.

TURKEY

The Dark Moment, by Ann Bridge. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1952. 337 pages. \$3.75.

Reviewed by Pamela Burr

The author tells us that into the making of this book went "tenseness, concentration, and excitement." This is not hard to believe. Only the most intense concentration could master the history of that tumultuous decade in which the new Turkish Republic was born, and Ann Bridge's excitement at the spectacle of a dedicated people leads us to suspect that she is as much in love with Turkey as is her English heroine, Fanny Pierce.

Fanny first falls in love with Turkey when, as a child, she is brought by her scholar uncle to Istanbul. There she forms a lasting attachment to an old aristocratic Turkish family whose gracious, peaceful existence is cruelly disturbed, first by war, then by revolution and the inevitable inner conflict that revolution brings. Féridé, Fanny's special friend, lives with her brother Ahmet, and her father and aged grandmother, Réfiyé Hanim, in an old yali up the Bosphorus. Although she respects her father as a good Turkish girl should, she is not his spiritual daughter but a child of her age. When war separates the two friends, each presides as an influence over the life of the other. In England, Fanny broods over the land and family to whom she has given her heart, which like the falcon of the old Turkish song will not come back to her; in Turkey, Féridé, because she has caught something of Fanny's independent English spirit, is enabled to exercise a more effective influence in the Westernization of her country.

During the course of the story Féridé grows in moral stature and at the end of the story, when her husband is the Ghazi's righthand man and she is her husband's respected adviser, she has ripened into a mature woman in whom the wisdom and calm of her grandmother is incarnated. These qualities are tested when her beloved young English friend, Fanny, returning on a visit, falls in love with Atatürk, imperiling the success of his reforms as well as her own personal happiness.

Although Ann Bridge's portrayal of Féridé is an accurate study, so far as it goes, her observations of human nature, her analysis of character, remain more convincing than the scenes in which these characters are left to express themselves through word and deed. Réfiyé Hanim alone is not only worthy of her background, she dominates it. She is more than a type, she is an individual. When she dies it is not only an epoch that has died, but it is as if a woman who has lived and breathed has passed away.

It is in her creation of setting and historical background that Ann Bridge excels. With her command of fact and her searching and rich observation, she transports us where she will. Whether she is describing the six brave little paraffin lamps that illuminate the darkness of Ankara, or the old yali with its "lovely, Persian-patterned, painted ceiling" and "the small, unceasing noise of the waves against the stone embankment," the details are not only accurate, they are artistically right. We can only cry, "It must have been so!"

The historical scene is so extensive as to be imposing. If we are left occasionally breathless by the crowded complexity of events, the fault is less the author's than history's. Turkey's anomalous position in World War I, the ignominy of its defeat, the heroism of its resistance against the Greeks, the forces behind Atatürk's revolution, the influences both personal and political which he exercised to Westernize the nation: all are summarized. If these summaries tend to retard the sweep of the narrative, they yet retain their legitimate position in the pattern of the whole.

The key to this pattern is, of course, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, whom Ann Bridge sees as "the quintessence of spiritual and intellectual force," a force which finds physical expression in "the

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strange, bony face," "the pale, light eyes under fierce, bushy eyebrows" and the grin "like a grimace." As the head of the state he is portrayed as a dynamic figure of whom it is easy to believe that "if he saw a fire he did not send for a fire engine; he went straight up to it and stamped it out with his own feet."

But in his relationship with the characters of the story he remains static. As Fanny's lover he loses conviction and power. He is neither an aloof, historical figure relegated to the background, nor is he reborn in the pages of fiction, caught in those significant moments that vitalize a character. Although the critic may readily perceive why he should remain inviolable, the reader, since he has been conjured out of the shadows, has a natural desire to see him play a more active, vital part upon the stage.

On the whole, however, *The Dark Moment* is a book well worth reading since it interprets one of the most significant periods in the drama of modern history.

PAMELA BURR, author of *My Turkish Adventure*, taught for several years at the American College for Girls in Istanbul.

My Turkish Adventure, by Pamela Burr. New York: Norton, 1951. 219 pages. \$3.00.

Reviewed by Irfan Orga

It is always a disconcerting experience for a native to read what the foreigner writes about him. But Pamela Burr's *My Turkish Adventure* is such a delightfully unsophisticated account of personal reminiscences that he can read it without raising an eyebrow at the preposterous allegations made about him.

Miss Burr has a good deal to say about the children she taught at the American College for Girls in Istanbul. However, as some of these children were not Turkish, and the few who were concealed their identities under the handsome compliments they paid their teachers, we cannot hope to get a clear picture of the Turks from them. To be guilty of generalization is dangerous, but on the whole children are liberal minded, and no matter what their nationality are unable to appreciate even the most obvious forms of humor when related to themselves. It is all the more difficult when the kind of humor is alien and may seem to touch

upon matters sacred to their pride. Thus, when Miss Burr tells us of the unfortunate teacher who told her class of gum-chewing students that they were like cows, it must be remembered that not only do the Turks never compare each other to animals but that the children to whom she spoke had not been brought up to appreciate the harmless humor of the expression "chewing the cud."

Pictures of Bayrams, the Turkish feast days, are presented through letters from children unable to express themselves with dignity. I think this a pity, and would much rather Miss Burr had described them to us in her grammatical English. She writes politely, though very much with her tongue in her cheek, regarding the new citizen of Turkey trying to buy high marks for his daughter's poor work by giving expensive presents to the teachers. Miss Burr's observations in this respect are shrewd and accurate, if understated.

Miss Burr tells us that "the magic word American" ran "through her work like a refrain," but she must not let this surprise her since, for the Turk, there is as much magic in the word "Frenchman" or "Englishman." It has always been part of tradition that the foreigner is an honored guest in the country, just as it is part of Turkish *surface* politeness that the foreigner is always right and his opinions must be listened to with respect since he comes from "outside" and may have something useful to contribute. The Turk, even the Turkish child, can never bear to reveal himself wholly. Compliments shrill off his tongue all the more readily because he knows them to be meaningless and it is one method of keeping the inquisitive alien at bay.

Miss Burr is at her best when she is descriptive. Here and there through the pages of her book one sees pictures of Istanbul — the shabby soldiery in the streets, the tawdry elegance. One feels the atmosphere of the covered market and the sweating humanity crowded into its gloominess. The clanging trams are heard weaving their perilous course through the narrow streets, and the curses of the drivers when careless pedestrians step in their path. One even sees the skyline at night during Bayram time, when the electric candles ring the minarets with unwinking gold. These passages enchanted me and

I was unwilling to be led away from them to the lumpy children expressing themselves artificially in bad English.

There is only one serious error in the book and that concerns the famous Enver Pasha. Miss Burr relates that "he died mysteriously in Kurdistan," whereas it is a well-known fact that he was killed by the Russians on August 4, 1922, on Çegen Hill in Turkistan, where he is buried. The circumstances of his death are fully described by the noted Turkish historian Feridun Kandemir and it is a pity that Miss Burr was misinformed on this important point.

♦ IRFAN ORGA, a Turk, is the author of *Portrait of a Turkish Family*.

ALSO NOTED

General

The Arab Countries of the Near East and Their Jewish Communities, by Nehemiah Robinson. New York: Institute of Jewish Affairs, 1951. 83 pages. \$1.20. Mimeographed. A survey of the main features of the Arab states and the position of the Jews within them.

Blood, Oil & Sand, by Ray Brock. Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1952. 256 pages. \$3.50. A journalist's interpretation of current events in the area.

* *Britain and Middle East Development*. London: Central Office of Information, 1951. 51 pages. Covers the activities of Great Britain in the economic development of the Middle East since the 19th century. Describes the work of the British Middle East Office in the field of technical assistance.

* *The British Middle East Office*. (ID 1114) New York: British Information Services, 1951. 6 pages. Mimeographed.

* *British Policy in the Middle East — Recent Statements*. (ID 1061) New York: British Information Services, 1951. 5 pages. Mimeographed.

The Destiny of Isabelle Eberhardt, by Cecily Mackworth. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1951. 158. The story of a Russian girl who lived as an Arab man in North Africa.

The Foreign Policy of Palmerston, 1830-1841, by Charles Webster. London: G. Bell, 1951. 2 volumes. 910 pages. 63s.

Homo Aeconomicus Islamicus, by J. Hans. Klagenfurt, Austria: Hans, 1952. 150 pages. \$2.50. A survey in German of the economic concepts and

practices of Islam together with their modern-day application in Islamic countries.

Ibn Khaldūn and Tamerlane: Their Historic Meeting in Damascus, 1401 A.D., by Walter J. Fischel. Berkeley: University of California, 1952. x+149 pages. \$2.75. A study based on Arabic manuscripts of Ibn Khaldūn's autobiography.

Ibn Sina: Livre des Directives et des Remarques. Paris: J. Vrin, 1951. 554 pages. Translated from the Arabic with introduction and notes by A. M. Goichon.

De Kaboul au Golfe Persique, by François Balsan. Paris: Peyronnet, 1951. Illustrations, maps. 400 fr.

Leopard in the Grass, by Desmond Stewart. New York: Farrar, Straus & Young, 1952. \$3.00. A novel concerning a young English archaeologist who becomes involved in Middle Eastern politics.

Naval Wars in the Levant, 1571-1853, by R. C. Anderson. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952. ix + 619 pages. Illustrations, maps. \$7.50.

* *Research on India, Pakistan, Nepal, Afghanistan, Iran, and Iraq*. Washington: Dept. of State, 1952. 8 pages. Research List No. 10. A list of research projects recently completed or about to be completed, including some projects completed since 1941 but not published.

* *Research on the Near East*. Washington: Dept. of State, 1952. 8 pages. Research List No. 9. Research projects completed or about to be completed.

La Vie Quotidienne des Musulmans au Moyen Age, by A. Mazaheri. Paris: Hachette, 1952. 600 fr.

Egypt

* *Anglo-Egyptian Conversations on the Defence of the Suez Canal and on the Sudan*. London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1951. 47 pages. 1s. 3d. Covers the period December 1950 to November 1951.

* *The Background of Anglo-Egyptian Relations*. New York: British Information Services, 1951. (ID 735, Revised) 10 pages.

Christian Egypt: Church and People, by Edward R. Hardy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1952. 176 pages. \$3.00. A survey from early times to the present.

* *The Cry of Egypt's Copts: Documents on Christian life in Egypt today*. New York: Phoenix Press, 1951. 24 pages.

Egypt and the Roman Empire, by Allan C. Johnson. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1951. vii + 183 pages. \$3.50. Jerome Lectures, Second Series.

Egypt Trade Statistics. Cairo: Government Press, 1951. A special classification for international use up to the year 1947.

* *Records of Conversations, Notes and Papers Exchanged Between the Royal Egyptian Government and the United Kingdom Government*. Cairo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1951. 195 pages. Covers the revision of the 1936 treaty in regard to the defense of Egypt, including the conversations between Field Marshall Sir William Slim and Prime Minister Mustafa al-Nahhas Pasha

* Pamphlets and documentary material marked with an asterisk may not be ordered through the Book Purchase Service.

during the period March 1950 to November 1951. Also covers the future status of the Sudan.

Eritrea and Ethiopia

Islam in Ethiopia, by J. Spencer Trimingham. New York: Oxford University Press, 1952. 304 pages. Maps. \$5.00.

* *Progress Report of the United Nations Commissioner in Eritrea, during the year 1951*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1951. 182 pages. (1951, A/1959) (P/51-25314). Contains historical background, terms of reference and appointment of the U.N. Commissioner in Eritrea; activities of the Commissioners; developments in Eritrea.

India

Agricultural Marketing in India, by K. R. Kulkarni. Bombay: The Co-operators' Book Depot, 1951. xviii+512 pages. Rs.20/-. A concise textbook with special reference to cooperative marketing of agricultural produce in India.

The Christian Task in Independent India, by Aiyaduvai Jesudasan. New York: Macmillan, 1952. 159 pages. \$2.50. An Indian Bishop examines the challenge and opportunities which independence has brought to the Christian church.

The English Factories in India, by Sir Charles Fawcett. Volume II (New Series). New York: Oxford University Press, 1952. 486 pages. Plates, map. \$8.50. Covers the eastern coast and Bengal.

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* *Legal Aspects of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Question*. New York: British Information Services, 1951. (ID 1063) 15 pages. Mimeographed.

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* *Assistance to Palestine Refugees*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1951. 48 pages. 50¢. The report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Middle East.

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Prepared by Sidney Glazer, Consultant in Near East Bibliography, Library of Congress

With contributions from: Elizabeth Bacon, Richard Ettinghausen, Sidney Glazer, Harold W. Glidden, Harvey P. Hall, Louis E. Leopold, Jr., George C. Miles, Leon Nemoy, M. Perlmann, C. Rabin, Mohammed Rashti, and Andreas Tietze.

Note: It is the aim of the Bibliography to present a selective and annotated listing of periodical material dealing with the Middle East generally since the rise of Islam. In order to avoid unwarranted duplication of bibliographies already dealing with certain aspects and portions of the area, the material included will cover only North Africa and Muslim Spain, the Arab world, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Turkey, the Transcaucasian states of Soviet Russia, Iran, Afghanistan, and Turkestan. An attempt is made to survey all periodicals of importance in these fields. The ancient Near East and Byzantium are excluded; so also Zionism, Palestine, and Israel in view of the current, cumulative bibliography in this field: *Zionism and Palestine*, a publication of the Zionist Archives and Library in New York.

Greater completeness of the Bibliography would be ensured if authors would be kind enough to mail offprints of their articles, especially when published in the less accessible journals, to the following address: Dr. Sidney Glazer, 147-22 Village Road (Apt. B), Jamaica 2, New York, U.S.A.

For list of abbreviations, see page 280.

GEOGRAPHY

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- 4710 K., G. H. T. and W., D. L. "Egypt." *Focus* 2 (D '5 '51) 1-5. Background data and geographical interpretation of the Suez and Sudan issues.
- 4711 BLACHÈRE, R. "Note sur le nom géographique ar-Rub' al-hālī." *J. Asiatique* (Paris) 239, no. 2 (1951) 209-10. The name does not appear before Burckhart; the old name is Dahnā.
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- 4714 BEYER, GUSTAV. "Die kreuzfahrergebiete Suedpalaestinas." *Beiträge zur Biblischen Landes- und Altertumskunde* (continuing ZDPV) 68, no. 2-3 (1950-1) 148-92; 249-81.
- 4715 BRASLAWSKI, J. "Genizah fragments concerning Acre and Byblos." (in Hebrew) *Eretz Israel* (Jerusalem) 1 (1951) 153-7. Analysis of Arabic documents.
- 4716 FULTON, A. S. "A Persian historical manuscript. *Brit. Museum Quart.* 16 (Ap '51) 39. A ms. of *Mir'at-i jahān-numā* by Muh. Baqā Sahāranpūri written in 1095 H. (A.D. 1684). Of special interest is the account of the first ten years of Aurangzeb's reign, since the author lived in close contact with the emperor.
- 4717 GOITEIN, S. D. "Did the caliph Omar prohibit the Jews from residing in Jerusalem?" (in Hebrew) *Melilah* (Manchester) 3-5 (1950) 156-65. Of Christian origin, the story came into vogue among the Muslim authors through Sayf. b. 'Umar, but it has no foundation in fact.
- 4718 HIRSCHBERG, J. W. "Notes on the debts of the Jews of Jerusalem in 1775." (in Hebrew) *Eretz Israel* 1 (1951) 58-68. Text and analysis of an official Arabic document.

- 4719 IZEDDIN, M. "Deux voyageurs du XV^e siècle en Turquie." *J. Asiatique* 239, no. 2 (1951) 159-74. Bertrand de la Broquière in 1432 in Murad II's Adrianople; Pero Tafur, a Spaniard, visited the Levant and the shores of the Black Sea and developed a high opinion of the Turks.
- 4720 LANG, D. M. "Count Todtleben's expedition to Georgia (1769-1771) according to a French eyewitness." *Bull. Schools of Orient. and Afr. Stud.* 13, no. 4 (1951) 878-907. Annotated French text of the *Rélation* by Captain de Grailly de Foix, who took part in a mutiny against Todtleben.
- 4721 LEWIS, B. "The legend of the Jewish origin of the Fatimid caliphs." (in Hebrew) *Melilah* 3-4 (1950). Study of the various forms of the legend which served to defame the dynasty.
- 4722 MAYER, L. A. "As-Sinnabra." (in Hebrew) *Eretz Israel* 1 (1951) 169-70. A note on historical topography.
- 4723 MINORSKY, V. "Caucasica II. The Georgian Maliks of Ahar." *Bull. Schools of Orient. and Afr. Stud.* 13, no. 4 (1951) 868-77. A Muslim-Georgian dynasty in the 11th-13th cent., with an appendix on the Princes Orbeli in the 12th cent.
- 4724 PIGULEVSKAYA, N. V. "The laws of the Himyarites." (in Russian) *Vizantiiski Vremennik* 3 (1951) 51-61. This 6th cent. dispute with South-Arabian Jews is to be interpreted as a reflection of Byzantine social structure and an attempt to impress the South Arabians with the regime.
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- 4733 HYSLOP, J. R. "Britain's achievements in the Sudan." *New Commonwealth* (London) 22 (D '51) 413-4. A review of progress from the British point of view.
- 4734 KHADDURI, MAJID. "Coups and counter-coups in the Yaman 1948." *Internat. Aff.* 38 (Ja '52) 59-68. Chronicle of the events following the assassination of Imam Yahya.
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- 4738 MILLER, A. "The American scheme of seizing Constantinople and the Straits in 1919." (in Russian) *Voprosy Ist.* (Mr '51) 61-79. The temporary rise of isolationism in the U.S., Wilson's defeat, not to mention Soviet resistance, thwarted the plot.
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- 4740 SHIN'AR, P. "The nationalist movement in Morocco, II." (in Hebrew, English

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- 4727 "Troubles over Tunisia." *Economist* (Ja 26 '52) 216.
- 4728 BENTWICH, NORMAN. "The Middle East and the United Nations." *Middle East Aff.* (New York) 2 (N '51) 351-60. Useful summary of U.N. action in the Middle East which, compared with the organization's efforts in other parts of the world, has had appreciable and beneficial results.
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- 4741 SHWADRAN, BENJAMIN. "Egypt before the Security Council." *Middle East. Aff.* 2 (D '51) 383-400. Detailed account of the steps that led to the passing of the Council resolution urging Egypt to end its restrictions on shipping through the Suez Canal, with a summary of the arguments of Egypt, Israel, and Great Britain.
- 4742 TADMOR, GIDEON. "Syria in its revolutions." (in Hebrew) *Beterem* (Tel Aviv) (Ja '52) 39-43. Believes that the Shishakli regime may enter into cooperation with Akram Hourani's agrarian-reform "Arab Socialist Party" (of which an interesting description is given).
- 4743 WECHSBERG, JOSEPH. "Letter from Libya." *New Yorker* (N 10 '51) 121-8. Describes the political and economic situation.
- See also 4710, 4753, 4759, 4760, 4764, 4766, 4774, 4776, 4777.

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- 4745 "Agricultural income in Egypt." *Econ. Bull.* no. 3 (1951) 181-6. Analysis of data for 1948/9.
- 4746 "The cement industry in Egypt." *Econ. Bull.* no. 4 (1950) 242-6.
- 4747 "The cotton textile industry in Egypt." *Econ. Bull.* no. 2 (1951) 95-103.
- 4748 "Egypt toys with boycott." *Economist* 162 (Ja 12 '52) 95. Discusses the possibility of an all-out boycott against Great Britain.
- 4749 "Egypt's balance of payments for the year 1950." *Econ. Bull.* no. 2 (1951) 104-9.
- 4750 "Growing importance of Kuwait emphasized by Persian crisis." *Petroleum Times* 56 (Ja 11 '52) 10-11.
- 4751 "Inauguration of Basra Petroleum Company's Zubair oilfield." *Petroleum Times* 56 (Ja 11 '52) 3-4.
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- 4755 "Postwar trends in Egypt's foreign trade." *Econ. Bull.* no. 2 (1951) 110-8.
- 4756 "World Bank plan for Persia." *Petroleum Times* 56 (Ja 11 '52) 30.
- 4757 BAER, GABRIEL. "Problems of land tenure in Syria and Iraq." (in Hebrew, with English summary.) *Hamizrah Hehadash* 3 (Autumn '51) 23-32. Analysis of recent statistics. Polarization of land tenure is highest of all Arab states in Iraq (80% of land owned by 1.5% of owners); it is high in the cereal-growing parts of Syria where state land is also passing into private hands. Comments on the Syrian draft law for agrarian reform.
- 4758 EL-BARAWY, RASHED. "The taxation system in Egypt." *Middle East. Aff.* 2 (D '51) 401-10. A technical discussion of the system of direct taxation which is based on the nature of the source rather than on ability to pay.
- 4759 FRASER, SIR WILLIAM. "Anglo-Iranian Oil Company." *Gt. Brit. and East* (Ja '52) 33. Full statement on the situation in Iran by the chairman of the company.
- 4760 LEITH-ROSS, FREDERICK. "Financial and economic developments in Egypt." *Internat. Aff.* 38 (Ja '52) 29-37. Treats only the postwar period.
- 4761 OKYAR, OSMAN. "The national income of Turkey." *Middle East. Aff.* 2 (N '51) 361-6. The Turkish Government's establishment in the Central Office of Statistics of a new "national income unit" will doubtless yield interesting and valuable information on the structure and evolution of the national economy.
- 4762 POTTER, FRANK D. "Kingdoms of oil: Kuwait, II." *World Oil* 134 (Ja '52) 232-4.
- 4763 SPANN, ROBERT E. "Egypt—the next Iran?" *World Oil* 134 (Ja '52) 246-7.
- 4764 STAUFFER, THOMAS B. "Labor unions in the Arab states." *Middle East J.* 6 (Winter '52) 83-8. Status of the unions and their affiliations, both Communist and non-Communist.
- 4765 YAARI, S. "The economic relations between Syria and Lebanon." *Middle East. Aff.* 2 (O '51) 315-22. Lebanon has been hard hit by the abolition of the customs union. Although Syria is now enjoying an extraordinary import boom (due to the disturbed state of world markets and an abnormal rise in the prices of primary articles), its future prosperity will depend on closer economic collaboration with her neighbor, perhaps in a form radically different from that which existed until the abrogation of the Common Interests Convention in March 1950.

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- 4766 "The Arab refugees." *Economist* (Ja '52) 28.
- 4767 ANDERSON, J. N. D. "Homicide in Islamic law." *Bull. Schools of Orient. and Afr. Stud.* 13, no. 4 (1951) 811-28. The concept of the offense: tort or crime? Degrees of homicide. The question of guilt and responsibility.
- 4768 ANDERSON, J. N. D. "Recent developments in *shari'a* law, VI." *Muslim World* 42 (Ja '52) 33-47. Reforms in the laws dealing with testamentary bequests have been slower than those concerned with marriage and divorce because the issue is regarded as less urgent on social grounds and because Egypt, the leading Arab country in these matters, is preparing a comprehensive code rather than individual legislative acts.
- 4769 BARZILAI (HADDAD), EZRA. "Jewish educational institutions in Iraq." (in Hebrew) *Yalqut Ha-Mizrah Ha-Tikhon* (Jerusalem) 3 (S '51) 11-6. Interesting data on the school system prior to the recent migration to Israel.
- 4770 BENOR, Y. L. "Arab education in Israel." (in Hebrew, English summary) *Hamizrah Hehadash* 3 (Autumn '51) 1-7. Statistics; discussion of the problems of the teaching of Arabic and Hebrew (experiments with teaching reading through the medium of colloquial Arabic); the Circassian and Maronite groups.
- 4771 CRAGG, KENNETH A. "The Christian church and Islam today." *Muslim World* 42 (Ja '52) 11-22. Some reflections on the nature of the possible Christian spiritual aid to Muslims, particularly the Palestinian Arab refugees, in their present moral and physical crisis.
- 4772 DONALDSON, DWIGHT M. "Suggestions for friends of Muslims." *Muslim World* 42 (Ja '52) 1-7. Aspects of religious freedom, advantages of the individual family, opposition to the seclusion of women, distinguishing Christianity from Judaism, and understanding of youth problems should be included in the modern Christian approach to the Muslims.
- 4773 GIBB, H. A. R. "La réaction contre la culture occidentale dans le proche orient." *Cahiers de l'Orient Contemp.* no. 1 (1951) 1-10. To save Islamic culture as such, the younger generation of Muslim intelligentia must come to grips with the fundamentals of creative Western thought.
- 4774 LEWIS, BERNARD. "Islamic revival in Turkey." *Internat. Aff.* 38 (Ja '52) 38-48.
- "If the revival continues to grow in strength and momentum at the present rate," concludes the author, "it is not impossible that even these reforms [the social legislation of the Republic] may be endangered."
- 4775 PATAI, RAPHAEL. "The Middle East as a culture area." *Middle East J.* 6 (Winter '52) 1-21. The area from Morocco to the Indus valley and from the Black and Caspian seas to approximately latitude 12° N holds in common a number of environmental and cultural characteristics; these characteristics are lucidly set forth.
- 4776 SHAH, IKBAL ALI. "Modern movements in the world of Islam." *Contemp. Rev.* (London) 1034 (F '52) 78-82. The author feels that pan-Islamic sentiment is deepening. A trip throughout the Islamic world has proved that appearances to the contrary "there is a totally unsuspected wealth of constructive thinking at work which cannot but have its effect as a force for good in the fullness of time."
- 4777 THOMAS, LEWIS V. "Recent developments in Turkish Islam." *Middle East J.* 6 (Winter '52) 22-40. Contrary to other competent observers, Thomas feels that reports of a resurgence of Islam in Turkey with anti-Western implications are greatly exaggerated.
- 4778 TRITTON, A. S. "Popular Shi'ism." *Bull. Schools of Orient. and Afr. Stud.* 13, no. 4 (1951) 829-39. A summary of the description of religious materials unpublished in the "Reasons for Laws" (*Ilal ash-sharā'i*) of Muḥ. b. 'Alī b. Bābūya (died 381/991 A.D.).
- 4779 UPPER, CLAUDIA REED. "Al-Ghazālī's thought." *Muslim World* 42 (Ja '52) 23-32. Analysis of his views concerning the nature of man's intelligence and relation with God. An attempt to show how the philosopher combined orthodoxy and mysticism, permitting intellect and ecstasy to work together without conflict.
- 4780 WILBER, DONALD N. "The structure and position of Islam in Afghanistan." *Middle East J.* 6 (Winter '52) 41-8. The Muslim clergy still hold a position of considerable power largely owing to their control of schools and law courts.

SCIENCE

(General, history)

- 4781 DUNLOP, D. M. "The existence and definition of philosophy." *Iraq* (London) 13, no. 2 (Autumn '51) 76-93. From a Bodleian ms. ascribed to al-Fārābī.
- 4782 RABIN, CH. "The history of the translation into Hebrew of the Canon of Ibn Sina."

(in Hebrew) *Melilah* 3-5 (1950) 132-47. Translated in the 13th cent. in Rome, with two other such attempts on record, the huge volume was printed in 1491 in Naples and was used by Vesalius.

ART

(*Archaeology, architecture, epigraphy, numismatics, minor arts, painting and music, manuscripts and papyri*)

- 4783 AGA-OGU, KAMER. "Blue-and-white porcelain plates made for Moslem patrons." *Far East. Ceramic Bull.* 3 (S '51) 12-6. Discussion of 3 Chinese plates of the late 17th or early 18th cent. which show progressive deterioration of the Arabic script used in the decoration.
- 4784 AGA-OGU, MEHMET. "Memorandum on the Corpus of Islamic Metalwork." *Ars Islamica* 15-16 (1951) 133-5. An outline of the projected Corpus by the late art historian. Of the planned 12 volumes, only the first part of the first volume is completed.
- 4785 AL-ASIL, NAJL. "Treasures of sculpture from the desert fortress of Hatra: Parthian and Aramean art." *Illus. London News* 219 (N 17 '51) 806-7, with 11 illust. A preliminary report about the finds of the first season which greatly enrich our knowledge of the art and religion of the Parthians.
- 4786 BADER, O. N. "A Sasanian vessel from Kungar." *Ars Islamica* 15-16 (1951) 139-42. Translation of a Russian article dealing with a boat-shaped silver vessel of the Sasanian period with unusual decorations. Postscript by R. Ettinghausen.
- 4787 BORN, WOLFGANG. "A lacquer-painted canteen." *Ars Islamica* 15-16 (1951) 137-9. Discussion of a papier maché canteen with lacquer paintings of a garden scene (probably Ottoman Turkish, 16th cent.) in the Arms Collection of the Neue Hofburg, Vienna. Illust.
- 4788 CAHEN, CLAUDE. "Documents relatifs à quelques techniques irakiennes au début de l'onzième siècle." *Ars Islamica* 15-16 (1951) 23-8. Edition of an Arabic text dealing with the manufacture of gold thread with a French translation; short comments on the ms. and this particular passage.
- 4789 COOMARASWAMY, A. K. "Note on the philosophy of Persian art." *Ars Islamica* 15-16 (1951) 125-8. Interpretation of Persian texts, especially those dealing with mysticism, and their significance for the understanding of art.
- 4790 DAVID-WEILL, JEAN "Encore une 'formule banale'." *Ars Islamica* 15-16 (1951) 136-7. Brief discussion of an unhistorical Kufic inscription carved in stucco and found in Susa.
- 4791 DIMAND, MAURICE S. "A Saljuk incense burner." *Metropolitan Museum of Art Bull.* 10 (Ja '52) 150-3. Describes the largest piece of Saljuk bronze sculpture from Iran found to date, an incense burner in the shape of a feline with bull's legs, made in 577 H. (A.D. 1181-3) for the amir Sayf al-Dunya wal-Din Muhammad al-Mawardi. The piece is also said to be signed by the artist, but his name is not given. Illust.
- 4792 ERDMANN, KURT. "Die entwicklung der Sāsānidischen krone." *Ars Islamica* 15-16 (1951) 87-123. Systematic and critical study of the Sasanian crowns as shown on coins, rock reliefs, and art objects. With appendices on the "hanging crown" and "the diadem." Illust.
- 4793 ERDMANN, KURT. "'Fatimid' rock crystals." *Oriental Art* 3, no. 4 (1951) 142-6. Traces the development from the early 9th to the middle of the 11th cent. of the medieval Muslim rock crystal carvings, which have so far been attributed to the Fatimid period. Illust.
- 4794 GRAY, BASIL. "Blue and white vessels in Persian miniatures of the 14th and 15th centuries re-examined." *Trans. of the Orient. Ceramic Soc.* 24 (1948-49) 23-30. Deals with Chinese blue and white porcelains or their Persian copies of the Timurid period as shown in Persian miniatures. Four paintings from a newly discovered *Jāmi' al-tawārikh* by Rashid al-Din, early 15th cent., belonging to the Asiatic Society of Bengal, are illustrated.
- 4795 GRAY, BASIL. "Islamic art at the Indian exhibition, Royal Academy, London, November 1947 to February 1948." *Ars Islamica* 15-16 (1951) 145-9. A discussion of paintings of the imperial Mogul and provincial courts (mostly unpublished); all exhibited in London. Illust.
- 4796 GODARD ANDRÉ. "L'origine de la madrasa, de la mosquée et du caravansérail à quatre iwāns." *Ars Islamica* 15-16 (1951) 1-9. The house with four iwāns in Khorasan is the origin of the madrasa with four iwāns which in turn served as a model for the mosque with four iwāns and the caravanserai with four iwāns. Illust.
- 4797 KELSO, JAMES L. "The ghosts of Jericho." *Natl. Geog. Mag.* 100 (D '51) 825-44. Popular account of an archaeological expedition.
- 4798 KÜHNEL, ERNST. "The Islamic department of the Berlin museum." *Ars Islamica* 15-16 (1951) 143-5. The history of the Islamic art collections during World War II

- and immediately afterwards—the losses, damages, and reconstruction.
- 4799 LAMM, CARL JOHAN. "A fragment of an early carpet in Stockholm." *Ars Islamica* 15-16 (1951) 135-6. Excavated in Egypt, probably in Fustât.
- 4800 MATHEW, GERVAISE. "A medieval Islamic kingdom off the Tanganyika coast." *Illust. London News* 219 (O 13 '51) 591-3. Discusses the palaces, mosques, and other structures of the Kilwa kings on Kilwa and Songo Muara Islands in the Indian Ocean, mostly dating from the 14th and 15th centuries. Fine photographs.
- 4801 MAYER, L. A. "Literature on Islamic art published in Palestine, Iraq, and Egypt during the war years." *Ars Islamica* 15-16 (1951) 154-61. A critical review of the materials published in European languages and Arabic, including the more popular magazines.
- 4802 MONTE SANTO, MARCIA. "La ceramica di Lindo (Rodi)." *Faenza* 27 no. 1 (1951) 5-13. The author tries to show that the famous so-called Rhodian wares of the 16th and 17th centuries, usually attributed to Iznik in Anatolia, should be regarded, at least partially, as products of Lindos on the Island of Rhodes. *Illust.*
- 4803 RABINO DI BORGOMALE, H. L. "La sigillographie iranienne moderne." *J. Asiatique* (Paris) 239 no. 2 (1951) 193-208.
- 4804 RAGONA, NINO. "Le ceramiche arabe del 'casale' di Piazza Armerina." *Faenza* 36 no. 6 (1950) 124-7. The Piazza Armerina museum in Sicily contains many glazed and unglazed sherds from excavations which testify to the activity of Muslim potters in Sicily.
- 4805 REITLINGER, GERALD. "Unglazed relief pottery from northern Mesopotamia." *Ars Islamica* 15-16 (1951) 11-22. Systematic discussion of the large unglazed storage jars with *barbotine* and engraved decorations and their development in 3 styles from the 9th century to the Mongol period. A list of the known pieces is appended. *Illust.*
- 4806 RICE, D. S. "A miniature in an autograph of Shihâb al-Din b. Faḍlallâh al-'Umari." *Bull. Schools of Orient. and Afr. Stud.* 13 no. 4 (1951) 856-67. A leaf of a book (*Dam'at al-bâki*) written in 1345 A.D., with a scene depicting a snow fall (?). Discussion of Damascene paintings of the period. *Illust.*
- 4807 RITTER, HELLMUT. "Ueber einige regeln die beim drucken mit arabischen typen zu beachten sind." *ZDMG* (Weisbaden) 100 no. 2 (1950) 377-80. Suggestions on casting and proof-reading; usually neglected variations of letter shapes in certain combinations.
- 4808 SAUVAGET, JEAN. "Une representation de la citadelle seljoukide de Merv." *Ars Islamica* 15-16 (1951) 128-32. Interpretation of a silver platter in the Hermitage Museum in Leningrad; according to the author, an historical event in the citadel of Merv—the attempted assassination of the Sultan Sanjar by two Ismaili *fida'i*—is represented. *Illust.*
- 4809 SCHLUMBERGER, DANIEL. "The great palace of Mahmud in Afghanistan." *Illust. London News* 218 (Je 16 '51) 973. Continuation of an earlier report (March 25, '50) in the same journal. Specially important for the announcement of newly discovered wall-paintings of about 50 guards on the walls of the "audience hall" and of colonettes with painted human figures in the banquet room. *Illust.*
- 4810 SERJEANT, R. B. "Material for a history of Islamic textiles up to the Mongol period." *Ars Islamica* 15-16 (1951) 29-85. Deals with textiles and *tirâz* in Spain, the Maghreb, Sicily, and Asia Minor. With added chapters on sea-wool, technical methods, dyers, furs, costume, the Kaaba coverings, Indian and Chinese influences, and early trade routes.
- 4811 SHEPHERD, DOROTHY G. "The third silk from the tomb of St. Bernard Calvo." *Bull. of the Cleveland Museum of Art* 39 (Ja '52) 12-4. Discussion of the style of this textile with eagles holding lions in their talons; attributed to an 11th cent. Muslim workshop in Spain imitating Byzantine models.
- 4812 WILKINSON, J. V. S. "Some Persian drawings in the Johnson albums at the India Office, London." *Ars Islamica* 15-16 (1951) 132-3. Six line drawings of the mid-Safavid period, all unpublished.
- 4813 ZBISS, SLIMAN-MOSTFA. "Contribution à l'étude de la céramique tunisienne d'époque musulmane: trois fragments d'époque ziride." *Rev. Archéologique* 6 (Ja '51) 47-55. Detailed analysis of three sherds of an enamelled plate with Kufic inscriptions painted in brown on yellowish background; analogous characters on tombstones fix their date as first third of the 11th cent. The sherds were found in the necropolis of the Khurasani rulers, in Tunis. *Illust.*
- See also 4901.

LANGUAGE

- 4814 BEESTON, A. F. L. "Phonology of the epigraphic South Arabian unvoiced sibilants." *Trans. Philol. Soc.* (1951) 1-26. Important contribution to the difficult problem of Semitic sibilants. Proves that South Arabian retained three distinct sibilants to the end.

- 4815 MALOV, S. E. "Turkisms in Old Russian." (in Russian) *Ivest. Akad. Nauk, Otdel. lit. i yaz.* 10 (Ap. '51) 201-3.
- 4816 MUNZEL, KURT. "Zur wortstellung der ergänzungsfragen im Arabischen." *ZDMG* 100 no. 2 (1950) 566-76. The final position of the question, especially in the Egyptian dialect, is of ancient Arabic origin, and is to be considered as an indicator of varying emotional emphasis.
- 4817 NEMETH, L. "Le système des noms de peuples turcs." *J. Asiatique* 239 no. 1 (1951) 69-70. No trace of totemism.
- 4818 RICHARD, JEAN. "La limite occidentale de l'expansion de l'alphabet ouigour." *J. Asiatique* 239 no. 1 (1951) 71-6. Among the Comans of Southern Russia.
- 4819 RÖSSLER, OTTO. "Verbalbau und verbal-flexion in den semitischen sprachen. *ZDMG* 100 no. 2 (1950) 461-514. Outline of an ambitious study of a comparative Semitic-Hamitic grammar that seeks to trace linguistic development over ten millennia.
- 4820 VON GABAIN, ANNEMARIE. "Die pronomina in alttürkischen." *ZDMG* 100 no. 2 (1950) 581-91. Data from various sources (including unpublished mss.) demonstrating the existence of an Altaic linguistic stock, even though many elements are still unstable.

LITERATURE

- 4821 AFFIFI, A. E. "The influence of hermetic literature on Moslem thought." *Bull. Schools of Orient. and Afr. Stud.* 13 no. 4 (1951) 840-55. Evidence that the hermetic writings were available in Arabic, and a study of their influence upon Ibn Sina, Ibn Tufayl, Ibn 'Arabi, etc.
- 4822 FULTON, A. S. "A rare Arabic manuscript." *Brit. Museum Quart.* 16 (Ja '51) 14. A ms. (incomplete) of the very rare commentary of Abū Zakariyā al-Tibrizī (11th cent.) on the poetical works of al-Mutanabbī.
- 4823 FULTON, A. S., and GRAY, BASIL. "Two Persian manuscripts." *Brit. Museum Quart.* 16 (Ja '51) 13. A divan of Ḥāfiẓ Sa'd, a poet apparently of the 13th cent., written in 1459 for the library of Shāh Būdāq Shaibānī, and a *Gulistān* by Sa'dī written in 1513 by Mun'im al-Dīn al-Awhādī, with 13 miniatures in early Ṣafavī style.
- 4824 HEFFENING, W. "Über buch- und druckwesen in der alten Türkei." *ZDMG* 100, no. 2 (1950) 592-9. A Prussian embassy report of 1819.
- 4825 LEVI DELLA VIDA, GIORGIO. "La dottrina e i dodici legati di Stomathalassa; uno scritto di ermetismo popolare in siriano e in arabo." *Atti della Accad. Naz. dei Lincei* 8, no. 3, 477-542.

- 4826 AL-MAQDISI, ANĪS. "Women and modern Arabic literature." (in Arabic) *Abḥāth* (Beirut) 4 (Mr '51) 19-34.
- 4827 SCHOONOVER, KERMIT. "A survey of the best modern books." *Muslim World* 42 (Ja '52) 48-55. The survey was based on a poll conducted among the leading writers, scholars, and political figures in Egypt. Some 40 titles are listed in order of frequency of mention. Ṭāhā Ḥusayn's *al-Ayyām* leads the selections, almost all of which are by Egyptian authors.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- 4828 TORRES BALBÁS, LEOPOLDO. "Bibliography of Spanish Muslim art, 1939-1946." *Ars Islamica* 15-16 (1951) 165-85. A critical survey dealing with architecture, architectural decoration, industrial and decorative arts, and the various forms of Mudéjar art. Illust.

BIOGRAPHY

- 4829 BASSET, A. "Adrien Barthélemy." *J. Asiatique* 239, no. 2 (1951) 239-41. The author of the dictionary of Syrian Arabic was a student of Islamic languages, Semitics, and Sanskrit who spent many years in the French foreign service.
- 4830 BLACHÈRE, R. "Jean Sauvaget, 1901-1950." *J. Asiatique* 239, no. 1 (1951) 1-4. A warm tribute by a colleague.
- 4831 CANARD, M. "La bibliothèque universitaire de St. Petersburg au début du XX^e siècle." *Rev. de la Méditerranée* (Paris-Algiers) 5 (S '51) 235-9. Translation of excerpts of Kratchkovsky's Memoirs.
- 4832 ETTINGHAUSEN, RICHARD. "Ernst Herzfeld, 1879-1948." *Ars Islamica* 15-16 (1951) 261-6. Obituary of the great archaeologist with an outline of his career and of his publications in the field of Sasanian and Islamic art. Appended is a bibliography supplementing that of G. C. Miles, published in *Ars Islamica* 7 (1940).
- 4833 ETTINGHAUSEN, RICHARD, and ROWLAND, BENJAMIN, JR. "In memoriam: Ananda Kentish Coomaraswamy (1877-1947)." *Ars Islamica* 15-16 (1951) 259. The first part deals with the Indian scholar's work on Persian and Indian painting; the second part describes in detail his work on Indian art and his philosophical approach.
- 4834 STERN, S. M. "Life of Shmuel Ha-Nagid." (in Hebrew) *Zion* (Jerusalem) 15 (1950) 135-45. New materials for the biography of the 11th cent. statesman of Granada.
- 4835 WEIBEL, ADÈLE COULIN. "Mehmet Aga-Oglu." *Ars Islamica* 15-16 (1951) 267-8.

Obituary of the specialist in Muslim art, followed by a "selective bibliography."

BOOK REVIEWS

- 4836 *The Middle East*. Hamizrah Hehadash 3 (Autumn '51) 94-5. (S. Yaari).
- 4837 *Rahnumā-i Qumm*. Ars Islamica 15-6 (1951) 216-7. (Donald N. Wilber).
- 4838 'ALĪ, JAWĀD. *Ta'rikh al-'Arab qabl al-Islām*. Risālah (Cairo) 19 (Ag 3 '51) 1016-7. (H. al-Jāsir).
- 4839 ANAWATI, G. C. *Essai de bibliographie Avicennienne*. J. Asiatique 239 (1951) 243-4. (G. Vajda).
- 4840 ĀYATĪ, 'ABD AL-HUSAIN, *Tārikh-i Yazd*. Ars Islamica. 15-16 (1951) 215-6. (Donald N. Wilber).
- 4841 BALJON, J. M. S. *The reforms and religious ideas of Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khān*. Bull. Schools of Orient. and Afr. Stud. 13 (1951) 1065-6. (A. Guillaume).
- 4842 BARRETT, DOUGLAS. *Islamic metalwork in the British Museum*. Oriental Art 3 (1951) 128. (E. Wellesz); Ars Islamica 15-16 (1951) 255-7. (R. Ettinghausen).
- 4843 BELOT, RAYMOND DE. *The struggle for the Mediterranean, 1939-1945*. Middle East J. 6 (Winter '52) 95-6. (Gilbert Cant). Excellent on naval strategy; less reliable on political factors.
- 4844 BIRGE, J. K. *A guide to Turkish area study*. Bull. Schools of Orient. and Afr. Stud. 13 (1951) 1062-3. (V. J. Parry). "It is impossible to pass over the grave omissions . . . and errors . . . which tend to obscure how much effort and care Dr. Birge has given to this very difficult task."
- 4845 BULLARD, SIR READER. *Britain and the Middle East from earliest times to 1950*. Muslim World 42 (Ja '52) 73-4. (Eric F. F. Bishop).
- 4846 BUSHAKRA, MARY. *I married an Arab*. Middle East J. 6 (Winter '52) 98. (Richard and Jeanne Nolte). Contains many illuminating sidelights on life among the Druzes of Lebanon.
- 4847 CAILLÉ, JACQUES. *La ville de Rabat*. Muslim World. 42 (Ja '52) 69-70 (Ruth J. Torrance).
- 4849 CERULLI, ENRICO. *Il 'libro della Scala'*. Speculum. 26 (Ap '51) 376-80 (A. R. Nykl).
- 4850 CHOURAGUI, ANDRÉ. *La condition juridique de l'Israélite marocain*. Middle East Aff. 2 (O '51) 333-4 (S. D. Goitein).
- 4851 COLOMBE, MARCEL. *L'évolution de l'Égypte*. Polit. Étrangère 16 (D '51) 413-5. (P. Rondot).
- 4852 DENNETT D. C. *Conversion and the poll tax in early Islam*. ZDMG 100 (1950) 637-40. (B. Spuler).
- 4853 EAST, W. GORDON and SPATE, O. K., eds. *The changing map of Asia—a political geography*. Hamizrah Hehadash. 3 (Autumn '51) 96-7 (M. Assaf).
- 4854 EKREM, SELMA. *Turkey: old and new*. Hamizrah Hehadash. 3 (Autumn '51) 95-6 (S. Shalmon). "The book describes Turkey as Americans would like to see it."
- 4855 ELGOOD, CYRIL. *A medical history of Persia and the eastern caliphate*. Middle East J. 6 (Winter '52) 101-2. (Allen O. Whipple). Revealing information on the relatively high standards of surgery and public health prior to the Qajar dynasty; information as well on more recent medical trends and legislation.
- 4856 ELISSÉEFF, N. *Thèmes et motifs des Mille et une Nuits: Essai de classification*. Bull. Schools. Orient & Afr. Stud. 13. 4 (1951) 1063. (A. Guillaume). "A great deal of extremely useful information in less than 100 pages."
- 4857 FARRUKH, 'UMAR. *Kalimah fi Ahmad Shawqī (2nd ed., 1950)*. Hamizrah Hehadash. 3 (Autumn '51) 101. (J. M. Landau).
- 4858 FISHER, W. B. *The Middle East*. Muslim World 42 (Ja '52) 71-3. (Thomas C. Barger). "The numerous errors and the plethora of unsupported deductions are in total the book's most serious defect."
- 4859 FRENCH, R. M. *The Eastern Orthodox Church*. Muslim World 42 (Ja '52) 57. (Arthur Jeffrey). The Eastern Churches, particularly the Greek Orthodox, have had a long and intimate connection with Islam in the Near East.
- 4860 FISHEL, WALTER J., ed. *Semitic and oriental studies presented to William Popper*. Hamizrah Hehadash. 3 (Autumn '51) 100. (S. D. Goitein).
- 4861 FRYE, RICHARD N., ed. *The Near East and the great powers*. Middle East J. 6 (Winter '52) 94-5. (Hans Kohn). These papers from the Harvard Conference in 1950 are spotty but contain valuable material, especially that by Majid Kjadduri on "The scheme of Fertile Crescent unity."
- 4862 GAIL, MARZIEH. *Persia and the Victorians*. Middle East J. 6 (Winter '52) 102-3. (T. Cuyler Young). Chapters, among others, on "Hippopotamus" Murray, Hajji Baba of Isphahan, and "Omar" Fitzgerald, some of which are written with "quixotic charm and penetrating insight."
- 4863 GALATOLI, ANTHONY M. *Egypt in Mid-passage*. Middle East J. 6 (Winter '52) 96-8. (Grant V. McClanahan). Although published in 1950, this book offers much to explain the present crisis in Anglo-Egyptian relations. Presents the point of

- view of the "broadminded, sympathetic young foreign resident."
- 4864 GOMÉZ-MORENO, MANUEL. *El parteón real de las hueglas de Burgos*. *Ars Islamica* 15-16 (1951) 227-230. (Jean Lopardo).
- 4865 GRANQVIST, HILMA. *Birth and childhood among the Arabs; Child problems among the Arabs*. *Amer. Sociological Rev.* 16 (D '51) 894. (Bernard J. Siegel). These companion volumes are studies of a Muhammadan village in Palestine from a socio-psychological point of view.
- 4866 GRAVES, PHILIP P., ed. *Memoirs [of King Abdullah]*. *Muslim World* 42 (Ja '52) 76-7. (Ernest Dawn). Cites instances of discrepancies between the Arabic original and G. Khuri's translation, which may be of interest to the general reader . . . but the serious student will have to refer to the original.
- 4867 GUERNIER, EUGÈNE. *La Berberie, l'Islam et la France*. *Middle East J.* 6. (Winter '52). 105-6. (R. Albrecht-Carrié). The French mistake was in considering the country Arab. The French conquest thus resulted in the final and greatest triumph of Arab over Berber; the opposite policy of restoring the Berber to the consciousness of his own distinct individuality should have been adopted."
- 4868 GUEST, GRACE DUNHAM. *Shiraz painting in the sixteenth century*. *Oriental Art.* 3, no. 1 (1950). 39-40. (E. Willesz).
- 4869 HADDAD, GEORGE. *Fifty years of modern Syria and Lebanon*. *Muslim World.* 42 (Ja '52) 76. (Majid Khadduri). Dr. Haddad's book is primarily written for the Western reader "who has no background of Near Eastern affairs . . . the work suffers from . . . ambiguity, some rash and not quite accurate statements . . . misprints."
- 4870 HAZARD, H. W. and COOK, H. L. *Atlas of Islamic history*. *Muslim World.* 42 (Ja '52) 105. (H. D. Glesson).
- 4871 HENNINGER, JOSEF. *Spuren Christlicher Glaubenswahrheiten im Koran*. *Muslim World.* 42. (Ja '52). 57-8. Arthur Jeffery.
- 4872 HERZFELD, ERNST. *Geschichte der Stadt Samarra*. *Ars Islamica.* 15-16 (1951). 225-7. (George C. Miles).
- 4873 HEYD, U. *Foundations of Turkish nationalism*. *Jewish Quart. Rev.* (Philadelphia) 42. (Ja '52). 331. (M. P.)
- 4874 HITTI, P. K. *History of Syria*. *Middle East Aff.* 2 (1951) 370-1. (E. A. Speiser). "This work may be more comprehensive . . . than any other of its kind, yet for reliable analyses and syntheses of the subjects involved one must still look elsewhere . . . the book has faulty focus . . . dependent judgments . . . is full of . . . erroneous statements."
- 4875 HOURANI, GEORGE FADLO. *Arab seafaring*. *Middle East J.* 6 (Winter '52) 99-100. (Richard LeBaron Bowen, Jr.). An historical account with much useful information although one may query some of his conclusions; less reliable on technical details of ship construction.
- 4876 JARRING, G. *Materials to the knowledge of Eastern Turki*. *Izvest. Akad. Nauk. Otdel lit. i yaz.* 10 (Ap '51) 205-7. (S. E. Malov).
- 4877 KHADDURI, MAJID. *Independent Iraq*. *Petroleum Times.* 55 (D 14 '51) 1154. "Mr. Khadduri's pages record, with detail and authority, a round half-dozen military coups d'état in as many years, the deposition and reinstatement of a ruler, a series of political assassinations, a governmental system complacently democratic in form while narrowly and unreliably oligarchic in fact."
- 4878 KISSELEV, S. V. *Histoire ancienne de la Sibirie du sud*. *Artibus Asiae* 14 (1951) 169-89. (R. Chirshman). Important for the early history of Turki tribes.
- 4879 KITZINGER, ERNST. *The horse and lion tapestry at Dumbarton Oaks*. *Ars Islamica.* 15-16 (1951) 217-23. (Donald N. Wilber). Survey of the problems with some constructive suggestions. The article by Kitzinger appeared in *Dumbarton Oaks*, no. 3 (Cambridge, 1946) with 3 text illustrations.
- 4880 KRATCHKOWSKAYA, V. A. *The tiles of the mausoleum from the Khānakāh Pīr Husain*. *Ars Islamica* 15-16 (1951) 251-55. (Salomea Fajans).
- 4881 LANGLEY, MICHAEL. *No woman's country: travels in Anglo-Egyptian Sudan*. *Muslim World.* 42 (Ja '52). 70-1. (H. E. Kelsey).
- 4882 LE TOURNEAU, R. *Fès avant le protectorat*. *Rev. des Études Juives* 10 (110) (1949-50) 131-2. (G. Vagda).
- 4883 LØKKEGAARD, FREDE. *Islamic taxation in the classic period*. *ZDMG* 100 (1950) 665-7. (B. Spuler).
- 4884 ORGA, IRFAN. *Portrait of a Turkish family*. *Muslim World* 42 (Ja '52) 78-9. (Ruby P. Birge).
- 4885 PAYNE, ROBERT. *Journey to Persia*. *Middle East J.* 6 (Winter '52) 100-1. (Donald N. Wilber). The author appears to be widely read in the early travelers to Iran, but his own account is replete with inaccuracies.
- 4886 PIJOÁN, JOSÉ. *Arte Islamico (Summa artis historia general del arte 12)*. *Ars Islamica* 15-16 (1951) 214-5. (E. Kühnel).
- 4887 RABINOWITZ, LOUIS. *The Jewish merchants called Radanites*. *Jewish Quart.*

- Rev. 42 (Ja '52) 321-5. (Walter J. Fischel).
- 4888 RAY, SUKUMAR. *Humāyūn in Persia*. Bull. Schools of Orient. & Afr. Stud. 13 (1951) 1065. (C. Collin Davies).
- 4889 REIFENBERG, ABRAHAM. *The struggle between the sown and the desert*. (in Hebrew) Middle East. Aff. 2 (N '51) 371-2. (A. N. Poliak). "The Desert is essentially the Syrian Desert, always ready to invade the contiguous agricultural territories whenever there is no strong and enlightened government to assist the cultivator against natural calamities and nomads."
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- 4895 THOMAS, LEWIS V., and FRYE, RICHARD N. *The United States and Turkey and Iran*. Middle East J. 6 (Winter '52) 93-4. (J. K. Birge). Extremely timely analyses; Thomas, in particular, makes an important point in emphasizing "the massive residue of true Ottoman mentality and practice" which exists side by side with Turkey's modern Westernization and must be realized by any foreigner working in Turkey today.
- 4896 TOLSTOV, S. P. *Drevnyi Khorezm: opyt istoriko-arkheologicheskogo issledovaniia*. Far East. Quart. 10 (1951) 410-1. (Rudolf Loewenthal). "The purpose of this report on the first Russian expedition to Khoresmia (in the Kara-Kalpak ASSR) is to furnish material about the origin and development of a feudal, slave owning society in Central Asia; to document the cultural and political relations of Khoresmia with other countries and civilisations and to provide an integrated history of Khoresmia."
- 4897 TOLSTOV, S. P. *Po sledam drevnekhoze zmiiskoi tsivilizatsii*. Far East. Quart. 10 (Ag '51), 410-1. (Rudolf Loewenthal). Covers the activities of the Khoresmian expedition (in the region of the Kara-Kalpak ASSR) for the decade 1937-1947, including the latest results of field work.
- 4898 TRITTON, A. S. *Islam: beliefs and practices*. Middle East J. 6 (Winter '52) 106-7. (William Thomson). Because of the book's brevity, the author has been forced to present only facts and events to the neglect of their historical and logical connection. Even in what it does present the book "fails occasionally of any apparent scheme of coherent presentation."
- 4899 VON GRUNEBaum, G. E. *A tenth-century document of Arabic literary theory and criticism*. Muslim World 42 (Ja '52) 58-61. (Franz Rosenthal). Comments on and corrects the translation of al-Bāqillānī's work on the "inimitabilities" of the Koran.
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- 4902 ZAKY, MOHAMMED HASSAN. *Al-funūn al-irāniya fil-'asr al-Islāmi*. Ars Islamica 15-16 (1951) 213-4. (E. Kühnel).

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- 4903 "Egypt's defense policy." *Economist* (Ja '52) 4.
- 4904 HART, LIDDELL B. H. "Can we defend the Middle East?" *Milit. Rev.* 31 (D '51) 30-6. The noted military analyst examines the strategic problems of the area and stresses the importance of holding Turkey and the coastal fringes in order to keep an invader contained "in a desert sack."

ABBREVIATIONS

Acad., Academy
 Aff., Affairs
 Afr., African
 Amer., American
 Brit., British
 Bull., Bulletin
 Cent., Central
 Contemp., Contemporary
 D., Deutsch
 Dept., Department
 East., Eastern
 G., Gesellschaft
 Geog., Geographical
 Gt. Brit., Great Britain
 Hist., Historical
 Illust., Illustrated
 Inst., Institute
 Internat., International

J., Journal
 M., Morgenländischer
 Mag., Magazine
 Mod., Modern
 Mus., Museum
 Natl., National
 Numis., Numismatic
 Orient., Oriental
 Pal., Palestine
 Philol., Philological
 Polit., Political, Politique
 Quart., Quarterly
 Res., Research
 Rev., Review
 Soc., Society, Société
 Stud., Studies
 Trans., Transactions
 Z., Zeitschrift

Russian
 Akad., Akademii
 Fil., Filosofi
 Ist., Istorii
 Izvest., Izvestiya
 Lit., Literaturi
 Otdel., Otdeleniye
 Ser., Seriya
 Sov., Sovetskoye
 Yaz., Yazika

Turkish
 Coğ., Coğrafya
 Fak., Fakulte
 Üniv., Üniversite

Arabic

K., Kitāb
 Maj., Majallah, Majallat

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